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XTwo German Giants: 

FREDERIC THE GREAT 

AND BISMARCK. 



THE FOUNDER AND THE BUILDER OF 
GERMAN EMPIRE. 



JOHN LORD, B.D., LL.D., 

Author of " Beacon LU/hts of Histtjry,"' etc. 



TO WHICH ARE ADDED 

A CHARACTER SKETCH OF BISMARCK BY BAYARD TAYLOR 
AND BISMARCK'S GREAT SPEECH ON THE ENLARGE- 
MENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY IN 1888. 



Mftb XTwo portraits. 



NEW YORK : 
FORDS, HOWARD, & HULBERT. S'Z-^^^ 
1894. 




T 



r\ 






Copyright • 
By John Lord in 1885 and 1891 ; 
By J. B. Ford & Co. in 188? ; 
By Fords, Howard, & Hulbfrt in IS93 



PUBLISHERS' NOTE. 



The closing of the career of Germany's great Chan- 
cellor marks an epoch in European history. The con- 
solidation and extension to imperial proportions of the 
Prussian Power, founded by the warlike Frederic, has 
been completed by the colossal hand of Bismarck. It 
has been a wonderful drama, the life and soul of which 
are to be found in the personality, the force, genius, 
and heroism, of the chief actors. 

As a modern Plutarch, Dr. John Lord has been en- 
lightening a multitude of readers with spirited biogra- 
phies of the men and women who stand for great 
movements in the world's progress; and in the long 
line of his studies it were difficult to find more striking 
characters than these two giants, who founded and 
builded the German Empire. The lecture on Frederic's 
career (1712-1786) is here followed by the one on Bis- 
marck, whose story, however, is prefaced by the achieve- 
ments of Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst, practically 
filling in the time between the two. If in these lectures 
history seems to dominate biography, it will be re- 
membered that the men made the history, and it is a 



PUBLhSHERS' NOTE. 



[isirt of their lives. While placing a high estimate on 
the immense services of each to the State, Dr. Lord is 
open-eyed to the crime of the one and the arrogance of 
the other. He is especially amazed that Carlyle, with 
all his hatred of shams, should have tried to "cover 
up with sophistries " the crimes of Frederic j and with 
incisive pen he impartially notes the foibles and faults 
as well as the grand traits of the Iron Chancellor. 

By way of completing the conception of Bismarck, 
there has been added a character sketch of him, written 
by Bayard Taylor, shortly after returning from his post 
as United States Minister to Germany. This is valu- 
able for its discriminating analysis of Bismarck, both as 
politician and as statesman, Avhile enlivened by personal 
reminiscences and anecdotes illustrating the character- 
istics of the man. 

No discussion of Bismarck's life and policy would be 
fair without giving full weight to his convictions con- 
cerning the maintenance of the immense military or- 
ganization that Germany is carrying. In the lecture 
on Frederic, Dr. Lord rgprobates the ambition of Prus- 
sia for military aggrandizement, yet sees a possible 
justification of it in providing a barrier against the 
barbarous irruption of Kussia into Europe; while Bis- 
marck's realization of that and other dangers threatening 
Germany — situated in the midst of jealous rivals and 
making herself too strong to be successfully attacked — 
has compelled the author's qualified approbation. Dr. 
Lord makes direct reference, on this point, to the speech 
— or rather the familiar and witty talk, for Bismarck's 
eloquence was essentially practical and, like his conduct 



PUBLI8EERS' NOTE. 



of life, contemptuous of formality — delivered to the 
Reichstag in 1888, while the bill for larger armament 
and moneys to support it was under discussion. This 
speech has been also added, as essential to a just under- 
standing of Bismarck's policy. It is a resume of the 
relations of Germany to the rest of Europe, unmatched 
for graphic condensation, — as Bismarck himself calls 
it, " a forty years' tableau." 

Frederic and Bismarck, these two rugged chieftains, 
the real creators of the German Fatherland, are set 
forth in the stirring sentences of Dr. Lord and the 
critical narrative of Bayard Taylor in their own peculiar 
personalities. And it is believed that, without pretence 
of exhaustive, detailed history, this brief book will give 
"a just and lucid view of the parts they played in war, 
diplomacy, and statecraft, which have shaped the life of 
Germany and profoundly affected the course of conti- 
nental Europe for two centuries. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Frederic the Great 11 

By Dr. John Lord. 

Prince Bismarck . 49 

By Dr. John Ix)KD. 

Bismarck : A Character Sketch 115 

By Bayahd Taylor. 

Speec hbefore the Reichstag, 1888 131 

By the Chancellor, Prince Bismarck. 

APPENDIX. 
Text of the Atistro-Germajj Treaty, referred to in 

Bismarck's Speech, 171 

vii 



PORTRAITS. 



Prince Bismarck Froniispuce 

Half-tone Eugraviug after a Photograph from Life. 

Frederic II, King of Pkcssia H 

Engraved by St. Aubiu, after a Bust by Blaise for the 
Gallery of Napoleon when First Consul. 



FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 



FREDERIC THE GREAT. 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 

' I "HE history of Frederic the Great is simply that 
-*- of a man who committed an outrageous crime, 
the consequences of which pursued him in the maledic- 
tions and hostilities of Europe, and who fought bravely 
and heroically to rescue himself and country from the 
ruin which impended over him as a consequence of this 
crime. His heroism, his fertility of resources, his un- 
flagging energy, and his amazing genius in overcoming 
difficulties won for him the admiration of that class 
who idolize strength and success ; so that he stands out 
in history as a struggling gladiator who baffled all his 
foes, — not a dying gladiator on the arena of a pagan 
amphitheatre, but more like a Judas Maccabeus, when 
hunted by the Syrian hosts, rising victorious, and lay- 
ing the foundation of a powerful monarchy ; indeed, his 
fame spread, irrespective of his cause and character, 
from one end of Christendom to the other, — not such a 
fame a3 endeared Gust^vus Adolphus to the heart of 



12 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

nations for heroic efforts to save the Protestant religion, 
— but such a fame as the successful generals of ancient 
Eome won by adding territories to a warlike State, re- 
gardless of all the principles of right and wrong. Such 
a career is suggestive of grand moral lessons ; and it is 
to teach these lessons that I describe a character for 
whom I confess I feel but little sympathy, yet whom I 
am compelled to respect for his heroic qualities and 
great abilities. 

Frederic of Prussia was born in 1712, and had an 
unhappy childhood and youth from the caprices of a 
royal but disagreeable father, best known for his tall 
regiment of guards ; a severe, austere, prejudiced, for- 
mal, narrow, and hypochondriacal old Pharisee, whose 
sole redeeming excellence was an avowed behef in 
God Almighty and in the orthodox doctrines of the 
Protestant Church. 

In 1740, this rigid, exacting, unsympathetic king 
died; and his son Frederic, who had been subjected 
to the severest discipline, restraints, annoyances, and 
humiliations, ascended the throne, and became the 
third King of Prussia, at the age of twenty-eight. His 
kingdom was a small one, being then about one quarter 
of its present size. 

And here we pause for a moment to give a glance at 
the a;ge in which he lived, — an age of great reactions, 
when the stirring themes and issues of the seventeenth 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 13 

century were substituted for mockeries, levities, and 
infidelities; when no fierce protests were made except 
those of Voltaire against the Jesuits; when an aban- 
doned woman ruled France, as the mistress of an 
enervated monarch ; when Spain and Italy were sunk 
in lethargic forgetfulness, Austria was priest-ridden, 
and England was governed by a ring of selfish landed 
proprietors ; when there was no marked enterprise but 
the slave-trade ; when no department of literature or 
science was adorned by original genius; and when 
England had no broader statesman than Walpole, no 
abler churchman than Warburton, no greater poet than 
Pope. There was a general indifference to lofty specu- 
lation. A materialistic philosophy was in fashion, — 
not openly atheistic, but arrogant and pretentious, whose 
only power was in sarcasm and mockery, like the satires 
of Lucian, extinguishmg faith, godless and yet boastful, 
— an Epicureanism such as Socrates attacked and Paul 
rebuked. It found its greatest exponent in Voltaire, 
the oracle and idol of intellectual Europe. In short, 
it was an age when general cynicism and reckless 
abandonment to pleasure marked the upper-classes ; an 
age which produced Chesterfield, as godless a man as 
Voltaire himself. 

In this period of religious infidelity, moral torpor, 
fashionable mediocrity, unthinking pleasure-seeking, 
and royal orgies; when the people were spurned, in- 



14 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

suited and burdened, — Frederic ascends an absolute 
throne. He is a young and fashionable philosopher. 
He professes to believe in nothing that ages of inquiry 
and study are supposed to have settled; he even 
ridicules the religious principles of his father. He ar- 
dently' adopts everything which claims to be a novelty, 
but is not learned enough to know that what he sup- 
poses to be new has been exploded over and over 
again. He is liberal and tolerant, but does not see the 
logical sequence of the very opinions he indorses. He 
is also what is called an accomplished man, since he 
can play on an instrument, and amuse a dinner-party 
by jokes and stories. He builds a magnificent theatre, 
and collects statues, pictures, snuff-boxes, and old china. 
He welcomes to his court, not stern thinkers, but sneer- 
ing and amusing philosophers. He employs in his 
service both Catholics and Protestants alike, since he 
holds in contempt the religion of both. He is free from 
animosities and friendships, and neither punishes those 
who are his enemies nor rewards those who are his 
friends. He apes reform, but shackles the press ; he 
appoints able men in his service, but cnly those who 
will be his unscrupulous tools. He has a fine physique, 
and therefore is unceasingly active. He flies from one 
part of his kingdom to another, not to examine morals 
or education or the state of the people, but to inspect 
tortresses and to collect camps. 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 15 

To such a man the development of the resources of his 
kmgdom, the reform of abuses, and educational pro- 
jects are of secondary importance ; he gives his primary- 
attention to raising and equipping armies, having in view 
the extension of his kingdom by aggressive and unjus- 
tifiable wars. He cares little for domestic joys or the 
society of women, and is incapable of sincere friendship. 
He has no true admiration for intellectual excellence, 
although he patronizes literary lions. He is incapa- 
ble of any sacrifice except for his troops, who worship 
him, since their interests are identical with his own. 
In the camp or in the field he spends his time, amusing 
himself occasionally with the society of philosophers as 
cynical as himself. He has dreams and visions of mili- 
tary glory, which to him is the highest and greatest on 
this earth, Charles XII. being his model of a hero. 

With such views he enters upon a memorable career. 
His first important public act as king is the seizure of 
part of the territory of the Bishop of Li^e, which he 
claims as belonging to Prussia. The old bishop is in- 
dignant and amazed, but is obliged to submit to a 
robbery which disgusts Christendom, but is not of 
sufficient consequence to set it in a blaze. 

The next thing he does, of historical importance, is 
to seize Silesia, a province which belongs to Austria, 
and contains about twenty thousand square miles,- — a 
fertile and beautiful province, nearly as large as his 



16 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 



own kingdom ; it is the highest table-land of Germany, 
girt around with mountains, hard to attack and easy to 
defend. So rapid and secret are his movements, that 
this unsuspecting and undefended country is overrun 
by his veteran soldiers as easily as Louis XIV. over- 
ran Flanders and Holland, and with no better excuse 
than the French king had. This outrage was an open 
insult to Europe, as well as a great wrong to Maria 
Theresa, — supposed by him to be a feeble woman who 
could not resent the injury. But in this woman he 
found the great enemy of his life, — a lioness deprived 
of her whelps, whose wailing was so piteous and so 
savage that she aroused Europe from lethargy, and 
made coalitions which shook it to its centre. At 
first she simply rallied her own troops, and fought 
single-handed to recover her lost and most valued 
province. But Frederic, with marvellous celerity and 
ability, got possession of the Silesian fortresses; the 
bloody battle of Mollwitz (1741) secured his prey, and 
he returned in triumph to his capital, to abide the 
issue of events. 

It is not easy to determine whether this atrocious 
crime, which astonished Europe, was the result of his 
early passion for military glory, or the inauguration of 
a policy of aggression and aggrandizement. But it was 
the signal of an explosion of European politics which 
ended in one of the most bloody wars of modem 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 



times. " It was," says Carlyle, " the little stone bro- 
ken loose from the mountain, hitting others, big and 
little, which again hit others with their leaping and 
rolling, till the whole mountain-side was in motion 
under law of gravity." 

Maria Theresa appeals to her Hungarian nobles, with 
her infant in her arms, at a diet of the nation, and 
sends her envoys to every friendly court. She offers 
her unscrupulous enemy the Duchy of Limberg and 
two hundred thousand pounds to relinquish his grasp 
on Silesia. It is like the offer of Darius to Alex- 
ander, and is spurned by the Prussian robber. It is 
not Limberg he wants, nor money, but Silesia, which 
he resolves to keep because he wants it, and at any 
hazard, even were he to jeopardize his own hereditary 
dominions. The peace of Breslau gives him a tempo- 
rary leisure, and he takes the waters of Aachen, and 
discusses philosophy. He is uneasy, but jubilant, for 
he has nearly doubled the territory and population of 
Prussia. His subjects proclaim him a hero, with im- 
mense paeans. Doubtless, too, he now desires peace, — 
just as Louis XIV. did after he had conquered Holland, 
and as Napoleon did when he had seated his brothers 
on the old thrones of Europe. 

But there can be no lasting peace after such out- 
rageous wickedness. The angered kings and princes 
of Europe are to become the instruments of eternal 



18 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

justice. They listen to the eloquent cries of the 
Austrian Empress, and prepare for war, to punish the 
audacious robber who disturbs the peace of the world 
and insults all other nationalities. But they are not 
yet ready for effective war; the storm does not at 
once break out. 

The Austiians however will not wait, and the second 
S^"' , ,var ensues, in which Saxony joins Austria. 
Again is Frederic successful, over the combined forces 
of these two powers, and he retains his stolen province. 
He is now regarded as a world-hero, for he has fought 
bravely against vastly superior forces, and is received 
in Berlin with unbounded enthusiasm. He renews his 
studies in philosophy, courts literary celebrities, re- 
organizes his army, and collects forces for a renewed 
encounter, which he foresees. 

He has ten years of repose and preparation, during 
which he is lauded and flattered, yet retaining sim- 
plicity of habits, sleeping but five hours a day, finding 
time for state dinners, flute-playing, and operas, of all 
which he is fond ; for he was doubtless a man of cul- 
ture, social, well read if not profound, witty, inquiring, 
and without any striking defects save tyranny, am- 
bition, parsimony, dissimulation, and lying. 

It was during those ten years of rest and military 
preparation that Voltaire made his memorable visit — 
his third and last — to Pottsdam and Berlin, thirty-two 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 19 

months of alternate triumph and humiliation. No 
literary man ever had so successful and brilliant a 
career as this fortunate and lauded Frenchman, — the 
oracle of all salons, the arbiter of literary fashions, a 
dictator in the realm of letters, with amazing fecund- 
ity of genius directed into all fields of labor; poet, 
historian, dramatist, and philosopher; writing books 
enough to load a cart, and all of them admired and 
extolled, all of them scattered over Europe, read by all 
nations; a marvellous worker, of unbounded wit and 
unexampled popularity, whose greatest literary merit 
was in the transcendent excellence of his style, for 
which chiefly he is immortal ; a great artist, rather than 
an original and profound genius whose ideas form the 
basis of civilizations. The King of Prussia formed an 
ardent friendship for this king of letters, based on 
admiration rather than respect ; invited him to his 
court, extolled and honored him, and lavished on him 
all that he could bestow, outside of political distinc- 
tion. But no worldly friendship could stand such a 
test as both were subjected to, since they at last com- 
prehended each other's character and designs. Voltaire 
perceived the tyranny, the ambition, the heartlessness, 
the egotism, and the exactions of his royal patron, and 
despised him while he flattered him ; and Frederic on his 
part saw the hoUowness, the meanness, the suspicion, 
the irritability, the pride, the insincerity, the tricks^ the 



20 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

ingratitude, the baseness, the lies of his distinguished 
guest, — and their friendship ended in utter vanity. 
What friendship can last without mutual respect ? 
The friendship of Frederic and Voltaire was hopelessly 
broken, in spite of the remembrance of mutual admira- 
tion and happy hours. It was patched up and mended 
like a broken vase, but it could not be restored. How 
sad, how mournful, how humiliating is a broken friend- 
ship or an alienated love ! It is the falling away of the 
foundations of the soul, the disappearance forever of 
what is most to be prized on earth, — its celestial cer- 
titudes. A beloved friend may die, but we are consoled 
in view of the fact that the friendship may be contmued 
in heaven : the friend is not lost to us. But when a 
friendship or a love is broken, there is no continuance 
of it through eternity. It is the gloomiest thing to 
think of in this whole world. 

But Frederic was too busy and pre-occupied a man 
to mourn long for a departed joy. He was absorbed in 
preparations for war. The sword of Damocles was 
suspended over his head, and he knew it better than 
any other man in Europe ; he knew it from his spies 
and emissaries. Though he had enjoyed ten years' 
peace, he knew that peace was only a truce ; that the 
nations were arming in behalf of the injured empress ; 
that so great a crime as the seizure of Silesia must be 
visited with a penalty; that there was no escape for 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 21 

him except in a tremendous life-and-death struggle, 
whicli was to be the trial of his life ; that defeat was 
more than probable, since the forces in preparation 
against him were overwhelming. The curses of the 
civilized world still pursued him, and in his retreat 
at Sans Souci he had no rest; and hence he became 
irritable and suspicious. The clouds of the political 
atmosphere were filled with thunderbolts, ready to 
fall upon him and crush him at any moment ; indeed, 
nothing could arrest the long-gathering storm. 

It broke out with unprecedented fury in the spring 
of 1756. Austria, Eussia, Sweden, Saxony, and France 
were combined to ruin him, — the most powerful coali- 
tion of the European powers seen since the Thirty 
Years' War. His only ally was England, — an ally 
not so much to succor him as to humble France, and 
hence her aid was timid and incompetent. 

Thus began the famous Seven Years' War, during 
which France lost her colonial possessions, and was 
signally humiliated at home, — a war which developed 
the genius of the elder Pitt, and placed England in the 
proud position of mistress of the ocean ; a war marked 
by the largest array of forces which Europe had seen 
since the times of Charles V., in which six hundred 
thousand men were marshalled under different leaders 
and nations, to crush a man who had insulted Europe 
and defied the law of nations and the laws of God. The 



FREDERIC THE GREAT. 



coalition represented one hundred millions of people 
with inexhaustible resources. 

Now, it was the memorable resistance of Frederic II. 
to this vast array of forces, and his successful retention 
of the province he had seized, which gave him his chief 
claim as a hero ; and it was his patience, his fortitude, 
his energy, his fertility of resources, and the enthusiasm 
with which he inspired his troops even after the most 
discouraging and demoralizing defeats, that won for him 
that universal admiration as a man which he lived to 
secure in spite of all his defects and crimes. We ad- 
mire the resources and dexterity of an outlawed bandit, 
but we should remember he is a bandit still ; and we 
confound all the laws which hold society together, 
when we cover up the iniquity of a great crime by 
the successes which have apparently baffled justice. 
Frederic II., by stealing Silesia, and thus provoking a 
great war of untold and indescribable miseries, is en- 
titled to anything but admiration, whatever may have 
been his military genius ; and I am amazed that so 
great a man as Carlyle, with all his hatred of shams, 
and his clear perceptions of justice and truth, should 
have whitewashed such a robber. I cannot conceive 
how the severest critic of the age should have spent 
the best years of his life in apologies for so bad a man, 
if his own philosophy had not become radically unsound, 
based on the abominable doctrine that the end justifies 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 33 

the means, and that an outward success is the test of 
right. Far different was Carlyle's treatment of Crom- 
well. Frederic had no such cause as Cromwell ; it was 
simply his own or his country's aggrandizement by any 
means, or by any sword he could lay hold of. The chief 
merit of Carlyle's history is his impartiality and accuracy 
in describing the details of the contest : the cause of 
the contest he does not sufficiently reprobate; and all 
his sympathies seem to be with the unscrupulous robber 
who fights heroically, rather than with indignant Europe 
outraged by his crimes. But we cannot separate crime 
from its consequences ; and all the reverses, the sorrows, 
the perils, the hardships, the humiliations, the immense 
losses, the dreadful calamities through which Prussia 
had to pass, which wrung even the heart of Frederic 
with anguish, were only a merited retribution. The 
Seven Years' War was a king-hunt, in which all the 
forces of the surrounding monarchies gathered around 
the doomed man, making his circle smaller and smaller, 
and which would certainly have ended in his utter 
ruin, had he not been rescued by events as unexpected 
as they were unparalleled. Had some great and pow- 
erful foe been converted suddenly into a friend at a 
critical moment, Napoleon, another unscrupulous rob- 
ber, might not have been defea,ted at Waterloo, or died 
on a rock in the ocean. But Providence, it would seem, 
who rules the fate of war, had some inscrutable reason 



24 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

for the rescue of Prussia under Frederic, and the hu- 
miliation of France under Napoleon. 

The brunt of the war fell of course upon Austria, 
so that, as the two nations were equally German, it 
had many of the melancholy aspects of a civil war. 
But Austria was Catholic and Prussia was Protestant ; 
and had Austria succeeded, Germany possibly to-day 
would have been united under an irresistible Catholic 
imperialism, and there would have been no German 
empire whose capital is Berlin. The Austrians, in 
this contest, fought bravely and ably, under Prince 
Carl and Marshal Daun, who were no mean competi- 
tors with the King of Prussia for military laurels. 
But the Austrians fought on the offensive, and the 
Prussians on the defensive. The former were obliged 
to manoeuvre on the circumference, the latter in the 
centre of the circle. The Austrians, in order to recover 
Silesia, were compelled to cross high mountains whose 
passes were guarded by Prussian soldiers. The war be- 
gan in offensive operations, and ended in defensive. 

The most terrible enemy that Frederic had, next to 
Austria, was Eussia, ruled then by Elizabeth, who had 
the deepest sympathy with Maria Theresa ; but when 
she died, affairs took a new turn. Frederic was then 
on the very verge of ruin, — was, as they say, about to 
be " bagged," — when the new Emperor of Eussia con- 
ceived a great personal admiration for his genius and 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 25 

heroism ; the Eussian enmity was converted to friend- 
ship, and the Czar became an ally instead of a foe. 

The aid which the Saxons gave to Maria Theresa 
availed but little. The population, chiefly and tradi- 
tionally Protestant, probably sympathized with Prus- 
sia more than with Austria, although the King himself 
was Cathohc, — that inglorious monarch who resem- 
bled in his gallantries Louis XV., and in his dile- 
tante tastes Leo X. He is chiefly known for the 
number of his concubines and his Dresden gallery of 
pictures. 

The aid which the French gave was really impos- 
ing, so far as numbers make efficient armies. But the 
French were not the warlike people in the reign of 
Louis XV. that they were under Henry IV., or Napo- 
leon Bonaparte. They fought, without the stimulus of 
national enthusiasm, without a cause, as part of a great 
machine. They never have been successful in war 
without the inspiration of a beloved cause. This war 
had no especial attraction or motive for them. What 
was it to Frenchmen, so absorbed with themselves, 
whether a Hohenzollern or a Hapsburg reigned in 
Germany? Hence, the great armies which the govern- 
ment of France sent to the aid of Maria Theresa were 
without spirit, and were not even marshalled by able 
generals. In fact, the French seemed more intent on 
cripplmg England than in crushing Frederic. The war 



26 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

had immense complications. Though France and Eng- 
land were drawn into it, yet both France and England 
fought more against each other than for the parties 
who had summoned them to their rescue. 

England was Frederic's ally, but her aid was not 
great directly. She did not furnish him with many 
troops ; she sent subsidies mstead, which enabled him 
to continue the contest. But these were not as great 
as he expected, or had reason to expect. With all the 
money he received from Walpole or Pitt he was re- 
duced to the most desperate straits. 

One thing was remarkable in that long war of seven 
years, which strained every nerve and taxed every 
energy of Prussia: it was carried on by Frederic in 
hard cash. He did not run in debt; he always had 
enough on hand in coin to pay for all expenses. But 
then his subjects were most severely taxed, and the 
soldiers were poorly paid. If the same economy he 
used in that war of seven years had been exercised by 
our Government in its late war, we should not have 
had any national debt at all at the close of the war, 
although we probably should have suspended specie 
payments. 

It would not be easy or interesting to attempt to 
compress the details of a long war of seven years in 
a single lecture. The records of war have great uni- 
formity, — devastation, taxes, suffering, loss of life and 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 27 

of property (except by the speculators and government 
agents), the flight of literature, general demoralization, 
the lowering of the tone of moral feeling, the ascend- 
ency of unscrupulous men, the exaltation of military 
talents, general grief at the loss of friends, fiendish 
exultation over victories alternated with depressing 
despondency in view of defeats, the impoverishment 
of a nation on the whole, and the sickening conviction, 
which fastens on the mind after the first excitement 
is over, of a great waste of life and property for which 
there is no return, and which sometimes a whole gener- 
ation cannot restore. Nothing is so dearly purchased 
as the laurels of the battle-field; nothing is so great 
a delusion and folly as military glory to the eye of a 
Christian or philosopher. It is purchased by the tears 
and blood of millions, and is rebuked by all that is 
grand in human progress. Only degraded and demoral- 
ized peoples can ever rejoice in war; and when it is 
not undertaken for a great necessity, it fills the world 
with bitter imprecations. It is cruel and hard and 
unjust in its nature, and utterly antagonistic to civil- 
ization. Its greater evils are indeed ovprruled ; Satan 
is ever rebuked and baffled by a benevolent Provi- 
dence. But war is always a curse and a calamity in its 
immediate results, — and in its ultimate results also, 
unless waged in defence of some immortal cause. 
It must be confessed, war is terribly exciting. The 

VOL. TV. — 12. 



FREDERIC THE GREAT. 



eyes of the civilized world were concentrated on Frede- 
ric II. during this memorable period ; and most people 
anticipated his overthrow. They read everywhere of his 
marchings and counter-marchings,, his sieges and bat- 
tles, his hair-breadth escapes, and his renewed exertions, 
from the occupation of Saxony to the battle of Torgau. 
In this war he was sometimes beaten, as at Kolin ; but 
he gained three memorable victories, — one over the 
French, at Eossbach ; the second, over the Austrians, 
at Luthen; and the third, over the Eussians, at Zorn- 
dorf, the most bloody of all his battles. And he gained 
these victories by outflanking, his attack being the form 
of a wedge, — learned by the example of Epaminondas, 
— a device which led to new tactics, and proclaimed 
Frederic a master of the art of war. But in these 
battles he simply showed himself to be a great general. 
It was not until his reverses came that he showed 
himself a great man, or earned the sympathy which 
Europe felt for a humiliated monarch, putting forth 
herculean energies to save his crown and kingdom. 
His easy and great victories in the first year of the war 
simply saved him from annihilation ; they were not 
great enough to secure peace. Although thus far he 
was a conqueror, he had no peace, no rest, and but 
little hope. His enemies were so numerous and power- 
ful that they could send large reinforcements : he could 
draw but few. In time it was apparent that he would 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 29 

be destroyed, whatever his skill and bravery. Had not 
the Empress Elizabeth died, he would have been con- 
quered and prostrated. After his defeat at Hochkirch, 
he was obliged to dispute his ground inch by inch, 
compelled to hide his grief from his soldiers, financially 
straitened and utterly forlorn; but for a timely subsidy 
from England he would have been desperate. The fatal 
battle of Kunnersdorf, in his fourth campaign, when 
he lost twenty thousand men, almost drove him to de- 
spair ; and evil fortune continued to pursue him in his 
fifth campaign, in which he lost some of his strongest 
fortresses, and Silesia was opened to his enemies. At 
one time he had only six days' provisions : the world 
marvelled how he held out. Then England deserted 
him. He made incredible exertions to avert his doom : 
everlasting marches, incessant perils; no comforts or 
luxuries as a king, only sorrows, privations, sufferings ; 
enduring more labors than his soldiers; with restless 
anxieties and blasted hopes. In his despair and hu- 
miliation it is said he recognized God Almighty. In 
his chastisements and misfortunes, — apparently on the 
very brink of destruction, and with the piercing cries 
of misery which reached his ears from every corner of 
his dominions, — he must, at least, have recognized a 
Eetribution. Still his indomitable will remained. His 
pride and his self-reliance never deserted him ; he would 
have died rather than have yielded up Silesia until 



30 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

wrested from him. At last the battle of Torgau, fought 
in the night, and the death of the Empress of Eussia, 
removed the overhanging clouds, and he was enabled 
to contend with Austria unassisted by France and Eus- 
sia. But if Maria Theresa could not recover Silesia, 
aided by the great monarchies of Europe, what could 
she do without their aid ? So peace came at last, when 
all parties were wearied and exhausted; and Frederic 
retained his stolen province at the sacrifice of one hun- 
dred and eighty thousand men, and the decline of one 
tenth of the whole population of his kingdom and its 
complete impoverishment, from which it did not re- 
cover for nearly one hundred yeai-s. Prussia, though a 
powerful military state, became and remained one of 
the poorest countries of Europe ; and I can remember 
when it was rare to see there, except in the houses of 
the rich, either a silver fork or a silver spoon ; to say 
nothing of the cheap and frugal fare of the great mass 
of the people, and their comfortless kind of life, with 
hardly any physical luxuries except tobacco and beer. 
It is surprising how, in a poor country, Frederic could 
have sustained such an exhaustive war without in- 
curring a national debt. Perhaps it was not as easy 
in those times for kings and states to run into debt 
as it is now. One of the great refinements of advanc- 
ing civilization is that we are permitted to bequeath 
our burdens to future generations. Time only will 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 3i 

show whether this is the wisest course. It is certainly 
not a wise ching for individuals to do. He who enters 
on the possession of a heavily mortgaged estate is an 
embarrassed, perhaps impoverished, man. Frederic, at 
least, did not leave debts for posterity to pay; he 
preferred to pay as he went along, whatever were 
the difficulties. 

The real gainer by the war, if gainer there was, was 
England, since she was enabled to establish a maritime 
supremacy, and develop her manufacturing and mer- 
cantile resources, — much needed in her future struggles 
to resist Napoleon. She also gained colonial posses- 
sions, a foothold in India, and the possession of Canada. 
This war entangled Europe, and led to great battles, 
not in Germany merely, but around the world. It was 
during this war, when France and England were antag- 
onistic forces, that the military genius of Washington 
was first developed in America. The victories of Clive 
and Hastings soon after followed in India. 

The greatest loser in this war was France : she lost 
provinces and military prestige. The war brought to 
light the decrepitude of the Bourbon rule. The mar- 
shals of France, with superior forces, were disgracefully 
defeated. The war plunged France in debt, only to be 
paid by a "roaring conflagration of anarchies." The 
logical sequence of the war was in those discontents 
and taxes which prepared the way for the French 



32 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

Eevolution, — a catastrophe or a new birth, as men 
differently view it. 

The effect of the war on Austria was a loss of pres- 
tige, the beginning of the dismemberment of the empire, 
and the revelation of internal weakness. Though Maria 
Theresa gained general sympathy, and won great 
glory by her vigorous government and the heroism of 
her troops, she was a great loser. Besides the loss of 
men and money, Austria ceased to be the great threat- 
ening power of Europe. From this war England, until 
the close of the career of Napoleon, was really the most 
powerful state in Europe, and became the proudest. 

As for Prussia, — the principal transgressor and actor, 
— it is more difficult to see the actual results. The 
immediate effects of the war were national impoverish- 
ment, an immense loss of life, and a fearful demoraliza- 
tion. The limits of the kingdom were enlarged, and its 
military and political power was established. It became 
one of the leading states of Continental Europe, sur- 
passed only by Austria, Eussia, and France. It led to 
great standing armies and a desire of aggrandizement. 
It made the army the centre of all power and the basis 
of social prestige. It made Frederic 11. the great mili- 
tary hero of that age, and perpetuated his policy in 
Prussia. Bismarck is the sequel and sequence of 
Frederic. It was by aggressive and unscrupulous wars 
that the Romans were aggrandized, and it was also 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER 33 

by the habits and tastes which successful war created 
that Eome was ultimately undermined. The Eoman 
empire did not last like the Chinese empire, although 
at one period it had more glory and prestige. So wai 
both strengthens and impoverishes nations. But I 
believe that the violation of eternal principles of right 
ultimately brings a fearful penalty. It may be long 
delayed, but it will finally come, as in the sequel of 
the wicked wars of Louis XIV. and Napoleon Bona- 
parte. Victor Hugo, in his " History of a Great Crime," 
on the principle of everlasting justice, forewarned " Na- 
poleon the Little" of his future reverses, while nations 
and kingdoms, in view of his marvellous successes, 
hailed him as a friend of civilization ; and Hugo lived 
to see the fulfilment of his prophecy. Moreover, it may 
be urged that the Prussian people, — ground down by 
an absolute military despotism, the mere tools of an 
ambitious king, — were not responsible for the atro- 
cious conquests of Frederic II. The misrule of mon- 
archs does not bring permanent degradation on a nation, 
unless it shares the crimes of its monarch, — as in the 
case of the Eomans, when the leading idea of the peo- 
ple was military conquest, from the very commencement 
of their state. The Prussians in the time of Frederic 
were a sincere, patriotic, and religious people. They 
were simply enslaved, and suffered the poverty and 
misery which were entailed by war. 



34 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

After Frederic had escaped the perils of the Seven 
Years' War, it is surprising he should so soon have 
become a party to another, atrocious crime, — the divi- 
sion and dismemberment of Poland. But here both 
Russia and Austria were also participants. 

«* Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime." 

And I am still more amazed that Carlyle should cover 
up this crime with his sophistries. No man in ordi- 
nary life would be justified in seizing his neighbor's 
property because he was weak and his property was 
mismanaged. We might as well justify Russia in at- 
tempting to seize • Turkey, although such a crime may 
be overruled in the future good of Europe. But Car- 
lyle is an Englishman ; and the English seized and 
conquered India because they wanted it, not because 
they had a right to it. The same laws which bind 
individuals also binds kings and nations. Free nations 
from the obligations which bind individuals, and the 
world would be an anarchy. Grant that Poland was 
not fit for self-government, this does not justify its 
political annihilation. The heart of the world ex- 
claimed against that crime at the time, and the injuries 
of that unfortunate state are not yet forgotten. Car- 
lyle says the "partition of Poland was an operation 
of Almighty Providence and the eternal laws of Na- 
ture," — a key to his whole philosophy, which means, 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 35 

if it means anything, that as great fishes swallow up 
the small ones, and wild beasts prey upon each other, 
and eagles and vultures devour other birds, it is all 
right for powerful nations to absorb the weak ones, 
as the Eomans did. Might does not make right by 
the eternal decrees of God Almighty, written in the 
Bible and on the consciences of mankind. Politicians, 
whose primal law is expediency, may justify such acts 
as public robbery, for they are political Jesuits, — al- 
ways were, always will be ; and even calm statesmen, 
looking on the overruling of events, may palliate ; but 
to enlightened Christians there is only one law, " Do 
unto others as ye would that they should do unto you." 
Nor can Christian civihzation reach an exalted plane 
untU it is in harmony with the eternal laws of God. 
Mr. Carlyle ghbly speaks of Almighty Providence 
favoring robbery; here he utters a falsehood, and I 
do not hesitate to say it, great as is his authority. 
God says, "Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not 
covet anything which is thy neighbor's, . . . for he is 
a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon 
the children, to the third and fourth generation." 
We must set aside the whole authority of divine 
revelation, to justify any crime openly or secretly com- 
mitted. The prosperity of nations, in the long run, is 
based on righteousness; not on injustice, cruelty, and 
selfishness. 



36 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

It cannot be denied that Frederic well managed his 
stolen property. He was a man of ability, of enlight- 
ened views, of indefatigable industry, and of an iron 
will. I would as soon deny that Cromwell did not 
well govern the kingdom which he had seized, on the 
plea of revolutionary necessity and the welfare of Eng- 
land, for he also was able and wise. But what was the 
fruit of Cromwell's well-intended usurpation ? — a hide- 
ous reaction, the return of the Stuarts, the dissipation 
of his visionary dreams. And if the states which 
Frederic seized, and the empire he had founded in 
blood and carnage had been as well prepared for lib- 
erty as England was, the consequences of his ambition 
might have been far different. 

But Frederic did not so much aim at the develop- 
ment of national resources, — the aim of all immor- 
tal statesmen, — as at the growth and establishment 
of a military power. He filled his kingdom and prov- 
inces with fortresses and camps and standing armies. 
He cemented a military monarchy. As a wise execu- 
tive ruler, the King of Prussia enforced law and order, 
was economical in his expenditures, and kept up a rigid 
discipline; even rewarded merit, and was friendly to 
learning. And he showed many interesting personal 
qualities, — for I do not wish to make him out a mon- 
ster, only as a great man who did wicked things, and 
things which even cemented for the time the powei 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 



of Prussia. He was frugal and unostentatious. Like 
Charlemagne, he associated with learned men. He 
loved music and literature ; and he showed an amaz- 
ing fortitude and patience in adversity, which called 
out universal admiration. He had a great insight into 
shams, was rarely imposed upon, and was scrupulous 
and honest in his dealings as an individual. He was 
also a fascinating man when he unbent; was affable, 
intelligent, accessible, and unstilted. He was an ad- 
mirable talker, and a tolerable author. He always 
sympathized with intellectual excellence. He sur- 
rounded himself with great men in all departments. 
He had good taste and a severe dignity, and despised 
vulgar people; had no craving for fast horses, and 
held no intercourse with hostlers and gamblers, even 
if these gamblers had the respectable name of brokers. 
He punished all public thieves; so that his admin- 
istration at least was dignified and respectable, and 
secured the respect of Europe and the admiration of 
men of ability. The great warrior was also a great 
statesman, and never made himself ridiculous, never 
degraded his position and powers, and could admire 
and detect a man of genius, even when hidden from 
the world. He was a Tiberius, but not a Nero fiddling 
over national calamities, and surrounding himself with 
stage-players, buffoons, and idiots. 

But here his virtues ended. He was cold, selfish, 



38 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

dissembling, hard-hearted, ungrateful, ambitious, un- 
scrupulous, without faith in either God or man; so 
sceptical in religion that he was almost an atheist. 
He was a disobedient son, a heartless husband, a capri- 
cious friend, and a selfish self -idolater. While he was 
the friend of hterary men, he patronized those who 
were infidel in their creed. He was not a religious 
persecutor, because he regarded all religions as equally- 
false and equally useful. He was social among con- 
vivial and learned friends, but cared little for women 
or female society. His latter years, though dignified 
and quiet, an idol in all military circles, with an im- 
mense fame, and surrounded with every pleasure and 
luxury at Sans-Souci, were still sad and gloomy, like 
those of most great men whose leadmg principle of 
life was vanity and egotism, — like those of Solomon, 
Charles V., and Louis XIV. He heard the distant 
rumblings, if he did not live to see the lurid fires, of 
the French Eevolution. He had been deceived in 
Voltaire, but he could not mistake the logical sequence 
of the ideas of Eousseau, — those blasting ideas which 
would sweep away all feudal institutions and all irre- 
sponsible tyrannies. When Mirabeau visited him he 
was a quaking, suspicious, irritable, capricious, unhappy 
old man, though adored by his soldiers to the last, — 
for those were the only people he ever loved, those 
who were willing to die for liim, those who built up 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER 39 

his throne : and when he died, I suppose he was 
sincerely lamented by his army and his generals and 
his nobility, for with him began the greatness of 
Prussia as a mihtary power. So far as a life devoted 
to the mihtary and political aggrandizement of a coun- 
try makes a man a patriot, Frederic the Great will 
receive the plaudits of those men who worship success, 
and who forget the enormity of unscrupulous crimes in 
the outward glory which immediately resulted, — yea, 
possibly of contemplative statesmen who see in the 
rise of a new power an instrument of the Almighty 
for some inscrutable end. To me his character and 
deeds have no fascination, any more than the fortu- 
nate career of some one of our modern millionnaires 
would have to one who took no interest in finance. It 
was doubtless grateful to the dying King of Prussia to 
hear the plaudits of his idolaters, as he stood on the 
hither shores of eternity ; but his view of the spectators 
as they lined those shores must have been soon lost 
sight of, and their cheering and triumphant voices un- 
heard and disregarded, as the bark, in which he sailed 
alone, put forth on the unknown ocean, to meet the 
Eternal Judge of the living and the dead. 

We leave now the man who won so great a fame, to 
consider briefly his influence. In two respects, it seems 
to me, it has been decided and impressive. 



40 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

In the first place, he gave an impulse to rationalistic 
inquiries in Germany ; and many there are who think 
this was a good thing. He made it fashionable to be 
cynical and doubtful. Being ashamed of his own 
language, and preferring the French, he encouraged 
the current and popular French literature, which in 
his day, under the guidance of Voltaire, was material- 
istic and deistical. He embraced a philosophy which 
looked to secondary rather than primal causes, which 
scouted any revelations that could not be explained 
by reason, or reconciled with scientific theories, — that 
false philosophy which intoxicated Franklin and Jef- 
ferson as well as Hume and Gibbon, and which finally 
culminated in Diderot and D'Alembert; the philoso- 
phy which became fashionable in German universities, 
and whose nearest approach was that of the exploded 
Epicureanism of the Ancients. Under the patronage 
of the infidel court, the universities of Germany became 
filled with rationalistic professors, and the pulpits with 
dead and formal divines ; so that the glorious old Luther- 
anism of Prussia became the coldest and most lifeless 
of all the forms which Protestantism ever assumed. 
Doubtless, great critics and scholars arose under the 
stimulus of that unbounded religious speculation which 
the King encouraged ; but they employed their learning 
in pulling down rather than supporting the pillars of 
the ancient orthodoxy. And so rapidly did rationalism 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 41 

spread in Northern Germany, that it changed its great 
lights into illuminati, who spurned what was revealed 
unless it was in accordance with their speculations and 
sweeping criticism. I need not dwell on this undis- 
guised and blazing fact, on the rationalism which became 
the fashion in Germany, and which spread so disastrously 
over other countries, penetrating even into the inmost 
sanctuaries of theological instruction. All this may be 
progress ; but to my mind it tended to extinguish the 
light of faith, and fill the seats of learning with cynics 
and unbelieving critics. It was bad enough to destroy 
the bodies of men in a heartless war ; it was worse to 
nourish those principles which poisoned the soul, and 
spread doubt and disguised infidelities among the 
learned classes. 

But the influence of Frederic was seen in a more 
marked manner in the inauguration of ^ national policy 
directed chiefly to military aggrandizement. If there 
ever was a purely military monarchy, it is Prussia ; and 
this kingdom has been to Europe what Sparta was to 
Greece. All the successors of Frederic have followed 
out his policy with singular tenacity. All their habits 
and associations have been military. The army has 
been the centre of their pride, ambition, and hope. 
They have made their country one vast military camp. 
They have exempted no classes from military services ; 
they have honored and exalted the army more than 



42 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

any other interest. The principal people of the land 
are generals. The resources of the kingdom are ex- 
pended in standing armies ; and these are a perpetual 
menace. A network of military machinery controls 
all other pursuits and interests. The peasant is a 
military slave. The student of the university can be 
summoned to a military camp. Precedence in rank 
is given to military men over merchant princes, over 
learned professors, over distinguished jurists. . The ge- 
nius of the nation has been directed to the perfection 
of military discipline and military weapons. The gov- 
ernment is always prepared for war, and has been 
rarely averse to it. It has ever been ready to seize a 
province or pick a quarrel. The late wat with France 
was as much the fault of Prussia as of the government 
of Napoleon. The great idea of Prussia is military 
aggrandizement: it is no longer a small kingdom, but 
a great empire, more powerful than either Austria or 
Prance. It believes in new annexations, until all Ger- 
many shall be united under a Prussian Kaiser. What 
Eome became, Prussia aspires to be. The spirit, the 
animus, of Prussia is mihtary power. Travel in that 
kingdom, — everywhere are soldiers, military schools, 
camps, arsenals, fortresses, reviews. And this military 
spirit, evident during the last hundred years, has made 
the military classes arrogant, austere, mechanical, con- 
temptuous. This spirit pen'-ades the nation. It despises 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 43 

other nations as much as France did in the last cen« 
tury, or England after the wars of Napoleon. 

But the great peculiarity of this military spirit is 
seen in the large standing armies, which dry up the 
resources of the nation and make war a perpetual 
necessity, at least a perpetual fear. It may be urged 
that these armies are necessary to the protection of the 
state, — that if they were disbanded, then France, or 
some other power, would arise and avenge their in- 
juries, and cripple a state so potent to do evil. It 
may be so; but still the evils generated by these 
armies must be fatal to liberty, and antagonistic to 
those peaceful energies which produce the highest 
civilization. They are fatal to the peaceful virtues. 
The great Schiller has said: — 

" There exists 
An higher than the warrior's excellence. 
Great deeds of violence, adventures wild, 
And wonders of the moment, — these are not they 
Which generate the high, the blissful, 
And the enduring majesty. 

I do not disdain the virtues which are developed by 
war; but great virtues are seldom developed by war, 
unless the war is stimulated by love of liberty or the 
conservation of immortal privileges worth more than 
the fortunes or the lives of men. A nation incapable 
of being roused in great neces.sities soon becomes m.- 



44 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

significant and degenerate, like Greece when it was 
incorporated with the Eoman empire; but I have no 
admiration of a nation perpetually arming and perpetu- 
ally seeking political aggrandizement, when the great 
ends of civilization are lost sight of. And this is what 
Frederic sought, and his successors who cherished his 
ideas. The legacy he bequeathed to the world was not 
emancipating ideas, but the policy of military aggran- 
dizement. And yet, has civilization no higher aim 
than the imitation of the ancient Romans? Can na-~ 
tions progressively become strong by ignoring the spirit 
of Christianity ? Is a nation only to thrive by adopt- 
ing the sentiments peculiar to robbers and bandits ? 
I know that Prussia has not neglected education, or 
science,, or industrial energy ; but these have been made 
subservient to military aims. The highest civilization 
is that which best develops the virtues of the heart 
and the energies of the mind : on these the strength of 
man is based. It may be necessary for Prussia, in the 
complicated relations of governments, and in view of 
possible dangers, to sustain vast standing armies ; but 
the larger these are, the more do they provoke other 
nations to do the same, and to eat out the vitals of 
national wealth. That nation is the greatest which 
seeks to reduce, rather than augment, forces which prey 
upon its resources and which are a perpetual menace. 
And hence the vast standing armies which conquerors 



THE PRUSSIAN POWER. 45 

seek to maintain are not an aid to civilization, but on 
the other hand tend to destroy it ; unless by civilization 
and national prosperity are meant an ever-expanding 
policy of military aggrandizement, by which weaker 
and unoffending states may be gradually absorbed by 
irresistible despotism, like that of the Eomans, whose 
final and logical development proves fatal to all other 
nationalities and hberties, — yea, to literature and art 
and science and mdustry, the extinction of which is the 
moral death of an empire, however grand and however 
boastful, only to be succeeded by new creations, through 
the fires of successive wars and hateful anarchies. 

In one point, and one alone, I see the Providence 
which permitted the military aggrandizement to which 
Frederic and his successors aimed ; and that is, in 
furnishing a barrier to the future conquests of a more 
barbarous people, — I mean the Eussians ; even as 
the conquests of Charlemagne presented a barrier to 
the future irruptions of barbarous tribes on his northern 
frontier. Eussia — that rude, demoralized, Slavonic 
empire — cannot conquer Europe until it has first de- 
stroyed the political and military power of Germany. 
United and patriotic, Germany can keep at present the 
Eussians at bay, and direct the stream of invasion to 
the East rather than the South; so that Europe will 
not become either Cossack or French, as Napoleon pre- 
dicted. In this light the military genius and power of 



46 FREDERIC THE GREAT. 

Germany, which Frederic did so much to develop, may 
be designed for the protection of European civilization 
and the Protestb^nt religion. 

But I will not speculate on the aims of Providence, 
or the evil to be overruled for good. With my limited 
vision, I can only present facts and their immediate 
consequences. I can only deduce the moral truths 
which are logically to be drawn from a career of 
wicked ambition. These truths are a part of that 
moral wisdom which experience confirms, and which 
alone should be the guiding lesson to all statesmen 
and all empires. Let us pursue the right, and leave 
the consequences to Him who rules the fate of war, 
and guides the nations to the promised period when 
men shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and 
universal peace shall herald the reign of the Saviour 
of the world. 



AUTHORITIES. 

The great work of Carlyle on the Life of Frederic, which exhausts the 
subject ; Macaulay's Essay on the Life and Times of Frederic the Great ; 
Carlyle's Essay on Frederic ; Lord Brougham on Frederic ; Coxe's History 
of the House of Austria ; Mira^eau's Histoire Se'crete de la Cour de Berlin ; 
(Euvres de Frederic le Grand; Ranke's Neue Biicher Preussischer Ge- 
schichte ; Pollnitz's Memoirs and Letters ; Walpole's Reminiscences ; Letters 
of Voltaire; Voltaire's Idee du Roi de Prusse; Life of Baron Trenck; 
Gillies' View of the Reign of Frederic IL ; Thiebault's Memoires de 
Frederic le Grand; Biographe Universelle; Thronbesteigung ; Holden. 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 

THE GERMAN EMPIKE. 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 

BEFOEE presenting Bismarck, it will be necessary 
to glance at the work of those great men who 
prepared the way not only for him, but also for the 
soldier Moltke, — men who raised Prussia from the 
humiliation resulting from her conquest by Napoleon. 

That humiliation was as complete as it was unex- 
pected. It was even greater than that of France after 
the later Franco-Prussian war. Prussia was dismem- 
bered; its provinces were seized by the conqueror; 
its population was reduced to less than four millions ; 
its territory was occupied by one hundred and fifty 
thousand French soldiers; the king himself was an 
exile and a fugitive from his own capital ; every sort 
of indignity was heaped on his prostrate subjects, who 
were compelled to pay a war indemnity beyond their 
power ; trade and commerce were cut off by Napoleon's 
Continental system; and universal poverty overspread 

the country, always poor, and now poorer than ever. 

49 



50 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Prussia had no allies to rally to her sinking fortunes ; 
she was completely isolated. Most of her fortresses 
were in the hands of her enemies, and the magnificent 
army of which she had been so proud since the days 
of Frederick the Great was dispersed. At the peace 
of Tilsit, in 1807, it looked as if the whole kingdom 
was about to be absorbed in the empire of Napoleon, 
like Bavaria and the Ehine provinces, and wiped out 
of the map of Europe like unfortunate Poland. 

But even this did not complete the humiliation. 
Napoleon compelled the King of Prussia — Frederick 
William III. — to furnish him soldiers to fight against 
Eussia, as if Prussia was already incorporated with 
his own empire and had lost her nationality. At that 
time France and Eussia were in alliance, and Prussia 
had no course to adopt but submission or complete 
destruction ; and yet Prussia refused in these evil days 
to join the Confederation of the Ehine, which em- 
braced all the German States at the south and west 
of Austria and Prussia. Napoleon, however, was too 
much engrossed in his scheme of conquering Spain, 
to swallow up Prussia entirely, as he intended, after 
he should have subdued Spain. So, after all, Prussia 
had before her only the fortune of Ulysses in the cave 
of Polyphemus, — to be devoured the last. 

The escape of Prussia was owing, on the one hand, 
to the necessity for Napoleon to withdraw his main 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 51 

army from Prussia in order to tight in Spain ; and 
secondly, to the transcendent talents of a few patriots 
to whom the king in his distress was forced to listen. 
The chief of these were Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharn- 
horst. It was the work of Stein to reorganize the 
internal administration of Prussia, including the finan- 
cial department ; that of Hardenberg to conduct the 
ministry of foreign affairs; and that of Scharnhorst 
to reorganize the military power. The two former 
were nobles ; the latter sprung from the people, — a 
peasant's son; but they worked together in tolerable 
harmony considering the rival jealousies that at one 
time existed among all the high officials, with their 
innumerable prejudices. 

Baron von Stein, born in 1757, of an old imperial 
knightly family from the country near Nassau, was as 
a youth well educated, and at the age of twenty- three 
entered the Prussian service under Frederick the Great, 
in the mining department, where he gained rapid pro- 
motion. Tn 1786 he visited England and made a 
careful study of her institutions, which he profoundly 
admired. In 1787 he became a sort of provincial 
governor, being director of the war and Domaine Cham- 
bers at Cleves and Hamm. 

In 1804 Stein became Minister of Trade, having 
charge of excise, customs, manufactures, and trade. 
The whole financial administration at this time under 



PRINCE BISMA R CK. 



King Frederick William III. was in a state of great 
confusion, from an unnecessary number of officials who 
did not work harmoniously. There was too much " red 
tape." Stein brought order out of confusion, simplified 
the administration, punished corruption, increased the 
national credit, then at a very low ebb, and re-estab- 
lished the bank of Prussia on a basis that enabled it 
to assist the government. 

But a larger field than that of finance was opened 
to Stein in the war of 1806. The king intrusted to 
him the portfolio of foreign affairs, — not willingly, but 
because he regarded him as the ablest man in the 
kingdom. Stein declined to be foreign minister unless 
he was entirely unshackled, and the king was obliged 
to yield, for the misfortunes of the country had now 
culminated in the disastrous defeat at Friedland. The 
king, however, soon quarrelled with his minister, be- 
ing jealous of his commanding abilities, and unused to 
dictation from any source. After a brief exile at Nas- 
sau, the peace of Tilsit having proved the sagacity of 
his views. Stein returned to power as virtual dictator 
of the kingdom, with the approbation of Napoleon; 
but his dictatorship lasted only about a year, when he 
was again discharged. 

During that year, 1807, Stein made his mark in 
Prussian history. Without dwelling on details, he 
ell'ecLed the abolition of serfdom in Prussia, the trade 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



in laud, aud niunicipal reforms, giving citizens self- 
government in place of the despotism of military 
bureaus. He made it his business to pay off the 
French war indemnity, — one hundred and fifty mil- 
lion francs, a great sum for Prussia to raise when dis- 
membered and trodden in the dust under one hundred 
and fifty thousand French soldiers, — and to establish 
a new and improved administrative system. But more 
than all, he attempted to rouse a moral, religious, and 
patriotic spirit in the nation, and to inspire it anew 
with courage, self-confidence, and self-sacrifice. In 
1808 the ministry became warlike in spite of its de- 
spair, the first glimpse of hope being the popular rising 
in Spain. It was during the ministry of Stein, and 
through his efforts, that the anti-Napoleonic revolution 
began. 

The intense hostility of Stein to Napoleon, and his 
commanding abilities, led Napoleon in 1808 impera- 
tively to demand from the King of Prussia the dis- 
misssal of his minister ; and Frederick William dared 
not resist. Stein did not retire, however, until after 
the royal edict had emancipated the serfs of Prussia, 
and until that other great reform was made by which 
the nobles lost the monopoly of office and exemption 
from taxation, while the citizen class gained admis- 
sion to all posts, trades, and occupations. These great 
reforms were chiefly to be traced to Stein, although 



54 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Hardenberg and others, like Schon and Niebuhr, had 
a hand in them. 

Stein also opened the military profession to the 
citizen class, which before was closed, only nobles be- 
ing intrusted with command in the army. It is true 
that nobles still continued to form a large majority 
of officers, even as peasants formed the bulk of the 
army. But the removal of restrictions and the abo- 
lition of serfdom tended to create patriotic sentiments 
among all classes, on which the strength of armies in 
no small degree rests. In the time of Frederick the 
Great the army was a mere machine. It was some- 
thing more when the nation in 1811 rallied to achieve 
their independence. Then was born the idea of na- 
tionality, — that, whatever obligations a Prussian owed 
to the state, Germany was greater than Prussia itself. 
This idea was the central principle of Stein's political 
system, leading ultimately to the unity of Germany 
as finally effected by Bismarck and Moltke. It became 
almost synonymous with that patriotism which sustains 
governments and thrones, the absence of which was 
the great defect of the German States before the times 
of Napoleon, when both princes and people lost sight 
of the unity of the nation in the interests of petty 
sovereignties. 

Stein was a man of prodigious energy, practical good 
sense, and lofty character, but irascible, haughty, and 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 55 

contemptuous, and was far from being a favorite with 
the king and court. His great idea was the unity and 
independence of Germany He thought more of Ger- 
man nationality than of Prussian aggrandizement. It 
was his aim to make his countrymen feel that they 
were Germans rather than Prussians, and that it was 
only by a union of the various German States that 
they could hope to shake off the French yoke, galling 
and humiliating beyond description. 

When Stein was driven into exile at the dictation 
of Napoleon, with the loss of his private fortune, he 
was invited by the Emperor of Eussia to aid him with 
his counsels, — and it can be scarcely doubted that in 
the employ of Russia he rendered immense services to 
Germany, and had no little influence in shaping the 
movements of the allies in effecting the ruin of the 
common despot. On this point, however, I cannot 
dwell. 

Count, afterward Prince, Hardenberg, held to sub- 
stantially the same views, and was more acceptable to 
the king as minister than was the austere and haughty 
Stein, although his morals were loose, and his abilities 
far inferior to those of the former. But his diplomatic 
talents were considerable, and his manners were agree- 
able, like those of Metternich, while Stein treated kings 
and princes as ordinary men, and dictated to them 
the course which was necessary to pursue. It was the 



56 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

work of Hardenberg to create the peasant-proprietor- 
ship of modern Prussia ; but it was the previous work 
of Stein to establish free trade in land, — which means 
the removal of hindrances to the sale and purchase of 
land, which still remains one of the abuses of Eng- 
land, — the ultimate effect of which was to remove 
caste in land as well as caste in persons. 

The great educational movement, in the deepest 
depression of Prussian affairs, was headed by William 
Baron von Humboldt. When Prussia lay disarmed, 
dismembered, and impoverished, the University of Ber- 
lin was founded, the government contributing one 
hundred and fifty thousand thalers a year ; and Hum- 
boldt — the first minister of public instruction — suc- 
ceeded in inducing the most eminent and learned men 
in Germany to become professors in this new univer- 
sity. I look upon this educational movement in the 
most gloomy period of German history as one of the 
noblest achievements which any nation ever made in 
the cause of science and literature. It took away the 
sting of military ascendency, and raised men of genius 
to an equality with nobles; and as the universities 
were the centres of liberal sentiments and all liberal- 
izing ideas, they must have exerted no small influence 
on the war of liberation itself, as well as on the cause 
of patriotism, which was the foundation of the future 
greatness of Prussia. Students flocked from all parts 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 57 

of Germany to hear lectures from accomplished and 
patriotic professors, who inculcated the love of father- 
land. Germany, though fallen into the hands of a 
military hero from defects in the administration of 
governments and armies, was not disgraced when her 
professors in the university were the greatest scholars 
of the world. They created a new empire, not of the 
air, as some one sneeringly remarked, but of mind, 
which has gone on from conquering to conquer. For 
more than fifty years German universities have been 
the centre of European thought and scholastic cul- 
ture, — pedantic perhaps, but original and profound. 

Before proceeding to the main subject, I have to 
speak of one more great reform, which was the work 
of Scharnhorst. This was that series of measures 
which determined the result of the greatest military 
struggles of the nineteenth century, and raised Prussia 
to the front rank of military monarchies. It was the 
levee en masse, composed of the youth of the nation, 
without distinction "^^ rank, instead of an army made 
up of peasants ana serfs and commanded by their 
feudal masters. Scharnhorst introduced a compulsory 
system indeed, but it was not unequal. Every man 
was made to feel that he had a personal interest in 
defending his country, and there were no exemptions 
made. True, the old system of Frederick the Great 
was that of conscription ; but from this conscription 



58 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

large classes and whole districts were exempted, while 
the soldiers who fought in the war of liberation were 
drawn from all classes alike: hence there was no 
unjust compulsion, which weakens patriotism, and en- 
tails innumerable miseries. It was impossible in the 
utter exhaustion of the national finances to raise a 
sufi&cient number of volunteers to meet the emer- 
gencies of the times; therefore if Napoleon was to 
be overthrown it was absolutely necessary to compel 
everybody to serve in the army for a limited period. 
The nation saw the necessity, and made no resistance. 
Thus patriotism lent her aid, and became an over 
whelming power. The citizen soldier was no great 
burden on the government, since it was bound to his 
support only for a limited period, — long or short 
as the exigency of the country demanded. Hence 
large armies were maintained at comparatively trifling 
expense. 

I need not go into the details of a system which 
made Prussia a nation of patriots as well as of soldiers, 
and which made Scharnhorst a great national bene- 
factor, sharing with Stein the glory of a great deliver- 
ance. He did not live to see the complete triumph 
of his system, matured by genius and patient study ; 
but his work remained to future generations, and 
made Prussia invincible except to a coalition of pow- 
erful enemies. All this was done under the eye of 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 59 

Napoleon, and a dreamy middle class became an effec- 
tive soldiery. So, too, did the peasants, no longer 
subjected to corporal punishment and other humilia- 
tions. What a great thing it was to restore dignity 
to a whole nation, and kindle the fires of patriotic 
ardor among poor and rich alike! To the credit of 
the king, he saw the excellence of the new system, at 
once adopted it, and generously rewarded its authors. 
Scharnhorst, the peasant's son, was made a noble, and 
was retained in office until he died. Stein, however, 
whose overshadowing greatness created jealousy, re- 
mained simply a baron, and spent his last days in 
retirement, — though not unhonored, or without influ- 
ence, even when not occupying the great offices of 
state, to which no man ever had a higher claim. 
The king did not like him, and the king was still 
an absolute monarch. 

Frederick William III. was by no means a great 
man, being jealous, timid, and vacillating ; but it was 
in his reign that Prussia laid the foundation of her 
greatness as a military monarchy. It was not the 
king who laid this foundation, but the great men 
whom Providence raised up in the darkest hours of 
Prussia's humiliation. He did one prudent thing, how- 
ever, out of timidity, when his ministers waged vig- 
orous and offensive measures. He refused to arm 
against Napoleon when Prussia lay at his mercy. 



CO PRINCE BISMARCK. 

This turned out to be the salvation of Prussia. A 
weak man's instincts proved to be wiser than the 
wisdom of the wise. When Napoleon's doom was 
sealed by his disasters in Eussia, then, and not till 
then, did the Prussian king unite with Eussia and 
Austria to crush the unscrupulous despot. 

The condition of Prussia, then, briefly stated, when 
Napoleon was sent to St. Helena to meditate and die, 
was this : a conquering army, of which Bllicher was 
one of its greatest generals, had been raised by the 
levee en masse, — a conscription, indeed, not of peasants 
alone, obliged to serve for twenty years, but' of the 
whole nation, for three years of active service; and 
a series of administrative reforms had been introduced 
and extended to every department of the State, by 
which greater economy and a more complete system 
were inaugurated, favoritism abolished, and the finances 
improved so as to support the government and furnish 
the sinews of war; while alliances were made with 
great Powers who hitherto had been enemies or doubt- 
ful friends. 

These alliances resulted in what is called the Ger- 
man Confederation, or Bund, — a strict union of all 
the various States for defensive purposes, and also to 
maintain a general system to suppress revolutionary 
and internal dissensions. Most of the German States 
entered into this Confederacy, at the head of which 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 61 

was Austria. It was determined in June, 1815, at 
Vienna, that the Confederacy should be managed by 
a general assembly called a Diet, the seat of which 
was located at Frankfort. In this Diet the various 
independent States, thirty-nine in number, had votes 
in proportion to their population, and were bound to 
contribute troops of one soldier to every hundred in- 
habitants, amounting to three hundred thousand in all, 
of which Austria and Prussia and Bavaria furnished 
more than half. This arrangement virtually gave to 
Austria and Prussia a preponderance in the Diet; and 
as the States were impoverished by the late war, and 
the people generally detested war, a long peace of forty 
years (with a short interval of a year) was secured 
to Germany, during which prosperity returned and 
the population nearly doubled. The Germans turned 
their swords into pruning -hooks, and all kinds of 
industry were developed, especially manufactures. 
The cities were adorned with magnificent works of art, 
and libraries, schools, and universities covered the 
land. No nation ever made a more signal progress in 
material prosperity than did the German States during 
this period of forty years, — especially Prussia^ which 
became in addition intellectually the most cultivated 
country in Europe, with twenty-one thousand primary 
schools, and one thousand academies, or gymnasia, in 
which mathematics and the learned languages were 



6-Z PRINCE BISMARCK. 

taught by accomplished scholars; to say nothing of 
the universities, which drew students from all Chris- 
tian and civilized countries in both hemispheres. 

The rapid advance in learning, however, especially 
in the universities and the gymnasia, led to the dis- 
cussion of innumerable subjects, including endless 
theories of government and the rights of man, by 
which discontent was engendered and virtue was not 
advanced. Strange to say, even crime increased. The 
universities became hot-beds of political excitement, 
duels, beer-drinking, private quarrels, and infidel dis- 
cussion, causing great alarm to conservative govern- 
ments and to peaceful citizens generally. At last the 
Diet began to interfere, for it claimed the general 
oversight of all internal affairs in the various States. 
An army of three hundred thousand men which obeyed 
the dictation of the Diet was not to be resisted ; and 
as this Diet was controlled by Austria and Prussia, it 
became every year more despotic and anti-democratic. 
In consequence, the Press was gradually fettered, the 
universities were closely watched, and all revolutionary 
movements in cities were suppressed. Discontent and 
popular agitations, as usual, went hand in hand. 

As early as 1818 the great reaction against all 
liberal sentiments in political matters had fairly set 
in. The king of Prussia neglected, and finally refused, 
to grant the constitutional government which he had 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 63 

promised in the day of his adversity before the battle 
of Waterloo ; while Austria, guided by Metternich, 
stamped her iron heel on everything which looked 
like intellectual or national independence. 

This memorable reaction against all progress in 
government, not confined to the German States but 
extending to Europe generally, has already been con- 
sidered in previous chapters. It was the great politi- 
cal feature in the history of Europe for ten years after 
the fall of Napoleon, particularly in Austria, where 
hatred of all popular movements raged with exceed- 
ing bitterness, intensified by the revolutions in Spain, 
Italy, and Greece. The assassination of Kotzebue, the 
dramatic author, by a political fanatic, for his sup- 
posed complicity with the despotic schemes of the 
Czar, kindled popular excitement into a blazing fl^ame, 
but still more fiercely incited the sovereigns of Ger- 
many to make every effort to suppress even liberty 
of thought. 

During the period, then, when ultra-conservative 
principles animated the united despots of the various 
German States, and the Diet controlled by Metternich 
repressed all liberal movements, little advance was 
made in Prussia in the way of reforms. But a great 
advance was made in all questions of political econ- 
omy and industrial matters. Free -trade was estab- 
lished in the most unlimited sense between all the 



64 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

states and provinces of the Confederation. All re- 
straints were removed from the navigation of rivers; 
new markets were opened in every direction for the 
productions of industry. In 1839 the Zollverein, or 
Customa-Union, was established, by which a uniform 
scale of duties was imposed in Northern Germany on 
all imports and exports. But no political reforms 
which the king had promised were effected during the 
life of Frederick William III. Hardenberg, who with 
Stein had inaugurated liberal movements, had lost 
his influence, although he was retained in power until 
he died. 

For the twenty years succeeding the confederation 
of the Grerman States in 1820, constitutional freedom 
made little or no progress in Germany. The only 
advance made in Prussia was in 1823, when the Pro- 
vincial Estates, or Diets, were established. These, 
however, were the mere shadow of representative 
government, since the Estates were convoked at ir- 
regular intervals, and had neither the power to initiate 
laws nor grant supplies. They could only express 
their opinions concerning changes in the laws per- 
taining to persons and property. 

On the 7th of June, 1840, Frederick William III. 
of Prussia died, and was succeeded by his son 
Frederick William IV., a religious and patriotic king, 
who was compelled to make promises for some sort 



TEE GERMAN EMPIRE. 65 

of constitutional liberty, and to grant certain conces- 
sions, which although they did not mean much gave 
general satisfaction. Among other things the freedom 
of the Press was partially guaranteed, with certain 
restrictions and the Zollverein was extended to Bruns- 
wick and Hesse-Homburg. Meantime the government 
entered with zeal upon the construction of railways 
and the completion of the Cathedral of Cologne, which 
tended to a more permanent union of the North Ger- 
man States. "We are not engaged here," said the 
new monarch, on the inauguration of the completion 
of that proudest work of mediaeval art, " with the con- 
struction of an ordinary edifice ; it is a work bespeak- 
ing the spirit of union and concord which animates the 
whole of Germany and all its persuasions, that we are 
now constructing." This inauguration, amid immense 
popular enthusiasm, was soon followed by the meet- 
ing of the Estates of the whole kingdom at Berlin, 
which for the first time united the various Provincial 
Estates in a general Diet; but its functions were 
limited to questions involving a diminution of taxation. 
No member was allowed to speak more than once on 
any question, and the representatives of the com- 
mons were only a third part of the whole assembly. 
This naturally did not satisfy the nation, and peti- 
tions flowed in for the abolition of the censorship 
of the Press and for the pu"blicity of debate. The 



66 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

king was not prepared to make these concessions in 
full, but he abolished the censorship of the Press as 
to works extending to above twenty pages, and enjoined 
the censors of lesser pamphlets and journals to exer- 
cise gentleness and discretion, and not erase anything 
which did not strike at the monarchy. At length, in 
1847, the desire was so universal for some form of 
representative government that a royal edict convoked 
a General Assembly of the Estates of Prussia, arranged 
in four classes, — the nobles, the equestrian order, the 
towns, and the rural districts. The Diet consisted of 
six hundred and seventy members, of which only 
eighty were nobles, and was empowered to discuss all 
questions pertaining to legislation ; but the initiative 
of all measures was reserved to the crown.. This 
National Diet assembled on the 24th of July, and was 
opened by the king in person, with a noble speech, 
remarkable for its elevation of tone. He convoked 
the Diet, the king said, to make himself acquainted 
with the wishes and wants of his people, but not to 
change the constitution, which guaranteed an absolute 
monarchy. The province of the Diet was consultative 
rather than legislative. Political and military power, 
as before, remained with the king. Still, an important 
step had been taken toward representative institutions. ^^^ 

It was about this time, as a member of the National 
Diet, that Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck appeared 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



upon the political stage. It was a period of great 
political excitement, not only in Prussia, but through- 
out Europe, and also of great_jmateriaI_prosperity. 
Bailways had been built, th e Zollverein had extended 
through North Germany, the^ universities were in 
their glory, and into everything fearless thinkers 
were casting their thoughtful eyes. Thirty-four years 
of peace had enriched and united the German States. 
The great idea of the day was political franchise. 
Everybody aspired to solve political problems, and 
wished to have a voice in deliberative assemblies. 
There was also an unusual agitation of religious ideas. 
Eonge had attempted the complete emancipation of 
Germany from Papal influences, and university pro- 
fessors threw their influence on the side of rationalism 
and popular liberty. On the whole there was a gen- 
eral tendency towards democratic ideas, which was 
opposed with great bitterness by the conservative par- 
ties, made up of nobles and government officials. 

Bismarck arose, slowly but steadily, with the whole 
force of his genius, among the defenders of the con- 
servative interests of his order and of the throne. He 
was then simply Herr von Bismarck, belonging to an 
ancient and noble but not wealthy family, whose seat 
was Schonhausen, where the future prince was born 
April 1, 1815. The youth was sent to a gymnasium 
in Berlin in 1830, and in 1832 to the university of 



68 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Gottingen in Hanover, where he was more distin- 
guished for duels, drinking -parties, and general law- 
lessness than for scholarship. Here he formed a 
memorable friendship with a brother -tiident, a young 
American, — John Lothrop Motley, later the historian 
of the Dutch Kepublic. Much has been written of 
Bismarck's reckless and dissipated life at the univer- 
sity, which differed not essentially from that of other 
nobles. He had a grand figure, superb health, extraor- 
dinary animal spirits, and could ride like a centaur. 
He spent but three semestres at Gottingen, and then 
repaired to Berlin in order to study jurisprudence 
under the celebrated Savigny ; but he was rarely seen 
in the lecture-room. He gave no promise of the great 
abilities which afterward distinguished him. Yet he 
honorably passed his State examination; and as he 
had chosen the law for his profession, he first served 
on leaving the university as a sort of clerk in the city 
police, and in 1834 was transferred to Aix-la-Chapelle, 
in the administrative department of the district. In 
1837 he served in the crown office at Potsdam. He 
then entered for a year as a sharpshooter of the 
Guards, to absolve his obligation to military service. 

The next eight years, from the age of twenty-four, 
he devoted to farming, hunting, carousing, and read- 
ing, on one of his father's estates in Pomerania. He 
was a sort of country squire, attending fairs, selling 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



wool, iuspecting timber, handling grain, gathering rents, 
and sitting as a deputy in the local Diet, — the talk 
and scandal of the neighborhood for his demon-like 
rides and drinking-bouts, yet now studying all the 
while, especially history and even philosophy, man- 
aging the impoverished paternal estates with prudence 
and success, and making short visits to France and 
England, the languages of which countries he could 
speak with fluency and accuracy. In 1847 he married 
Johanna von Putkammer, nine years younger than 
himself, who proved a model wife, domestic and wise, 
of whom he was both proud and fond. The same year, 
his father having died and"^lt him Schonhausen, he 
was elected a member of the Landtag, a quasi parlia- 
ment of the eight united Diets of the monarchy ; and 
his great career began. 

Up to this period Bismarck was not a publicly 
ma:5J^ed man, except in an avidity for country sports 
in jj^rsemanship. He ever retained his love 
of the'^TOuntry and of country life. If proud and 
overbearing, he was not ostentatious. He had but 
few friends, but to these he was faithful. He never 
was popular until he had made Prussia the most pow- 
erful military State in Europe. He never sought to 
be loved so much as to be feared; he never allowed 
himself to be approached without politeness and de- 
ference. He seemed to care more for dogs than men. 



^ 



/O PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Nor was he endowed with those graces of manner 
which marked Metternich. He remained harsh, se- 
vere, grave, proud through his whole career, from first 
to last, except in congenial company. What is called 
society he despised, with all his aristocratic tenden- 
cies and high social rank. He was born for untram- 
melled freedom, and was always impatient under 
contradiction or opposition. When he reached the 
summit of his power he resembled Wallenstein, the 
hero of the Thirty Years' War, — superstitious, self- 
sustained, unapproachable, inspiring awe, rarely kind- 
ling love, overshadowing by his vast abilities the 
monarch whom he served and ruled. 

No account of the man, however, would be complete 
which did not recognize the corner-stone of his char- 
acter, — an immovable belief, in the feudalis tic ri ght 
of royalty to rule its subjects, Descended from an 
ancient family of knights and statesmen, of the most 
intensely aristocratic and reactionary class even in 
Germany, his inherited instincts and his own tremen- 
dous will, backed by a physique of colossal size and 
power, made effective his loyalty to the king and the 
monarchy, which from the first dominated and in- 
spired him. In the National Diet of 1847, Herr von 
Bismarck sat for more than a month before he opened 
his lips; but when he did speak it became evident 
that he was determined to support to the utmost the 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



power of the crown. He was plus royaliste que le 
roi. In the ordinary sense he was no orator. He 
hesitated, he coughed, he sought for words ; his voice, 
in spite of his herculean frame, was feeble. But 
sturdy in his loyalty, although inexperienced in par- 
liamentary usage, he offered a bold front to the liber- 
alism which he saw to be dangerous to his sovereign's 
throne. Like Oliver Cromwell in Parliament, he 
gained daily in power, while, unlike the English 
statesman, he was oppoaed_tQ_the_ £opular sid e, and 
held up the monarch y after the fashion of Strafford. 
From that time, and in fact until 1866 when he con- 
quered Austria, Bismarck w .s ver y unpopul ar ; and as 
he rose in power he became the most bitterly hated 
man in Prussia, — which hatred he returned with 
arrogaiit__caiitempt. He consistently opposed all re- 
forms, even the emancipation of the Jews, which won 
him the favor of the monarch. 

When the revolution of 1848 broke out, which 
hurled Louis Philippe from the i'rench throne, its 
flames reached every continental State except Eussia. 
Metternich, who had been all powerful in Austria for 
forty years, was obliged to flee, as well as the imperial 
family itself. All the Germanic States were now pro- 
mised liberal constitutions by the fallen or dismayed 
princes. In Prussia affairs were critical, and the 
reformers were sanguine of triumph. Berlin was agi- 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



tated by mobs to the verge of anarchy. The king, 
seriously alarmed, now promised the boon which he 
had thus far withheld, and summoned the Second 
United Diet to pave the way for a constituent assem- 
bly. In this constituent assembly Bismarck scorned 
to sit. For six months it sat squabbling and fighting, 
but accomplishing nothing. At last Bismarck found 
it expedient to enter the new parliament as a deputy, 
and again vigorously upheld the absolute power of the 
crown. He did, indeed, accept the principle of con- 
stitutional government, but, as he frankly said, against 
hisjwill_and onlvjj ^a new power in t he han ds of the 
monarch to restrain jpopular_ agitation and maintain 
order. Through his influence the king refused the 
imperial crown offered by the Frankfort parliament, 
because he conceived that the parliament had no right 
to give it, that its acceptance would be a recognition 
of naiianal-4astead-oL_iayal_sovere^^ and that it 
would be followed probably by civil war. As time 
went on he became mere and more the leader of the 
conservatives. I need not enumerate the subjects 
which came up for discussion in the new Prussian 
parliament, in which Bismarck exhibited with more 
force than eloquence his loyalty to the crown, and a 
conservatism which was branded by the liberals as 
mediaeval. But his originality, his boldness, his fear- 
lessness, his rugged earnestness, his wit anH humor. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 73 

yhis biting sarcasm^ his fertility of resources, his knowl- 
edge of men and affairs, and his devoted patriotism, 
ma rked him out for promotion. 

In 1851 Bismarck was sent as first secretary of the 
Prussian embassy to the Diet of the various German 
StafesT^nvened at Frankfort, in which Austria held 
a predominating influence. It was not a parliament, 
but an administr ative c ouncil of the Germanic Con- 
federation founded by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. 
It made no laws, and its sittings were secret. It was 
a body which represented the League of Sovereigns, 
and was composed of only seventeen delegates, — 
its main function being to suppress all liberal move- 
ments in the various German States ; like the Congress 
of Vienna itself. The Diet of Frankfort_was ^reten- 
tious.^b ut prac tically^ impotent, and was the laughing- 
stock of Europe. It was full of jealousies and 
intrigues. It was a mere diplomatic conference. As 
Austria and Prussia controlled it, things went well 
enough when these two Powers were agreed ; but they 
did not often agree. There was a perpetual rivalry 
between them, and an unextinguishable jealousy. 

There were many sneers at the appointment of a man 
to this diplomatic post whose manners were brusque 
and overbearing, and who had spent the most of his 
time, after leaving the university, among horses, cattle, 
and dogs ; who was only a lieutenant of militia, with a 
33 



74 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

single decoration, and who was unacquainted with 
what is called diplomacy. But the king knew his 
man, and the man was conscious of his powers. 

Bismarck found life at Frankfort intolerably dull. 
He had a contempt for his diplomatic associates gener- 
ally, and made fun of them to his few intimate friends. 
He took them, in almost at a g1aiicft ,ior he had an in- 
tuitive knowledge of character ; he weighed them in his 
balance, and found them wanting. In a letter to his 
wife he writes: "Nothing but miserable trifles do 
these people trouble themselves about. They strike 
me as infinitely more ridiculous with their important 
ponderosity concerning the gathered rags of gossip, 
than even a member of the Second Chamber of Berlin 
in the full consciousness of his dignity. . . . The 
men of the minor States are mostly mere caricatures 
of periwig diplomatists, who at once put on their 
official visage if I merely beg of them a light to my 
cigar." 

His extraordinary merits were however soon ap- 
parent to the king, and even to his chief, old General 
Eochow, who was soon transferred to St. Petersburg 
to make way for the secretary. The king's brother 
William, Prince of Prussia, when at Frankfort, was 
much impressed by the young Prussian envoy to the 
Bund, and there was laid the foundation of the friend- 
ship between the future soldier-king and the future 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



chancellor, between whom there always existed a warm 
confidence and esteem. Soon after, Bismarck made 
the acquaintance of Metternich, who had ruled for so 
long a time both the Diet and the Empire. The old 
statesman, now retired, invited the young diplomatist 
to his castle at Johannisberg. They had different 
aims, but similar sympathies. The Austrian statesman 
sought to preserve the existing state of things ; the 
Prussian, to make his country dominant over Ger- 
many. Both were aristocrats, and both were conserva- 
tive; but Metternich was as bland and polished as 
Bismarck was rough and brusque. 

Nothing escaped the watchful eye of Bismarck at 
Frankfort as the ambassador of Prussia. He took 
note of everything, both great and small, and com- 
municated it to Berlin as if he were a newspaper 
correspondent. In everything he showed his sympathy 
with absolutism, and hence recommended_renfiw:ed. 
shackles on the Press and on the universities, — at 
that time the hotbed of revolutionary ideas. His 
central aim and constant tfibiigTit'was the^ascendeiicy. 
of Prussia, — first in royal strength at home, then 
throughout Germany as the rival of Austria. Bis- 
marck was not only a keen observer, but he soon learned 
to disguise his thoughts. Nobody could read him. He 
was frank when his opponents were full of lies, knowing 
that he would not be believed. He became a perfect 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



master of the art of deception. No one was a match for 
him in statecraft. Even Prince Gortschakoff became his 
dupe. By his tact he kept Prussia from being entangled 
by the usurpation of Napoleon III., and by the Crimean 
war. He saw into the character . of the French em- 
peror, and discovered that he was shallow, and not to 
be feared. At Frankfort Bismarck had many opportu- 
nities of seeing distinguished men of all nations ; he 
took their gauge, and penetrated the designs of cabinets. 
He counselled his master to conciliate Napoleon, though 
regarding him as an upstart; and he^gught the^friend- 
shi£j).t France in ordexjto eclipse J;he--stai---Qf_Austria, 
whom it was necessary to hurQMe_.befQraJEmssia cculd 
rise. IrThis whole diplomatic career at Frankfort it 
was Bismarck's aim to contravene the, ^designs of 
Austria, having in view the aggrandizement of Prussia 
as the true head and centre of German nationality. 
He therefore did all he could to prevent Austria from 
being assisted in her war with Italy, and rejoiced in 
her misfortunes. In the mean time he made frequent 
short visits to Holland, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary, 
acquired the languages of these countries, and made 
himself familiar with their people and institutions, 
besides shrewdly studying the characters, manners, and 
diplomatic modes of the governing classes of European 
nations at large. Cool, untiring, self-possessed, he was 
storing up information and experience. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



At the end of eight years, in 1859, Bismarck was 



sador to Alexander IL He was then forty-three years 
of age, and was known as the sworn foe of Austria. 
His free-and-easy but haughty manners were a great 
contrast to those of his stiff, buttoned-up, and pre- 
tentious predecessors ; and he became a great favorite 
in Eussian court circles. The comparatively small 
salary he received, — less than twenty thousand dol- 
lars, with a house, — would not allow him to give 
expensive entertainments, or to run races in prodigality 
with the representatives of England, France, or even 
Austria, who received nearly fifty thousand dollars. 
But no parties were more sought or more highly 
appreciated than those which his sensible and unpre- 
tending wife gave in the high society in which they 
moved. With the empress dowager he was an espe- 
cial favorite, and was just the sort of man whom the 
autocrat of all the Eussias would naturally like, espe- 
cially for his love of hunting, and his success in shoot- 
ing deer and bears. He did not go to grand parties 
any more than he could help, despising their osten- 
tation and frivolity, and always feeling the worse 
for them. 

On the 2d of January, 1861, Frederick William IV., 
who had for some time been insane, died, and was 
succeeded by the Prince Eegent William I., already 



78 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

in his sixty-fifth year, every inch a soldier and nothing 
else. Bismarck was soon summoned to the councils 
of his sovereign at Berlin, who was perplexed and an- 
noyed by the Liberal party, which had the ascendency 
in the lower Chamber of the general Diet. Office was 
pressed upon Bismarck, but before he accepted it he 
wished to study Napoleon and French affairs more 
closely, and was therefore sent as ambas sador to Paris 
in 1862. He made that year a brief visit to London, 
Disraeli being then the premier, who smiled at his 
schemes for the regeneration of Germany. It was while 
journeying amid the Pyrenees that Bismarck was again 
summoned to Berlin, the lower^ C hamber having ridden 
rough-shod oyer his Majesty's plans for army reform. 
The king invested him with the great office ~bf "Presi- 
dent of the Ministry, his abilities being universally 
recognized. 

It was now Bismarck's mission to break.-the-mll_o|^ 
the Prussian parliament, and to thrust Austria out of 
the Germanic body. He considered only the end in 
view, caring nothing for the means : he had no scru- 
ples. It was his religion to raise Prussia to the same 
ascendency that Austria had held under Metternich. 
He had a master whose will and ambition were equal 
to his own, yet whose support he was sure of in car- 
rying out his grand designs. He was now a second 
Richelieu, to whom the aggrandizement of the mon- 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 79 

archy which he served and the welfare of Fatherland 
were but -convertible terms. He soon came into bitter 
conflict, not with nobles, but with progressive liberals 
in the Chamber, who detested him and feared him, but 
to whom he did not condescend to reveal his plans, — 
bearmg obloquy with placidity in the greatness of the 
end he had in view. He was a self-sustained, haughty, 
unapproachable man of power, except among the few 
friends whom he honored as boon companions, without 
ever losing his discretion, — wearing a mask with appa- 
rent frankness, and showing real frankness in matters 
which did not concern secrets of state, especially on 
the subjects of education and religion. Like his mas- 
ter, he was more a Oalvinist than a Lutheran. He 
openly avowed his dependence on Almighty God, and 
on him alone, as the hope of natiolis. In this respect 
we trace a resemblance to Oliver Cromwell rather than 
to Frederick the Great. Bismarck was a compound 
of both, in his patriotism and his unscrupulousness. 

The first thing that King William and his minister 
did was to double the army. But this vast increase 
of military strengtlTseemeH unnecessary to the Liberal 
party, and the requisite increase of taxes ..to_ support 
it was unpopular. Hence Bismarck was brought in 
conflict with the lower Chamber, which represented 
the middle classes. He dared not tell his secret 
schemes without imperilling their success, which led 



80 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

to grave misunderstandings. ror_four_j£ars_tlie con- 
flict raged between the crown and the parliament, both 
the king and Bismarck being inflexible ; and the lower 
House was equally obstinate in refusing to grant the 
large military supplies demanded. At last Bismarck 
dissolved the Chambers, and the king declared that 
as the Three Estates could not agree, he should con- 
tinue to do his duty by Prussia without regard to 
" these pieces of paper called constitutions." The next 
four sessions of the Chamber were closed in the same 
manner. Bismarck admitted that he was acting un- 
constitutionally, but claimed the urgency of public 
necessity. In the public debates he was cool, sar- 
castic, and contemptuous. The Press took up the 
fight, and the Press was promptly muzzled. Bis- 
marck was denounced as a Catiline, a Strafford, a 
Polignac ; but he retained a provoking serenity, and 
quietly prepared for war, — since war, he foresaw, 
was sooner or later inevitable. "Nothing can solve 
the question," said he, "but blood and iron." 

At last an event occurred which showed his hand. 
In November, 1863, Frederick VII., the king of Den- 
mark, died. By his death the Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
tion again burst upon distracted Europe, — Who was 
to reign over the two Danish provinces ? The king 
of Denmark, as Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, had 
been represented in the Germanic Diet. By the treaty 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 81 

of London, in 1852, he had undertaken not to incorpo- 
rate the duchies with the rest of his monarchy, allow- 
ing them to retain their traditional autonomy. In 
1863, shortly before his death, Frederick VII. by a 
decree dissolved this autonomy, and virtually incor- 
porated Schleswig, which was only partly German, 
with the Danish monarchy, leaving the wholly German 
Holstein as before. Bismarck protested against this 
violation of treaty obligations. The Danish parlia- 
ment nevertheless passed a law which incorporated 
the province with Denmark ; and Charles IX., the 
new monarch, confirmed the law. 

But a new claimant to the duchies now appeared 
in the person of Frederick of Augustenburg, a Ger- 
man prince ; and the Prussian Chamber advocated his 
claims, as did the Diet itself ; but the throne held its 
opinion in reserve. Bismarck contrived (by what dip- 
lomatic tricks and promises it is difficult to say) to 
induce Austria to join with Prussia in seizing the 
provinces in question and in dividing the spoil be- 
tween them. As these two Powers controlled the 
Diet at Frankfort, it was easy to carry out the pro- 
gramme. An Austro-Prussian army accordingly in- 
vaded Schleswig-Holstein, and to the scandal of all 
Europe drove the Danish defenders to the wall. It 
was regarded in the same light as the seizure of Silesia 
by Frederick the Great, — a high-handed and un- 



83 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

scrupulous violation of justice and right. England 
was particularly indignant, and uttered loud protests. 
So did the lesser States of Germany, jealous of the 
aggrandizement of Prussia. Even the Prussian Cham- 
ber refused to grant the money for such an enterprise. 

But Bismarck laughed in his sleeve. This arch- 
diplomatist had his reasons, which he did not care 
to explain. He had in view the weakening of the 
power of the Diet, and a quarrel with Austria. True, 
he had embraced Austria, but after the fashion of a 
bear. He knew that Austria and Prussia would 
wrangle about the division of the spoil, which v^ould 
lead to misunderstandings, and thus furnish the pre- 
text for a war, which he felt to be necessary before 
Prussia could be aggrandized and German unity be 
effected, with Prussia at its head, — the two great 
objects of his life. His policy was marvellously as- 
tute; but he kept his own counsels, and continued 
to hug his secret enemy. 

On the 30th of October 1864, the Treaty^fJVienna 
was signed, by which it was settled that the king 
of Denmark should surrender Schleswig-Holstein and 
Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia, and he bound him- 
self to submit to what their majesties might think fit 
as to the disposition of these three duchies. Prob- 
ably both parties sought an occasion to quarrel, since 
their commissioners had received opposite instructions, 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 83 

— the Austrians defending the claims of Frederick of 
Augustenburg, as generally desired in Germany, and 
the Prussians now opposing them. Prussia demanded 
the expulsion of the pretender ; to which Austria said 
no. Prussia further sounded Austria as to the annex- 
ation of the duchies to herself, to which Austria con- 
sented on condition of receiving an equivalent of some 
province in Silesia. " What ! " thought Bismarck, 
angrily, "give you back part of what was won for 
Prussia by Frederick the Great? Never!" Affairs 
had a gloomy look ; but war was averted for a while 
by the Convention of Gastein, by which the possession 
of Schleswig was assigned to Prussia, and Holstein 
to Austria ; and further, in consideration of two and a 
half millions of dollars, the Emperor Francis Joseph 
ceded to King William all his rights of co-proprietor- 
ship in the Duchy of Lauenburg. 

But the Chamber of Berlin boldly declared this 
transaction to be null and void, since the country had 
not been asked to ratify the treaty. It must be borne 
in mind that the conflict was still going on between 
Bismarck, as the defender of the absolute sovereignty 
of the king, and the liberal and progressive members 
of the Chamber, who wanted a freer and more demo- 
cratic constitution. Opposed, then, by the Chamber, 
Bismarck dissolved it, and coolly reminded his enemies 
that the Chamber had nothing to do with politics, — 



84 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

only with commercial affairs and matters connected 
with taxation. This was the period of his greatest 
unpopularity, since his policy and ultimate designs 
were not comprehended. So great was the popular 
detestation in which he was held that a fanatic tried 



to kill him in the street, but only succeeded in wound- 
ing him slightly. 

In the mean time Austria fomented disaffection in 
the provinces which Prussia had acquired, and Bis- 
marck resolved to cut the knot by the sword. Prus- 
sian troops marched to the frontier, and Austria on her 
part also prepared for war. It is difficult to see that a 
real casus belli existed. We only know that both par- 
ties wanted to fight, whatever were their excuses and 
pretensions ; and both parties sought the friendship of 
Eussia and France, especially by holding out delusive 
hopes to Napoleon of accession of territory. They suc- 
ceeded in inducing both Russia and France to remain 
neutral, — mere spectators of the approaching contest, 
which was purely a German affair. It was the first 
care of Prussia to prevent the military union of her 
foes in North Germany with her foes in the south, — 
which was effected in part by the diplomatic genius 
of Bismarck, and in part by occupying the capitals of 
Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel with Prussian 
troops, in a very summary way. 

The encounter now began in earnest between Prus- 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 85 

sia aud Austria for the prize of ascendency. Both 
parties were confident of success, — Austria as the 
larger State, with proud traditions, triumphant over 
rebellious Italy ; and Prussia, with its enlarged mili- 
tary organization and the new breech-loading needle- 
gun. 

Count von Moltke at this time came prominently on 
the European stage as the greatest strategist since Na- 
poleon. He was chief of staff to the king, who was 
commander-in-chief. He set his wonderful machinery 
in harmonious action, and from his office in Berlin 
moved his military pawns by touch of electric wire. 
Three great armies were soon centralized in Bo- 
hemia, — one of three corps, comprising one hundred 
thousand men, led by Prince Charles, the king's 
nephew; the second, of four corps, of one hundred 
and sixteen thousand men, commanded by the crown 
prince, the king's son; and the third, of forty thou- 
sand, led by General von Bittenfield. "March sep- 
arately; strike together, " were the orders of Moltke. 
Vainly did the Austrians attempt to crush these 
armies in detail before they should combine at the 
appointed place. On they came, with mathematical 
accuracy, until two of the armies reached Gitschin, the 
objective point, where they were joined by the king, by 
Moltke, by Bismarck, and by General von Roon, the war 
minister. On the 2d of June, 1866, they were oppo- 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



site Koniggratz (or Sadowa, as the Austrians called 
it), where the Austrians were marshalled. On the 
3d of July the battle began; and the scales hung 
pretty evenly until, at the expected hour, the crown 
prince — "our Fritz," as the people affectionately 
called" him after this, later the Emperor Frederick 
William — made his appearance on the field with his 
army. Assailed on both flanks and pressed in the 
centre, the Austrians first began to slacken fire, then to 
waver, then to give way under the terrific concentrated 
fire of the needle-guns, then to retreat into ignominious 
flight. The contending forces were about equal ; but 
science and the needle-gun won the day, and changed 
the whole aspect of modern warfare. The battle of 
Koniggratz settled this point, — that success in war 
depends more on good powder and improved weapons 
than on personal bravery or even masterly evolutions. 
Other things being equal, victory is almost certain to 
be on the side of the combatants who have the best 
weapons. The Prussians won the day of Koniggratz 
by their breech-loading guns, although much was due 
to their superior organization and superior strategy. 

That famous battle virtually ended the Austro-Prus- 
sian campaign, which lasted only about seven weeks. It 
was one of those " decisive battles " that made Prussia 
the ascendent power in Germany, and destroyed the 
prestige of Austria. It added territory to Prussia equal 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 87 

to one quarter of the whole kingdom, and increased 
her population by four and a half millions of peo- 
ple. At a single bound, Prussia became a first-class 
military State. 

The Prussian people were almost frantic with joy ; 
and Bismarck, from being the most unpopular man in 
the nation, became instantly a national idol. His 
marvellous diplomacy, by which Austria was driven 
to the battlefield, was now seen and universally ac- 
knowledged. He obtained fame, decorations, and in- 
creased power. A grateful nation granted to him four 
hundred thousand thalers, with which he bought the 
estate of Varzin. General von Moltke received three 
hundred thousand thalers and immense military pres- 
tige. The war minister, Von Roon, also received three 
hundred thousand thalers. These three stood out as 
the three most prominent men of the nation, next to 
the royal family. 

Never was so short a war so pregnant with impor- 
tant consequences. It consolidated the German Con- 
federation under Prussian dominance. By weakening 
Austria it led to the national unity of Italy, and se- 
cured free government to the whole Austrian empire, 
since that government could no longer refuse the de- 
mands of Hungary. Above all, " it shattered the fabric 
of Ultramontanism which had been built up by the 
concordat of 1853." 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



It was the expectation of Napoleon III. that Austria 
would win in this war ; but the loss of the Austrians 
was four to one, besides her humiliation, condemned 
as she was to pay a war indemnity, with the loss 
also of the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort. But Bismarck 
did not push Austria to the wall, since he did not wish 
to make her an irreconcilable enemy. He left open 
a door for future and permanent peace. He did not 
desire to ruin his foe, but simply to acquire the lead 
in German politics and exclude Austria from the 
Germanic Confederation. Napoleon, disappointed and 
furious, blustered, and threatened war unless he too 
could come in for a share of the plunder, to which 
he had no real claim. Bismarck calmly replied, 
" Well, then, let there, be war," knowing full well that 
France was not prepared. Napoleon consulted his 
marshals. "Are we prepared," asked he, "to fight 
all Germany ? " " Certainly not," replied the marshals, 
" until our whole army, like that of Prussia, is supplied 
with a breech-loader; until our drill is modified to 
suit the new weapon ; until our fortresses are in a 
perfect state of preparedness, and until we create 
a mobile and efficient national reserve." 

When Carlyle heard the news of the great vic- 
tories of Prussia, he wrote to a friend, " Germany is to 
stand on her feet henceforth, and face all manner of 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 89 

Napoleons and hungry, sponging dogs, with clear steel 
in her hand and an honest purpose in her heart. This 
seems to me the best news we or Europe have heard 
for the last forty years or more." 

The triumphal return of the Prussian troops to 
Berlin was followed on the 24th of February, 1867, 
by the opening of the first North German parlia- 
ment, — three hundred deputies chosen from the vari- 
ous allied States by universal suffrage. Twenty-two 
States north of the Main formed themselves into a 
perpetual league for the protection of the Union and 
its institutions. Legislative power was to be invested 
in two bodies, — the Eeichstag, representing the peo- 
ple; and the Bundesrath, composed of delegates from 
the allied governments, the perpetual presidency of 
which was invested in the king of Prussia. He was 
also acknowledged as the commander-in-chief of the 
united armies ; and the standing army, on a peace 
footing, was fixed at one per cent of all the inhabi- 
tants. This constitution was drawn by Bismarck him- 
self, not unwilling, under the unquestioned supremacy 
of his monarch, to utilize the spirit of the times, and 
admit the people to a recognized support of the crown. 

Thus Germany at last acquired a liberal constitu- 
tion, though not so free and broad as that of England. 
The absolute control of the army and navy, the power 
to make treaties and declare peace and war, the ap- 
34 



90 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

pointment of all the great officers of state, and the 
control of education and other great interests still re- 
mained with the king. The functions of the lower 
House seemed to be mostly confined to furnishing the 
sinews of war and government, — the granting of 
money and regulation of taxes. Meanwhile secret 
treaties of alliance were concluded with the southern 
States of Germany, offensive and defensive, in case of 
war, — another stroke of diplomatic ability on the 
part of Bismarck; for the intrigues of Napoleon had 
been incessant to separate the southern from the nor- 
thern States, — in other words, to divide Germany, 
which the French emperor was sanguine he could do. 
With a divided Germany, he believed that he was 
more than a match for the king of Prussia, as soon as 
his military preparations should be made. Could he 
convert these States into allies, he was ready for war. 
He was intent upon securing for France territorial 
enlargements equal to those of Prussia. He could 
no longer expect anything on the Ehine, and he turned 
his eyes to Belgium. 

The war cloud arose on the political horizon in 
1867, when Napoleon sought to purchase from the 
king of Holland the Duchy of Luxemburg, which was 
a personal fief of his kingdom, though it was inhab- 
ited by Germans, and which made him a member of the 
Germaiiic Confederation if he chose to join it. In the 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 91 

time of Napoleon I. Luxemburg was defended by one 
of the strongest fortresses in Europe, garrisoned by- 
Prussian troops ; it was therefore a menace to France 
on her northeastern frontier. As Napoleon ITT. prom- 
ised a very big sum of money for this duchy, with 
a general protectorate of Holland in case of Prussian 
aggressions, the king of Holland was disposed to listen 
to the proposal of the French emperor; but when 
it was discovered that an alliance of the southern 
States had been made with the northern States of 
Germany, which made Prussia the mistress of Ger- 
many, the king of Holland became alarmed, and de- 
clined the French proposals. The chagrin of the 
emperor and the wrath of the French nation became 
unbounded. Again they had been foiled by the arch- 
diplomatist of Prussia. 

All this was precisely what Bismarck wanted. Con- 
fident of the power of Prussia, he did all he could 
to drive the French nation to frenzy. He worked on 
a vainglorious, excitable, and proud people, at the 
height of their imperial power. Napoleon was irreso- 
lute, although it appeared to him that war with Prus- 
sia was the only way to recover his prestige from thes 
mistakes of the Mexican expedition. But Mexico had 
absorbed the marrow of the French army, and the 
emperor was not quite ready for war. He must find 
some pretence for abandoning his designs on Luxem- 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



burg, any attempt to seize which would be a plain 
casus belli. Both parties were anxious to avoid the 
initiative of a war which might shake Europe to its 
centre. Both parties pretended peace ; but both desired 
war. 

Napoleon, a man fertile in resources, in order to 
avoid immediate hostilities looked about for some way 
to avoid what he knew was premature ; so he pro- 
posed submitting the case to arbitration, and the 
Powers applied themselves to extinguish the gather- 
ing flames. The conference — composed of represen- 
tatives of England, France, Eussia, Austria, Prussia, 
Holland, and Belgium — met in London ; and the 
result of it was that Prussia agreed to withdraw her 
garrison from Luxemburg and to dismantle the fort- 
ress, while the duchy was to continue to be a member 
of the German Zollverein, or Customs Union. King 
William was willing to make this concession to the 
cause of humanity; and his minister, rather than go 
against the common sentiment of Europe, reluctantly 
conceded this point, which, after all, was not of para- 
mount importance. Thus was war prevented for a 
time, although everybody knew that it was inevitable, 
sooner or later. 

The next three years Bismarck devoted himself to 
diplomatic intrigues in order to cement the union of the 
German States, — for the Luxemburg treaty was well 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 93 

known to be a mere truce, — and Napoleon did the 
same to weaken the union. In the mean time King 
William accepted an invitation of Napoleon to visit 
Paris at the time of the Great Exposition ; and thither 
he went, accompanied by Counts Bismarck and Moltke. 
The party was soon after joined by the Czar, accom- 
panied by Prince Gortschakoff, who had the reputa- 
tion of being the ablest diplomatist in Europe, next 
to Bismarck. The meeting was a sort of carnival of 
peace, hollow and pretentious, with fetes and banquets 
and military displays innumerable. The Prussian min- 
ister amused himself by feeling the national pulse, 
while Moltke took long walks to observe the fortifica- 
tions of Paris. When his royal guests had left, Na- 
poleon travelled to Salzburg to meet the Austrian 
emperor, ostensibly to condole with him for the unfor- 
tunate fate of Maximilian in Mexico, but really to 
interchange political ideas. Bismarck was not de- 
ceived, and openly maintained that the military and 
commercial interests of north and south Germany 
were identical. 

In April, 1868, the Customs Parliament assembled 
in Berlin, as the first representative body of the entire 
nation that had as yet met. Though convoked to 
discuss tobacco and cotton, the real object was to 
pave the way for " the consummation of the national 
destinies." 



04 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Bismarck meanwhile conciliated Hanover, whose 
sovereign, King George, had been dethroned, by giving 
him a large personal indemnity, and by granting home 
rule to what was now a mere province of Prussia. 
In Berlin he resisted in the Eeichstag the consti- 
tutional encroachments which the Liberal party aimed 
at, — ever an autocrat rather than minister, having no 
faith in governmental responsibility to parliament. 
Only one master he served, and that was the king, 
as Eichelieu served Louis XIIL Nor would he hear 
of a divided ministry; affairs were too complicated 
to permit him to be encumbered by colleagues. He 
maintained that public affairs demanded quickness, 
energy, and unity of action ; and it was certainly 
fortunate for Germany in the present crisis that 
the foreign policy was in the hands of a single 
man, and that man so able, decided, and astute as 
Bismarck. 

All the while secret preparations for war went on 
in both Prussia and France. French spies overran 
the Ehineland, and German draughtsmen were busy 
ia the cities and plains of Alsace-Lorraine. France 
had at last armed her soldiers with the breech- 
loading chassepot gun, by many thought to be superior 
to the needle-gun; and she had in addition secretly 
constructed a terrible and mysterious engine of war 
called mitrailleuse, — a combination of gun-barrels 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 95 



fired by mechanism. These were to effect great re- 
sults. On paper, four hundred and fifty thousand 
men were ready to rush as an irresistible avalanche 
on the Ehine provinces. To the distant observer it 
seemed that France would gain an easy victory, and 
once again occupy Berlin. Besides her supposed mili- 
tary forces, she still had a great military prestige. 
Prussia had done nothing of signal importance for 
forty years except to fight the duel with Austria ; but 
France had done the same, and had signally con- 
quered at Solferino. Yet during forty years Prussia 
had been organizing her armies on the plan which 
Scharnhorst had furnished, and had four hundred and 
fifty thousand men under arms, — not on paper, but 
really ready for the field, including a superb cavalry- 
force. The combat was to be one of material forces.. 
guided by science. 

I have said that only a pretext was needed to 
begin hostilities. This pretext on the part of the 
French was that their ambassador to Berlin, Bene- 
detti, was reported to have been insulted by the king. 
He was not insulted. The king simply refused to 
have further parley with an arrogant ambassador, 
and referred him to his government, — which was the 
proper thing to do. On this bit of scandal the French 
politicians — the people who led the masses — lashed 
themselves into fury, and demanded immediate war. 



96 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

Napoleon could not resist the popular pressure, and 
war was proclaimed. The arrogant demand of Na- 
poleon, through his ambassador Benedetti, that the 
king of Prussia should agree never to permit his rela- 
tive, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, to accept the 
vacant throne of Spain, to which he had been elected 
by the provisional government of that country, Avas 
the occasion of King "William's curt reception of the 
French envoy ; for this was an insulting demand, not 
to be endured. It was no affair of Napoleon, espe- 
cially since the prince had already declined the throne 
at the request of the king of Prussia, as the head 
of the Hohenzollern family. But the French nation 
generally, the Catholic Church party working through 
the Empress Eugenie, and, above all, the excitable 
Parisians, goaded by the orators and the Press, saw 
the possibility of an extension 6f the Roman empire 
of Charles V., under the control of Prussia ; and 
Napoleon was driven to the fatal course, first, of mak- 
ing the absurd demand, and then — in spite of a 
wholesome irresolution, born of his ignorance con- 
cerning his own military forces — of resenting its 
declinature with war. 

In two weeks the German forces were mobilized, 
and the colossal organization, in three great armies, 
all directed by Moltke as chief of staff to the com- 
mander-in-chief, the still vigorous old man who ruled 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 



aud governed at Berlin, were on their way to the 
seat of war. At Mayence the king in person, on the 
2d of August, 1870, assumed command of the united 
German armies ; and in one month from that date 
France was prostrate at his feet. 

It would be interesting to detail the familiar story ; 
but my limits will not permit. I can only say that 
the three armies of the German forces, each embracing 
several corps, were, one under the command of General 
Steinmetz, another under Prince Frederic Charles, and 
the third under the crown prince, — and all under the 
orders of Moltke, who represented the king. The 
crown prince, on the extreme left, struck the first blow 
at Weissenburg, on the 4th of August ; and on the 
6th he assaulted McMahon at Worth, and drove back 
his scattered forces, — partly on Chalons, and partly 
on Strasburg ; while Steinmetz, commanding the right 
wing, nearly annihilated Frossard's corps at Spicheren. 
It' was now the aim of the French under Bazaine, who 
commanded two hundred and fifty thousand men near 
Metz, to join McMahon's defeated forces. This was 
frustrated by Moltke in the bloody battle of Gravelotte, 
compelling Bazaine to retire within the lines of Metz, 
the strongest fortress in France, which was at once 
surrounded by Prince Charles. Meanwhile the crown 
prince continued the pursuit of McMahon, who had 
found it impossible to effect a junction with Bazaine. 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 



At Sedan the armies met ; but as the Germans were 
more than twice the number of the French, and had 
completely surrounded them, the struggle was useless, 
— and the French, with the emperor himself, were 
compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. Thus 
fell Napoleon's empire. 

After the battle of Sedan, one of the decisive battles 
of history, the Germans advanced rapidly to Paris, 
and King William took up his quarters at Versailles, 
with his staff and his councillor Bismarck, who had 
attended him day by day through the whole cam- 
paign, and conducted the negotiations of the surrender. 
Paris, defended by strong fortifications, resolved to sus- 
tain a siege rather than yield, hoping that something 
might yet turn up by which the besieged garrison 
should be relieved, — a forlorn hope, as Paris was 
surrounded, especially on the fall of Metz, by nearly 
half a million of the best soldiers in the world. Yet 
that memorable siege lasted five months, and Paris 
did not yield until reduced by extreme famine; and 
perhaps it might have held out much longer if it^ could 
have been provisioned. But this was not to be. The 
Germans took the city as Alaric had taken Kome, 
without much waste of blood. 

The conquerors were now inexorable, and demanded 
a war indemnity of five milliards of francs, and the ces- 
sion of Metz and the two provinces of Alsace-Lorraine 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 99 

(which Louis XIV. had formerly wrested away), in- 
cluding Strasburg. Eloquently but vainly did old 
Thiers plead for better terms ; but he pleaded with 
men as hard as iron, who exacted, however, no more 
than Napoleon III. would have done had the fortune 
of war enabled him to reach Berlin as the conqueror. 
War is hard under any circumstances, but never was 
national humiliation more complete than when the 
Prussian flag floated over the Arc de Triomphe, and 
Prussian soldiers defiled beneath it. 

Nothing was now left for the aged Prussian king 
but to put upon his head the imperial crown of Ger- 
many, for all the German States were finally united 
under him. The scene took place at Versailles in the 
Hall of Mirrors, in probably the proudest palace ever 
erected since the days of Nebuchadnezzar. Surrounded 
by princes and generals, Chancellor Bismarck read 
aloud the Proclamation of the Empire, and the new 
German emperor gave thanks to God. It was a fitting 
sequence to the greatest military success since Napo- 
leon crushed the German armies at Jena and Auster- 
litz. The tables at last were turned, and the heavy, 
phlegmatic, intelligent Teutons triumphed over the 
warlike and passionate Celts. So much for the genius 
of the greatest general and the greatest diplomatist 
that Europe had known for half a century. 

Bismarck's rewards for his great services were mag- 



100 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

nificent, quite equal to those of Wellington or Marl- 
borough. He received another valuable estate, this 
time from his sovereign, vs^hich gift made him one of 
the greatest landed proprietors of Prussia; he was 
created a Prince ; he vs^as decorated with the principal 
orders of Europe ; he had augmented power as chan- 
cellor of confederated Germany ; he was virtual dicta- 
tor of his country, which he absolutely ruled in the 
name of a wearied old man passed seventy years of age. 
But the minister's labors and vexations do not 
end with the Franco-German war. During the years 
that immediately follow, he is still one of the hard- 
est-worked men in Europe. He receives one thou- 
sand letters and telegrams a day. He has to manage 
an unpractical legislative assembly, clamorous for 
new privileges, and attend to the complicated affairs 
of a great empire, and direct his diplomatic agents in 
every country of Europe. He finds that the sanctum 
of a one-man power is not a bed of roses. Sometimes 
he seeks rest and recreation on one of his estates, but 
labors and public duties follow him wherever he goes. 
He is too busy and preoccupied even for pleasure, 
unless he is hunting boars and stags. He seems to 
care but little for art of any kind, except music ; he 
never has visited the Museum of Berlin but once in 
his life; he never goes to the theatre. He appears 
as little as possible in the streets, but when recognized 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. lOl 

he is stared at as a wonder. He lives hospitably but 
plainly, and in a palace with few ornaments or luxu- 
ries. He enshrouds himself in mystery, but not in 
gloom. Few dare approach him, for his manners are 
brusque and rough, and he is feared more even than 
he is honored. His aspect is stern and haughty, ex- 
cept when he occasionally unbends. In his family he 
is simple, frank, and domestic ; but in public he is the 
cold and imperative dictator. Even the royal family 
are uncomfortable in his commanding and majestic 
presence; everybody stands in awe of him but his 
wife and children. He caresses only his dogs. He 
eats but once a day, but his meal is enough for five 
men ; he drinks a quart of beer or wine without taking 
the cup from his mouth ; he smokes incessantly, gene- 
rally a long Turkish pipe. He sleeps irregularly, dis- 
turbed by thoughts which fill his troubled brain. 
Honored is the man who is invited to his table, even 
if he be the ambassador of a king ; for at table the 
host is frank and courteous, and not overbearing like 
a literary dictator He is well read in history, but 
not in art or science or poetry. His stories are admi- 
rable when he is in convivial mood; all sit around 
him in silent admiration, for no one dares more than 
suggest the topic, — he does all the talking himself. 
Bayard Taylor, when United States minister at Berlin, 
was amazed and confounded by his freedom of speech 



102 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

and apparent candor. He is frank in matters he does 
not care to conceal, and simple as a child when not 
disputed or withstood, but when opposed fierce as a 
lion, — a spoiled man of success, yet not intoxicated 
with power. Haughty and irritable perhaps, but never 
vain like a French statesman in office, — a Webster 
rather than a Thiers. 

Such is the man who has ruled the German empire 
with an iron hand for twenty years or more, — the most 
remarkable man of power known to history for seventy- 
five years ; immortal like Cavour, and for his services 
even more than his abilities. He has raised Prussia 
to the front rank among nations, and created German 
unity. He has quietly effected more than Eichelieu 
ever aspired to perform ; for Eichelieu sought only to 
build up a great throne, while Bismarck has united 
a great nation in patriotic devotion to Fatherland, 
which so far as we can see, is as invincible as it is 
enlightened, — enlightened in everything except in 
democratic ideas. 

I will not dwell on the career and character of Prince 
Bismarck after the Franco-Prussian war. He has not 
since been identified with any great national movements 
which command universal interest. His labors have 
been chiefly confined to German affairs, — quarrels with 
the Keichstag, settlement of difficulties with the various 
States of the Germanic Confederation, the consolida- 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 103 

tion of the internal affairs of the empire while he car- 
ried on diplomatic relations with other great Powers, 
efforts to gain the good-will of Eussia and secure the 
general peace of Europe. These, and a multitude of 
other questions too recent to be called historical, he 
has dealt with, in all of which his autocratic sympa- 
thies called out the censures of the advocates of greater 
liberty, and diminished his popularity. For twenty 
years his will was the law of the German Confedera- 
tion ; though bitterly opposed at times by the Liberals, 
he was always sustained by his imperial master, who 
threw the burdens of State on his herculean shoulders, 
sometimes too great to bear with placidity. His foreign 
policy has been less severely criticised than his domes- 
tic, which was alternate success and failure. 

The war which he waged with the spiritual power was 
perhaps the most important event of his administra- 
tion, and in which he had not altogether his own way, 
underrating, as is natural to such a man, spiritual 
forces as compared with material. In his memorable 
quarrel with Eome he appeared to the least advan- 
tage, — at first rigid, severe, and arbitrary with the 
Catholic clergy, even to persecution, driving away the 
Jesuits (1872), shutting up schools and churches, im- 
prisoning and fining ecclesiastical dignitaries, intolerant 
in some cases as the Inquisition itself. One quarter 
of the people of the empire are Catholics, yet he sternly 



104 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

sought to suppress their religious rights and liberties as 
they regarded them, thinking he could control them by- 
material penalties, — such as taking away their support, 
and shutting them up in prison, — forgetting that con- 
scientious Christians, whether Catholics or Protestants, 
will in matters of religion defy the mightiest rulers. 
No doubt the policy of the Catholics of Germany was 
extremely irritating to a despotic ruler who would ex- 
alt the temporal over the spiritual power; and equally 
true was it that the Pope himself was unyielding in 
regard to the liberties of his church, demanding every- 
thing and giving back nothing, in accordance with the 
uniform traditions of Papal domination. The Catho- 
lics, the world over, look upon the education of their 
children as a thing to be superintended by their own 
religious teachers, — as their inalienable right and im- 
perative duty ; and any State interference with this 
right and this duty they regard as religious persecution, 
to which they will never submit without hostility and 
relentless defiance. Bismarck felt that to concede to 
the demands which the Catholic clergy ever have 
made in respect to religious privileges was to "go to 
Canossa," — where Henry IV. Emperor of Germany, in 
1077, humiliated himself before Pope Gregory VII. in 
order to gain absolution. The long-sighted and ex- 
perienced Thiers remarked that here Bismarck was 
on the wrong track, and would be compelled to retreat. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 105 

with all his power, Bismarck was too wise a man to 
persist in attempting impossibilities, and after a bitter 
fight he became conciliatory. He did not "go to Ca- 
nossa," but he yielded to the dictates of patriotism and 
enlightened policy, and the quarrel was patched up. 

His long struggles with the Catholics told upon his 
health and spirits, and he was obliged to seek long 
periods of rest and recreation on his estates, — some- 
times, under great embarrassments and irritations, 
threatening to resign, to which his imperial master, 
grateful and dependent, would never under any circum- 
stances consent. But the prince president of the min- 
isters and chancellor of the empire was loaded down 
with duties — in his cabinet, in his office, and in the 
parliament — most onerous to bear, and which no other 
man in Germany was equal to. His burdens at times 
were intolerable: his labors were prodigious, and the 
opposition he met with was extremely irritating to a 
man accustomed to have his own way in everything. 

Another thing gave him great solicitude, taxed to 
the utmost his fertile brain; and that was the rising 
and wide-spreading doctrines of Socialism, — which was 
to Germany what Nihilism is to Eussia and Fenianism 
was to Ireland ; based on discontent, unbelief, and des- 
perate schemes of unpractical reform, leading to the 
assassination even of emperors themselves. How to 
deal with this terrible foe to all governments, all 



106 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

laws, and all institutions was a most perplexing ques- 
tion. At first he was inclined to the most rigorous 
measures, to a war of utter extermination; but how 
could he deal with enemies he could neither see nor 
find, omnipresent and invisible, and unscrupulous as 
Satanic furies, — fanatics whom no reasoning could 
touch and no laws control, whether human or divine ? 
As experience and thought enlarged his mental vision, 
he came to the conclusion that the real source and 
spring of that secret and organized hostility which he 
deplored, but was unable to reach and to punish, were 
evils in government and evils in the structure of so- 
ciety, — aggravating inequality, grinding poverty, igno- 
rance, and the hard struggle for life. Accordingly, he 
devoted his energies to improve the general condition 
of the people, and make the struggle for life easier. 
In his desire to equalize burdens he resorted to in- 
direct rather than direct taxation, — to high tariffs 
and protective duties to develop German industry; 
throwing to the winds his earlier beliefs in the theo- 
ries of the Manchester school of political economy, and 
all speculative ideas as to the blessings of free-trade 
for the universe in general. He bought for the gov- 
ernment the various Prussian railroads, in order to 
have uniformity of rates and remove vexatious dis- 
criminations, which only a central power could effect. 
In short, he aimed to develop the material resources 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 107 

of the country, both to insure financial prosperity 
and to remove those burdens which press heavily on 
the poor. 

On one point, however, his policy was inexorable ; 
and that was to suffer no reduction of the army, but 
rather to increase it to the utmost extent that the 
nation could bear, — not with the view of future con- 
quests or military aggrandizement, as some thought, 
but as an imperative necessity to guard the empire 
from all hostile attacks, whether from France or Eus- 
sia, or both combined. A country surrounded with 
enemies as Germany is, in the centre of Europe, with- 
out the natural defences of the sea which England 
enjoys, or great chains of mountains on her borders 
difficult to penetrate and easy to defend, as is the 
case with Switzerland, must have a superior military 
force to defend her in case of future contingencies 
which no human wisdom can foresee. Nor is it such 
a dreadful burden to support a peace establishment 
of four hundred and fifty thousand men as some 
think, — one soldier for every one hundred inhabi- 
tants, trained and disciplined to be intelligent and 
industrious when his short term of three years of ac- 
tive service shall have expired: much easier to bear, 
I fancy, than the burden of supporting five paupers or 
more to every hundred inhabitants, as in England and/ 

Scotland. / 

/ 



108 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

In 1888 Bismarck made a famous speech in the 
Reichstag to show the necessity of Prussia's being 
armed. He had no immediate fears of Russia, he said ; 
he professed to beheve that she would keep peace with 
Germany. But he spoke of numerous distinct crises 
within forty years, when Prussia was on the verge of 
being drawn into a general European war, which diplo- 
macy fortunately averted, and such as now must be 
warded off by being too strong for attack. He men- 
tioned the Crimean war in 1853, the Italian war in 
1858, the Pohsh rebellion in 1863, the Schleswig- 
Holstein embroilment which so nearly set all Europe 
by the ears, the Austro- Prussian war of 1866, the 
Luxemburg dispute in 1867, the Franco-German war of 
1870, the Balkan war of 1877, the various aspects 
of the Eastern Question, changes of government in 
France, etc., — each of which in its time threatened 
the great "coalition war," which Germany had thus 
far been kept out of, but which Bismarck wished to 
provide against for the future. 

" The long and the short of it is," said he, " that we must 
be as strong as we possibly can be in these days. We have 
the capability of being stronger than any other nation of 
equal population in the world, and it would be a crime if 
we did not use this capability. We must make still greater 
exertions than other Powers for the same ends, on account of 
our geographical position. We lie in the midst of Europe. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. 109 

We have at least three sides open to attack. God has 
placed on one side of us the French, — a most warlike and 
restless nation, — and he has allowed the fighting tendencies 
of Kussia to become great; so we are forced into measures 
which perhaps we would not otherwise make. And the very 
strength for which we strive shows that we are inclined to 
peace ; for with such a powerful machine as we wish to make 
the German army, no one would undertake to attack us. We 
Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world ; and it is 
the fear of God which causes us to love and cherish peace." 

Such was the avowed policy of Bismarck, — and I 
believe in his sincerity, — to maintain friendly relations 
with other nations, and to maintain peace for the in- 
terests of humanity as well as for Germany, which can 
be secured only by preparing for war, and with such 
an array of forces as to secure victory. It was not 
with foreign Powers that he had the greatest difficulty, 
but to manage the turbulent elements of internal hos- 
tilities and jealousies, and oppose the anarchic forces 
of doctrinaires, visionary dreamers, clerical aggressors, 
and socialistic incendiaries, — foes alike of a stable 
government and of ultimate progress. 

In the management of the internal affairs of the 
empire he cannot be said to have been as successful 
as was Cavour in Italy He was not in harmony with 
the spirit of the age, nor was he wise. His persistent 
opposition to the freedom of the Press was as great 



110 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

an error as his persecution of the Catholics ; and his 
insatiable love of power, grasping all the great offices 
of State, was a serious offence in the eyes of a jealous 
master, the present emperor, whom he did not take 
sufficient pains to conciliate. The greatness of Bis- 
marck was not as administrator of an empire, but 
rather as the creator of an empire, and which he raised 
to greatness by diplomatic skill. His distinguishable 
excellence was in the management of foreign affairs; 
and in this power he has never been surpassed by any 
foreign minister. 

Contrary to all calculations, this great proud man 
who has ruled Germany with so firm a hand for thirty 
years, and whose services have been unparalleled in 
the history of statesmen, was not too high to fall. 
He has fallen because a young, inexperienced, and 
ambitious sovereign, — apt pupil of his own in the 
divine right of monarchs to govern, and yet seemingly 
inspired by a keen sensitiveness to his people's wants 
and the spirit of the age, — could not endure his com- 
manding ascendency and haughty dictation, and ac- 
cepted his resignation offered in a moment of pique. 
He has fallen as Wolsey fell before Henry VIIL, — 
too great a man for a subject, yet always loyal to the 
principles of legitimacy and the will of his sovereign 
But he retired at the age of seventy -five, with princely 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE. Ill 

estiites, unexampled honors, and the admiration and 
gratitude of his countrymen ; with the consciousness 
of having elevated them to the proudest position in 
continental Europe, in spite of the dangers vv^hich have 
threatened them from the east and the west and the 
south, to say nothing of those arising from internal 
dissensions and parliamentary discords The aged 
Emperor William I. died in 1888, full of years and of 
honors. His son the Emperor Frederick died within 
a few months of him, leaving behind a deep respect 
and a genuine sorrow. The grandson, the present 
Emperor William II., has been called "a modern man, 
notwithstanding certain proclivities which still adhere 
to him, like pieces of the shell of an egg from which 
the bird has issued." He is yet an unsolved problem, 
but may be regarded not without hope for a wise, 
strong, and useful reign. 

As for Prince Bismarck, with all his faults, — and no 
man is perfect, — I love and honor this courageous 
giant, who has labored, under such vexatious opposition, 
to secure the unity of Germany and the glory of the 
Prussian monarchy ; who has been conscientious in the 
discharge of his duties, as he has understood them, in 
the fear of God, whose sovereignty he has ever, like 
his imperial master, acknowledged, — a modern Crom- 
well in another cause, whose fame will increase with 
the advancing ages. The truly immortal men are those 



112 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

who have rendered practical services to their country 
and to civilization in its broadest sense, rather than 
those theoretical dreamers who with fine sounding words 
have imposed. upon their contemporaries. 



AUTHORITIES. 

Professor Seely's Life of Stein, Hezekiel's Biography of Bismarck, 
and the Life of Prince Bismarck hy Charles Lowe, are the books to which 
I am most indebted for the compilation of this chapter. But one may 
profitably read the various histories of the Franco-Prussian war, the Life 
of Prince Hardenberg, the Life of Moltke, the Life of Scharnhorst, and 
the Life of William von Humboldt. An excellent abridgment of German 
History, during this century, is furnished by Professor Miiller. The 
Speech of Prince Bismarck in the German Reichstag, February, 1888, 
I have found very instructive and interesting, — a sort of resume of his 
own political life. 



PUmCE BISMARCK, x 

A CHARACTER SKETCH.— By BAYARD TAYLOR. 
Written in 1877. 



PRINCE BISMARCK. 

A CHARACTER SKETCH.— By BAYARD TAYLOR. 

The distinction between a politician and a states- 
man is constantly forgotten, or at least practically- 
slurred over, in our civil history. The former may be 
described as a man who studies the movements of 
parties as they are developed from day to day, and 
from year to year ; who is quick to avail himself of 
popular moods and thereby to secure temporary power; 
and whose highest success lies in his barometrical 
capacity of foreseeing coming changes and setting the 
sails of his personal fortune in such wise as either 
safely to weather a gale or to catch the first breath of 
a favorable wind. But the statesman is one who is 
able to look, both backward and forward, beyond his 
own time ; who discovers the permanent forces under- 
lying the transient phenomena of party conflicts ; who 
so builds that, although he may not complete the 
work, those who succeed him will be forced to complete 
it according to his design; and who is individually 
great enough to use popularity an an aid, without 

accepting the lack of it as a defeat. 

115 



116 PMINOE BISMARCK. 

In the economy of human government, it so hap- 
pens that very frequently mere politicians are elevated 
to seats which should be occupied, of right, by states- 
men ; while the latter, shut out from every field of 
executive power, and allowed no other place than the 
parliamentary forum, are too often mistaken for mere 
political theorists. The history of our own country 
gives us many examples of this perversity of fate, this 
unhappy difference Isetween the path indicated by 
genius and that prescribed by circumstances. But in 
Europe, where the accident of rank in almost all cases 
determines the possible heights of political power, the 
union of genius and its field of action — of statesman- 
ship and opportunity — is much rarer. And rarest of 
all is that grasp of mind which never fails to consider 
passing events in their broadest relation to all history, 
and that serenity of intellect which is satisfied with 
their logical place therein, though the present genera- 
tion be incompetent to perceive it. Of the six promi- 
nent European statesmen of this century — Pitt, Stein, 
Metternich, Cavour, Gortschakoff, and Bismarck — the 
last-named possesses these rare faculties in the fullest 
degree. More fortunate than most of the others, lie 
has lived to see much of his work secured — so far as 
our intelligence may now perceive — beyond the possi- 
bility of its being undone. 

When the younger Pitt, early in 1806, after the 



A CHARACTER SKETCH. 117 

battles of Ulm and Ansterlitz, cried out in despair, 
" Roll up the map of Europe !" he could not have 
guessed that in less than ten years his heroic although 
unfortunate policy would be triumphant. He died 
a few months afterwards, broken in spirit, with no 
prophetic visions of'Leipsic and Waterloo to lighten 
his hopeless forebodings. Stein saw Germany free, 
but his activity ceased long before she rose out of the 
blighting shadow of the Holy Alliance ; Metternich 
perished after the overthrow of the system to which he 
had devoted his life ; and Cavour passed away nearly 
ten years before Venice and Eome came to complete 
his United Italy. Gortschakoff still lives,* a marvel of 
intellectual vigor at his age, and may well rejoice in 
the emancipation of the serfs, the liberalization of the 
Russian Government, and the elevation of his country 
to a new importance in the Avorld ; but it has not been 
given to him, as to Bismarck, to create a new political 
system, to restore a perished nationality, and to fill 
its veins with blood drawn directly from the hearts of 
the people. 

If Bismarck's career is so remarkable in its results, 
it is even more remarkable in its character. We can 
comprehend it only by estimating at their full value 
two distinct, almost antagonistic, elements which are 

* He died in 1883. 



118 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

combined in his nature. It requires some knowledge 
of the different classes of society in Grermany, and of 
the total life of the people, to understand them clearly; 
and I must limit myself to indicating them in a few 
rapid outlines. 

Bismarck is of an ancient noble family of Pom- 
erania, belonging to that class which is probably the 
most feudalistic in its inherited habits, and the 
most despotically reactionary in its opinions, of 
the various aristocratic circles of Germany. In him 
the sense of will and the instinct of rule which brooks 
no disobedience are intensified by a physical frame of 
almost giant power and proportions. He is one of 
those men who bear down all obstacles from impulse, 
no less than from principle — who take a half-animal j 
delight in trampling out a path when others attempt ] 
to beset or barricade it. Apart from his higher polit- I 
ical purposes, he cannot help but enjoy conquering for j 
the sake of conquest alone. This is not a feature of | 
character which implies heartlessness or conscious | 
cruelty; in him it coexists with many fine social, 
humane, and generous qualities. 

The other element in Bismarck's nature, which lifts 
him so far above tlie level of the class into which he 
was born, is an almost phenomenal capacity to see 
all life and all history apart from his inherited intel- 
lectual tendencies. Until recently, it was almost 



)ial,y 



A CHARACTKR SKETCH. 119 

impossible for any Prussian Junker to judge a polit- 
ical question of the present day without referring 
it to some obsolete, mediaBval standard of opinion ; but 
there never was an English or an American statesman 
more keenly alive to the true significance of modern 
events, to the importance of political movements and 
currents of thought, and to the necessity of selecting 
strictly practical means, than the Chancellor of the 
German Empire. He possesses a wonderful clearness 
of vision, and therefore rarely works for an immediate 
result. In the midst of the most violent excitements 
his brain is cool, for he has studied their causes and 
calculated their nature and duration. It is impossible 
that he should not have gone through many intel- 
lectual struggles in his early years : the opposing qual- 
ities which combine to form his greatness could not 
have been easily harmonized. Out of such struggles, 
perhaps, has grown a tact — or let us rather call it a 
power — which specially distinguishes him. He pos- 
sesses an astonishing skill in the use of an inscrutable 
reticence or an almost incredible frankness, just as he 
chooses to apply the one or the other ; and some of 
his most signal diplomatic triumphs have been won 
in this manner. The secret thereof is, that while he 
uses the antiquated conventionalisms of diplomacy 
when it suits, he relishes every fair opportunity of 
showing his contempt for them by speaking the 



190 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

simple truth, knowing beforehand that it will not be 
believed. 

Looking back over his history, it is now easy to 
see that Bismarck's great political plan might easily 
have failed, had he not possessed such a remarkable 
combination of candor and secretiveness. It was 
undoubtedly slowly developed in his mind during his 
residence of eight years in Frankfurt as the repre- 
sentative of Prussia in the old German Diet. He 
there learned the impracticability of such a union, 
the damage inflicted upon all Germany by the domi- 
nant influence of Austria, and the necessity of a radical 
political change. His strong conservative sentiments 
did not blind him to the fact that such a change could 
only be accomplished by the aid of the people ; and 
this involved the danger, at that time, of precipitating 
a new revolution. He had the power to wait, and, 
while keeping his great object steadily in view, to 
conceal every movement which pointed towards it. 
Even had he been far more liberal in his political 
views, he could not have escaped the necessity of 
endeavoring to place himself at the head of the 
Conservative party : there was no other path to power, 
and no success was possible without power. 

In other respects, his residence at Frankfurt was 
rich in opportunities for the broader education of a 
statesman. His journeys to Italy, Hungary, Den- 



A CHARACTER SKETCH. 121 

mark, and Holland, his wide acquaintance with intel- 
ligent representatives of all European nations, and 
his acquisition of many languages, were aids to his 
cool, objective study of races, events, and governing 
forces. There was little opportunity for personal 
distinction ; the character of his services was only 
known to Frederic William IV. and his ministers; 
but the former, if unsuccessful as a ruler, was a man 
of great wit and keen intellect, and appreciated Bis- 
marck's ability from the first. Not until he "was 
appointed ambassador to Russia, in 1859, was the 
future statesman much heard of, outside of Prussia. 
His position in St. Petersburg, and afterwards in 
Paris, made manifest his intellectual power and dip- 
lomatic skill, and brought his name into prominence. 
When he became the minister of King William I., 
in the autumn of 1862, the moral shock which the 
German people experienced was not caused by their 
ignorance of his abilities. He was by that time well 
known, distrusted, feared, and — hated. 

I can distinctly recall the excitements of this 
period. When I reached St. Petersburg, in June, 
1862, Bismarck had taken his leave but a few weeks 
previously, and the diplomatic and court circles still 
included him in their gossip. He was almost in- 
variably spoken of with the greatest cordiality: his 
frankness, good-nature, and hearty enjoyment of 



122 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

repartee were specially emphasized. I remember that 
his brief term of service in France was then watched 
with very keen interest by the representatives of the 
other Powers. When I returned to Germany, a year 
later, he was at the head of affairs in Berlin ; and I 
doubt whether even Metternich was ever so unpopular 
with the great majority of the people. This was not 
surprising; for a member of the Prussian Herrenhaus 
(House of Lords), who was a chance travelling-com- 
panion of mine, expressed his unbounded satisfaction 
that an "Absolutist" was at last minister. There 
would be no more revolutions, he affirmed ; no more 
concession of useless privileges to the people ; the 
ancient rights of king and nobles would be restored. 
When the Conservatives said these things, the Liberals 
were justified in foreboding the worst evils. During 
this period I saw Bismarck, for the only time; and, 
however much I sympathized with the general feeling, 
I could not withhold the respect and admiration which 
attend the recognition of grand individual power. 
In stature and proportions he seemed to me to be the 
equal of General Winfield Scott, but his face had 
nothing of the vanity and petulance which character- 
ized the latter's. It was massive, clear, and firm — as 
if cut in granite when in repose, but slowly brighten- 
ing when he spoke. His tremendous will was ex- 
pressed as fully in the large, clear gray eyes as in the 



A CHARAGTEB SKETCH. 123 

outlines of the jaw. To judge from photographs, his 
face has changed but slightly since then. 

The world will never know the extent of the strain 
to which Bismarck's nature was subjected during those 
four years, when he rarely looked upon the people 
without meeting gloomy eyes or hearing sullen mur- 
murs of hate, when murder constantly tracked his 
footsteps and revolution only waited for some act 
which might let it loose. His long conflict with the 
Legislative Assembly, in regard to the army estimates, 
was inevitably misinterpreted. In fact, it was so 
designed ; for the statesman's secret plan could not 
be concealed from Austria, France, and Europe, unless 
the German people were first deceived. But the sus- 
picion that the increase of the military power of 
Prussia was solely intended to create a weapon against 
the liberties of the people provoked an imminent dan- 
ger. Bismarck walked on a narrow path between two 
abysses : if he had wavered for an instant, he must 
have fallen. He was made to feel, in a thousand ways, 
the depth of the popular indignation ; and he bore it, 
perhaps, the more easily because he always frankly 
declared his consciousness of it. This is a part of his 
experience which Herr Hesekiel * has passed over very 
lightly, out of consideration for the Germans them- 

* In his authorized Biography of Bismarck. 



124 PRINCE BISMARCK. 



selves, no less than for his subject; yet it should by 
no means be omitted from the statesman's biography. 
One incident, which I heard of at the time it occurred, 
is worth preserving. Bismarck was dining with a 
friend at the table d'hote of a hotel in Frankfurt, when 
he noticed strong signs of hostile recognition in two 
ladies who sat opposite. They immediately dropped 
their German, and began talking in the almost extinct 
Lettisch (Lettonian) tongue, feeling themselves per- 
fectly safe to abuse the minister to their heart's con- 
tent therein. But Bismarck, who never forgets any- 
thing, remembered a few words of the language, and 
could guess the drift of their talk. He waited a while, 
and then whispered to his friend, " When I say some- 
thing to you in an unknown tongue, hand me the 
dish of potatoes." Presently he spoke aloud, in Let- 
tonian, "Give me the potatoes, please!" The friend 
instantly complied; the ladies stared, petrified with 
surprise, then hurriedly rose and left the table. 

It is impossible wholly to preserve a great political 
secret from the instincts of other minds. For a year 
before the declaration of war against Austria, in 1866, 
a presentiment of something not entirely evil, to be 
reached through Bismarck's government, began to be 
felt in Germany. Singularly enough, it first impressed 
itself upon the young, and, when betrayed, was a fre- 
quent source of trouble in the homes of the Liberal 



A CHARACTER SKETCH. 125 

party. Among other instances, a boy of my own 
acquaintance, not more than eighteen years of age, 
prevailed upon his fellow-pupils in an academy to 
join him in sending a letter of congratulation to Bis- 
marck, after young Blind's mad attempt at assassina- 
tion. He was rewarded by a charming letter from the 
minister, and in the pride of his heart could not help 
showing it, to the amazement and deep mortification 
of his parents. But now the noble young fellow is 
dead ; and Bismarck's letter, preserved in a stately 
frame, is treasured by the family as a most precious 
souvenir of the son's foresight. The declaration of 
war nevertheless was a great shock to Germany. 
Even then its true purpose was not manifest ; but 
six weeks of victory, and the conditions of peace, 
opened the eyes of all. It is difficult to find, in the 
annals of any nation, such an overwhelming revulsion 
of sentiment. The swiftness of the work gave con- 
vincing evidence of long preparation : it was a phe- 
nomenon in German politics ; and the truth pierced, 
like a sudden shaft of lightning, to the hearts and 
brains of the whole people. In a day, Bismarck the 
Despot was translated into Bismarck the Liberator. 

When in Germany, in 1867, I learned, through 
the best sources, of a suggested finale to the Prusso- 
Austrian war, which I do not think has yet passed 
into history. The proposition, privately considered at 



126 PBINCE BISMARCK. 

Nikolsburg before signing the treaty of peace with 
Austria, was that the entire Prussian army should 
march westward through Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and 
Baden, to the Rhine, compel the support of Southern 
Germany, and engage France if she should take up 
the gage of battle thus thrown down. The boldness 
of such a plan must have made it very attractive ; 
but Bismarck, probably in deference to the King's 
views, finally declared that the fortune already secured 
was so great that it must not be hazarded. How 
much he gained by waiting four years does not now 
need to be explained. The movement might have 
been carried into effect, with very great probability 
of success; yet it would only have united Germany 
in form, not in feeling. It might have reconstructed 
the Empire, but upon no such firm foundation as it 
stands on at present. 

From that day, all men in all civilized countries 
who study the development of history have followed 
with keenest interest the course of the German states- 
man. He has been the focus of such intelligent 
observation that no important line of policy could 
long be kept secret ; but it is still the habit to dis- 
trust his simplest and frankest declarations. A mind 
of lower order would have been satisfied with the 
enormous triumph of avenging those bitter years of 
the Napoleonic usurpation, from 1806 to 1813, with 



A CHARACTER SKETCH. 127 

restoring the ancient boundaries of race after two 
centuries, and constructing the new and vital, because 
logical and coherent, German nationality. 

It was known that Bismarck^s iron constitution 
had been seriously shattered by his long and unre- 
lieved labors and the tremendous wear and tear of his 
moral energy. He should now be satisfied, said the 
world; he has a right to a season of rest and peace. 
Therefore, when he immediately plunged into a new 
and — as many of his heartiest admirers believed — an 
unnecessary struggle, there was a general feeling of 
surprise, amounting almost to dissatisfaction. The 
simple truth is, he saw the beginning of a conflict 
which will continue to disturb the world until it is 
finally settled by the complete divorcement of Church 
and State in all civilized nations. The work he under- 
took to do had far less reference to the interests of 
our day than to those of the coming generations. I 
shall not discuss the means he employed : to do this 
intelligently requires an intimate knowledge of the 
history of the whole subject in Germany since the 
Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648 ; and hence very little 
of the foreign criticism of his policy is really applica- 
ble. He has at least succeeded in building a firm 
dike against the rising tide of ecclesiastical aggression ; 
and the fight yet to be fought in France and Italy and 
Spain — perhaps even in England and the United 



128 PBINCE BISMARCK. 

States — will be the less fierce and dangerous because 
of his present work. He might well have avoided 
the hard, implacable features of the struggle, but the 
principle which impels him has the imperious char- 
acter of a conscience. 

While wondering at this man's great work, we 
must nevertheless guard ourselves against attributing 
to him liberal ideas of government in any partisan 
sense. He is an aristocrat, lifted by a great intellect 
above the narrowing influences of his rank. He 
believes in a government of power, and which shall 
exercise its power sternly when need comes. His 
habit of facing events defiantly, even in cases where 
a conciliatory policy might lead to the same results, 
makes his attitude sometimes unnecessarily harsh and 
despotic. As an individual, he is magnanimous ; as 
a statesman, never. His exaction of terms from 
France, his treatment of the German press, the 
bishops, and finally Count von Arnim, are prominent 
illustrations of this quality of his nature. In debate 
he is sometimes carried too far by the irritation 
created by his antagonists, and quite forgets his 
acquired imperturbability. But even in such in- 
stances he often has courage enough to publicly con- 
fess the fault. The truth is, he accepts the legisla- 
tive feature of the Imperial Government of Germany 
through his intellect, while the inherited instincts of 



A CHARACTER SKETCH. 129 

his nature rebel against it. His brain is modern, 
but the blood which feeds it is that of the Middle 
Ages. 

For compactness, clearness, and force there are no 
better speeches in the German language than Bis- 
marck's. He is an excellent English scholar, and has 
evidently modelled his style upon the best English 
examples. His sentences are short and as little in- 
volved as possible : he endeavors to avoid that con- 
struction, peculiar to the German tongue, which 
throws the verb — often the key-word to the meaning 
— to the very end of the sentence. He is rarely elo- 
quent; but he has an epigrammatic power of putting 
a great deal of significance into brief phrases, many 
of which find immediate currency among the people. 
For instance, the whole meaning of his conflict with 
the Catholic ecclesiastics was compressed into the 
sentence, "We shall not go to Canossa !" And the 
declaration of his policy of "blood and iron," which 
sent a thrill of horror through the country when first 
uttered, has become a proud and popular phrase. 

Bismarck stands now [1887] at the height of his suc- 
cess. He can receive no additional honor, nor is it 
likely that his influence will be further extended, except 
through new developments which may attest the wis- 
dom of his policy. It is not in his nature to stand 
idle : while he lives he will remain in action. He 



130 PRINCE BISMARCK. 

will therefore be a disturbing influence in European 
politics — an element of power through respect, or 
mistrust, or fear. But while it is not likely that any 
force or combination of forces can overthrow the work 
of his life, nothing he may henceforth do can in- 
validate his right to the title of the First Statesman 
of the Age. 
New York, March 17, 1887. 



/ 



SPEECH OF BISMAKCK 

BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG, 

February 6, 1888. 

Translated by Sarah Zimubruan. 

If I make use of words to-day, it is not to commend to 
your acceptance the measure * which the President has just 
mentioned. That it will be passed, I do not doubt ; nor do I 
believe I can do anything to increase the majority by which 
it will be passed, and to which of course great importance 
is attached, both at home and abroad. Gentlemen of all 
parties will have settled their intentions as they are in- 
clined, and I have the fullest confidence that the German 
Reichstag will again restore this increase of our defensive 
power to the height from which we gradually reduced it in 
the years 1867-1883 ; and this, not on account of the situa- 
tion in which we now find ourselves, not on account of the 
apprehensions which the Stock Exchange and public opinion 
are able to excite, but as the result of a wise examination 
of the whole situation of Europe. Therefore I shall have 
more to say in my speech about this, than about the measure 
itself. 

I do not care about speaking, for in this matter a word 
unfortunately spoken may do much harm, and many words 

* Relating to an additional tax for the purpose of increasing 
the Imperial army. 

131 



132 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

cannot do much towards enlightening the minds of our 
own people and the minds of foreigners. This indeed they 
might themselves do without my aid. I speak unwillingly; 
but I fear that were I to keep silent the expectations which 
are attached to the present debate, the unrest in public 
opinion, the anxious disposition of our people and of foreign 
nations, would rather increase than decrease. It would be 
thought that the question is so difficult and so critical that 
a foreign minister dared not touch the situation. I speak, 
therefore ; but I speak with reluctance. 

I might confine myself to recalling expressions which I 
made from this same place more than a year ago. The situa- 
tion has changed but little since then. I came across a 
newspaper cutting to-day from the Freisinnige Zeiturig 
[" Freethinking Newspaper"] — a publication which, I be- 
lieve, belongs more to my political friend Deputy Richter 
[the Socialist] than to me [laughter] — which pictured a 
tolerably knotty subject in order thereby to explain some- 
thing more difficult. But I will only make general reference 
to the main points cited there, with the declaration that if 
the situation be altered since then, it is for the better rather 
than for the worse. 

A year ago we were afraid chiefly of a declaration of war 
which might come to us from France. Since then a peace- 
loving President has retired from the government in France, 
and a peace-loving President has succeeded him. It is a 
favorable symptom, that in its election of a new head of the 
State the French Government has not put its hands into 
Pandora's box, but that we may reckon that the peaceable 
policy represented by President Gr6vy will be continued by 
President Carnot. Besides this, we have other changes in the 



BEFOBE THE GERMAN BEICHBTAQ. 138 

French Ministry whose indication for peace is even stronger 
than the change of President, which was connected with other 
reasons. Such members of the ministry as were disposed to 
subordinate the peace of their country and of Europe to their 
personal plans have been pushed out, and others of whom 
we have not this fear have taken their places. I think I am 
also able to state — and I do it with much pleasure, because 
I wish not to rouse public opinion, but to quiet it— that our 
A own attitude towards France appears more peaceful, much 
i less explosive, than it has been for some years. 

The fears which have arisen during this year have been 
directed much more towards Russia than towards France, or, I 
may say, towards the exchange of mutual agitations, threats, 
quarrels, and provocations, which have taken place between 
the Eussian and French press in the course of the summer. 
But I do not believe that the question is altered in Russia 
from what it was a year ago. The "Freethinker" has 
printed prominently, with particularly black type, what I said 
last year : 

" Our friendship with Russia suffered no break during the 
time of our war, and is raised above all doubt to-day. At 
all events, we expect from Russia neither an attack nor an 
unfriendly policy." 

That this was printed in large type was perhaps intended 
to make the attack on it easier [laughter] ; perhaps also 
with the hope that I have arrived at a different opinion in 
the mean time, and am persuaded to-day that my trust in the 
Russian policy of last year was a mistake. That is not the 
case. That which makes it look so lies partly with the Rus- 
sian press, partly in the mobilization of Russian troops. 

Concerning the press, I cannot attach decided importance 



134 SPEECH OF BIISMARGK 

to it. They say that in Russia it is of more signification than 
in France. My opinion is exactly the contrary. In France 
the press is a power which exerts influence upon the resolu- 
tions of the government; it is not so in Russia, nor can it 
be : in both cases the press is for me but printer's ink upon 
paper, against which we wage no war. There lies no provoca- 
tion for us in it. Only one man stands behind every article 
in the press, — he who has guided the pen that sends each 
article into the world. Even in a Russian paper — we assume 
it to be an independent Russian paper — that is supported with 
French secret funds, it is all the same. The pen which writes 
therein an article unfriendly to Germany is supported by 
no one but him who has guided it with his hand — by no one 
but him who has achieved this lucubration in his study, and 
by the censor, which a Russian newspaper is bound to have ; 
i.e., one of the more or less high officials in current politics, 
who gives his protection only to this same Russian paper. 
Both writer and censor have as little influence contrary to 
the authority of His Majesty the Czar of Russia as the 
weight of a feather. 

In Russia the press has not the same influence upon public 
opinion as in France, and at the most is its barometer, tol- 
erated according to the standard of Russian press laws, but 
without in any way attracting the attention of the Russian 
Government, or of His Majesty the Czar of Russia. As 
against the opinion of the Russian press, I had the immediate 
testimony of the Emperor Alexander himself. When, after 
the lapse of several years, I had the honor of being again re- 
ceived in audience by the Czar a few months ago, I again 
convinced myself that the Emperor of Russia entertains no 
warlike tendency toward us, has no intention either to invade 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 135 

us, or to wage any aggressive war. I do not believe the 
Russian press ; but I do believe the word of the Emperor 
Alexander, and absolutely trust it. If both lie on the scales 
before me, the testimony of the Russian press, with its 
hatred towards Germany, flies up in the air like a feather, 
while the personal testimony of the Emperor Alexander has 
great weight for me. Therefore I say, the press does not 
cause me to think that our relations with Russia to-day are 
worse than they were a year ago. 

I come to the other question — that of the mobilization of 
Russian troops. Such movements have always taken place 
to a large extent ; they have taken the present imaginary 
threatening form especially since 1879— since the end of the 
Turkish war. There may be, indeed, very slightly, an appear- 
ance that the accumulation of Russian troops m the neighbor- 
hood of the German and Austrian boundaries, in districts 
where their maintenance is dearer and more dijficult than in 
the interior of their own country, can only suggest the inten- 
tion of invading and seizing suddenly one of the neighboring 
countries, sans dire : Gare ! *— I cannot find just the right 
German expression. But I do not think that to be the fact. 
For one thing, it is not characteristic of the Russian monarch ; 
it is in contradiction to his utterances, and its object would 
be extraordinarily difficult to understand. Russia can have 
no intention of conquering part of Prussia; nor of Austria 
either, I believe. I think that Russia possesses quite as many 
Polish subjects as it wishes for, and it has no inclination to 
increase their numbers. [Laughter.] 

No reason, no pretext, can be shown why any European 

* "Without saying: On guard!" — an expression of the fen- 
cing-school. 



136 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

sovereign should attack his neighbors quite suddenly. I go 
so far in my belief as to be persuaded that if, through any 
explosive phenomenon in France, upon which no one can 
reckon beforehand, and which the present government in 
France certainly does not expect — if we found ourselves en- 
tangled in a French war through such a phenomenon, Russia 
would not immediately Join it. And, on the other hand, were 
we involved in a war with Russia, we should be quite safe from 
France ; no French Government would be strong enough to 
hinder it, however great its wish to do so. But again, to-day, 
I say that I look for no aggression from Russia, and retract 
nothing which I declared a year ago. 

You will ask : Why, then, the mobilization of troops in this 
expensive manner? WeU, there are questions of which an 
explanation cannot easily be demanded from the foreign 
cabinets which they concern. When explanations are begun 
to be asked about them, ambiguous replies are given, and the 
rejoinder is again ambiguous. It is a dangerous road, which 
I do not care to tread. The mobilization of troops is, accord- 
ing to my judgment, an occurrence for which one nation can- 
not demand a categorical explanation, — or, using a student's 
expression, "cannot take to task for," — but against which 
preparations can be made with reserve and foresight. 

Therefore I can give no authentic reason for the motives 
of these Russian mobilizations. But I, who have been trusted 
with foreign and also with Russian diplomacy for a genera- 
tion — I', as well as any one else, may make my own reflec- 
tions about them ; and they take me so far as to make me 
assume that the Russian Cabinet has the conviction — and it 
will be well founded — that, in the next European crisis which 
may happen, the weight of the Russian voice in the diplomatic 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. . 137 

Areopagus of Europe will carry so much more influence the 
stronger Kussia is on the European boundary, — the farther 
to the west the Kussian troops are situated. Russia would 
be ready just so much more quickly, either as ally or as ad- 
versary, if she keeps her principal troops, or at least a strong 
army, near her western boundaries. 

For a long time this policy has guided the Russian reviews 
of troops. You will remember that even during the Crimean 
war a large army was waiting all the time in the Polish 
kingdom, which, had it been despatched to the Crimea at 
the right moment, would perhaps have given another turn to 
the war. On looking farther back in the past, it will be 
found that in the movement of 1830 Russia was unprepared 
and unfit for attack, because it had no troops in large num- 
bers in the west of its empire. It is therefore unnecessary 
to draw the conclusion that there is an aggressive intention 
toward us because troops are massed in the western prov- 
inces (sapadin Guberni, as the Russians say). I suppose 
that a fresh Eastern crisis is expected at some time or other ; 
in order then to be ready to assert the Russian wishes with 
great weight, one does not need a standing army in Kazan, 
but farther westward. 

But if an Eastern crisis do happen? Yes; we have no 
surety about that. In my opinion we have had four crises 
in this century, deducting the lesser ones, and those which 
did not fully develop themselves : one in the year 1809, which 
ended with the treaty by which Russia ceded the Pruth 
boundary ; then in 1838 ; * in 1854, the Crimean war ; and 
in 1877 1 — in periods of about twenty odd years apart. Why 

* The war between Russia and Turkey, consequent upon the 
Greek Revolution. 

f The Russo-Turkish Balkan war. 



138 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

should the next crisis occur so much sooner, rather Mian ^fter 
the same space of time, about 1899, some twenty-twc^- years 
later ? I prefer at least to consider it possible that the crisis 
will be deferred, and not made to happen immediately. 

Besides, there are also other European events, which are 
bound to occur in the similar periods. For example, Polish 
insurrections. In former times we looked for one every 
eighteen to twenty years. Perhaps the desire to prevent them 
is one reason why Eussia wishes to be so strong in Poland. 
Likewise, changes of government in France — they also occur 
every eighteen or twenty years ; and no one can deny that a 
change in the French Government may lead to a crisis which 
every interested power must wish to be able to interfere in, 
with full importance — I mean only in a diplomatic manner, 
but with a diplomacy behind which stands an army perfectly 
equipped and ready to fight. 

If Eussia means this, — which I would much sooner con- 
jecture from the standpoint of a purely technical, diplomatic ^ 
judgment, based upon my experience, than that it wishes to 
respond to the comparatively hounding threats and bullyings 
of the newspapers, — there is absolutely no reason why we 
should look gloomily into our future, as we have generally 
done for. the last forty years. The Eastern crisis is the most 
probable one that can happen. When it happens, we are not 
the most interested parties in it. Without approaching too 
nearly into any engagement, we are completely ready to wait 
while the powers most interested in the Mediterranean, in 
the Levant, first fight out their determinations, and then, as 
they prefer, strike or make peace with Eussia. 

We are not interested, in the highest degree, on one side 
or the other of the Eastern question. Every Great Power 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 139 

which seeks to interfere and to influence and to manage 
matter? beyond its sphere of interest in the politics of other 
lands, ventures beyond the province which God has assigned 
to it ; it follows the policy of power, and not the policy of 
interest ; it governs for prestige only. We will not do that ; 
we Will wait, when the Eastern crisis comes, to see what 
situation the more interested Powers will take, before we 
make any movement. 

There is therefore no reason to consider our situation at 
this moment so serious that just the present condition of 
affairs is the occasion on account of which we seek to-day 
to pass a military measure for a powerful increase of the 
army. I wish to keep aside the question of the second con- 
scription of the militia ; in short, to separate the measure 
for the increase of the army with the other, the financial bill, 
entirely from the question of what our present situation is. 
The question is not one of a merely temporary contrivance : 
it is one of a lasting, of a permanent, strengthening of the 
German army. 

That it is not a question of a temporary arrangement, will 
be apparent, I believe, when I beg you to go with me 
through the alarms of war which we have had during the 
last forty years, without having been proved at any time 
to have been in a state of nervous restlessness. In the 
year 1848, when the dikes and sluices, which had till then 
confined the waters in their quiet courses, fell to pieces, we 
had to settle two matters which threatened war : they con- 
cerned Poland and Schleswig-Holstein. The first cry after 
the month of March was : War against Russia for the restora- 
tion of Poland ! Soon after there was exceeding danger of 
becoming entangled in a great European war, through the 



140 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

Schleswig-Holstein question ; and I do not need to recall to 
you how, through the settlement at Olmutz in 1850, a great 
conflagration was prevented. There followed perhaps two 
years of a quieter time, but they were full of uneasiness. It 
was at the time that I was minister in Frankfurt. 

In the year 1853 the beginnings of the Crimean war were 
felt ; this war lasted from 1853 till 1856. During the whole 
time we found ourselves on the very edge — I will not say of 
the precipice, but of the slope, down which we might be 
drawn into the war. I remember that fi'om 1853 till 1856 I 
was obliged to go backward and forward, like a pendulum, 
between Frankfurt and Berlin, because His late Majesty,- by 
the confidence which he placed in me, really used me as 
deputy for his independent poficy when the Western Powers 
were too strong in their persuasions that we, on our part, 
should also declare war against Eussia, and the opposition of 
his minister of foreign affairs was too weak for him. I do 
not know how often it was— the game tired me out — that I 
had to write a more friendly despatch to Eussia for His 
Majesty ; that this despatch was sent off ; that Herr von 
Manteuffel sent in his resignation ; and that, after the dis- 
patch was gone, His Majesty begged me to go on an errand 
to Herr von Manteuffel, in the country or anywhere, and 
induce him to take up his portfolio again. All the time was 
the Prussia of that day on the eve of a great war : it was 
exposed to the enmity of all Europe except Eussia if it de- 
clined to agree with the policy of the Western Powers, and 
otherwise it would have been forced to a breach with Eussia, 
— lasting probably for a long time, because the desertion of 
Prussia would have been felt most painfully by Eussia. Dur- 
ing the Crimean war, then, we were in constant danger of 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 141 

being drawn in. That lasted till 1856, when it was finally 
concluded by the Treaty of Paris, and made for us, by this 
treaty, a kind of Canossa in the Paris Congress. There was 
no necessity for us to play the part of a greater Power than 
we were, and to ratify that treaty. But we bowed and 
scraped in order to be allowed finally to sign. That will not 
happen to us again. [Laughter.] 

That was in 1856. As early as 1857 the Neuehatel ques- 
tion threatened us with war, although it has not become 
very well known. At that time I was sent to Paris, in the 
spring of 1857, by the late King, in order to negotiate with 
the Emperor Napoleon about the marching through of Prus- 
sian troops to an attack upon Switzerland. What that 
meant, had it been agreed to, how it would have become a 
far-spreading war panic, how it would have led us into diffi- 
culties with France as well as with other Great Powers, every 
one will see to whom I tell it. The Emperor Napoleon did 
not feel inclined to consent to it. My negotiations in Paris 
were cut short, because His Majesty the King had in the 
mean time himself arranged the matter in a friendly way 
between Austria and Switzerland.* 

But in that same year there was still danger of war. I 
may say that when I was in Paris on that mission the 
Italian war, which broke out somewhat more than a year 
later, was already in the air, and that we escaped almost by 
a hair's-breadth from being drawn into a great European 
coalition war. We went as far as starting troops : indeed, 
we should undoubtedly have attacked had not the Peace of 



* Neuchatel was detached from Prussia and became a member 
of the Swiss Confederation. 



142 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

Villafranca been concluded — not at all too soon for Austria, 
perhaps just at the right moment for us. "We should have 
had to conduct war under unfavorable conditions ; we should 
have had to turn a campaign which was Italian into a 
Prusso-Freach war, the conclusion, end, and treaty of which 
would not have depended upon us, but upon the friends or 
enemies who stood behind us. And so, with the war-clouds 
leaving the horizon clear for one year, we reached the 
Sixties. 

In 1863 occurred a scarcely less great danger of war, which 
remains comparatively unknown to the great public, and 
which will first make an impression when the secret archives 
of the Cabinet are published. You will remember the Polish 
rebellion, which happened in 1863 ; and I shall never forget 
how one morning, during one of the visits from Sir Andrew 
Buchanan, the English ambassador, and Talleyrand, the 
French representative, which I was wont to have, they made 
hell hot for me about the inexcusable adhesion of the Prus- 
sian policy to that of Kussia, and spoke rather menacingly to 
us. Later at noon of the same day I had the pleasure of 
hearing in the Prussian Landtag the same arguments and 
charges with which the two foreign ministers had attacked 
me in the morning. [Laughter.] I could have stood that 
quietly ; but the Emperor Alexander lost patience, and wished 
to draw the sword against the chicanery of the Western 
powers. You will remember that the French forces were 
then engaged in Mexico with American projects, so that 
France could not put forth its whole power. The Tzar of 
Russia would not any longer submit to the Polish intrigues 
carried on by the other powers, and was prepared in alliance 
with us to resist events and strike. You will remember that 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 143 

at that time Prussia internally was in a difficult position — 
that in Germany minds were already fermenting, and Frank- 
furt's assembly of princes was in preparation. It must be 
acknowledged that there existed a great temptation for my 
gracious master to settle this difficult internal question by 
entering upon a warlike undertaking in great style ; and 
doubtless there would have been war by Prussia and Russia 
in alliance against those who supported the Polish rebellion 
against us, had not His Majesty been held back by a dread of 
solving internal difficulties, Prussian as well as German, with 
outside help [" Bravo ! "] ; and we declined, — silently, without 
asserting the reasons for our proceedings beyond the un- 
friendly projects of other German Governments toward us. 
The death of the King of Denmark soon afterward turned all 
interested persons to other thoughts. But it required only a 
"Yes" instead of a " No " at Gastein from His Majesty, and 
a great war, the coalition war, would have happened in 1863. 
Any other but a German minister would probably, as oppor- 
tunist, have been persuaded by all considerations of utili- 
tarianism, in order to solve our internal difficulties. Among 
our own people, as well as among foreigners, there was 
scarcely a right idea of the extent to which the will of the 
nation and a faithful conscientiousness [" Bravo !" from the 
Eight] guided monarch and minister in the government of 
the German country. [" Bravo ! " from all sides.] 

The year 1864— we were just speaking of 1863 — brought 
fresh and most alarming fears of war. From the moment 
our troops crossed the Eider I was waiting each week for the 
interference of the European convention of seniors [laughter] 
in the Danish affair, and you will admit that it was in the 
highest degree possible. Even at that time we could perceive 



144 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

that if Austria and Germany were united, althougli the then 
existing German Confederation did not by any means have 
the same military signification which the same countries have 
to-day, they could not have been so easily attacked by Europe. 
["Bravo!"] That was manifest even then; but the fear of 
war remained the same. 

In 1865 the front changed, and preparations for the w^ar 
of 1866 were then begun. I remember only one council of 
Prussian ministers which took place in 1865, after the occupa- 
tion of Gueldres, which was afterwards vacated through the 
Treaty of Gastein. But in the year 1866 war fully broke out, 
and there was the greatest danger — which we prevented only 
through the most prudent use of circumstances— that out of 
this duel between Prussia and Austria a vast European coali- 
tion war might arise, in which the very question of existence 
would depend on brain and brawn. 

That was 1866, and in 1867 the Luxembourg question fol- 
lowed. A somewhat firmer answer was then required from us 
— which perhaps we could have given, had we then been 
strong enough to have foreseen a good result with safety in 
bringing about the great French war at that time. 

From thence onward, in 1868, 1869, till 1870, we were con- 
tinuously in fear of war, while abiding by treaties which Herr 
von Beust made at the time in Salzburg and other places 
between France, Italy, and Austria, and about which care 
was taken that they should be performed at our cost. Appre- 
hension before the [French] war was so great, that I as Prime 
Minister received many deputations from trading and industrial 
bodies, who said to me : " This indecision is quite unbearable ; 
go to war rather : rather war than longer worry with this 
depression in all trades." We waited quietly till we were 



BEFORE TEE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 145 

attacked; and I believe we did well so to contain ourselves 
that we remained the aggressed and not the aggressors. 

Now, since that great war of 1870 was fought, I ask you, 
Has there been any year without the fear of war? At the 
beginning of the Seventies — even as we came home from 
France — it was asked : " "When will the next war be ? When 
will the Revanche be fought ? At latest in five years ? " It 
was said to us then : ' ' The question whether we are to have 
this war, and with what result " — it was one of the Hundred, 
who upbraided me with it in the Reichstag, — " depends nowa- 
days only on Russia ; Russia alone has the sword in the 
hand. " I shall probably return to this question later on. 

In the mean time I wish to go on through the forty years' 
picture, and mention that again in 1876 a war-storm 
gathered : in 1877 the Balkan war would have led to a con- 
flagration through the whole of Europe, and was prevented 
only by the Congress held in Berlin ; and quite suddenly 
after the Congress a new danger was opened up to us in the 
East, because Russia had taken amiss our behavior at the 
Congress. Perhaps I will come back again to that also, if 
my strength will allow me. 

Then there followed a certain reaction in the intimate re- 
lationship of the three Emperors, which for some time had 
permitted us to look into the future with more quietude ; yet 
on the first symptoms of uncertainty in the relations between 
the three Emperors, or from the expiration of the treaties 
which they had made with each other, public opinion became 
nervous again. However, the overwrought excitement with 
which we struggle to-day, and have struggled during late 
years, but especially to-day, I hold to be particularly baseless. 

Yet though I consider this nervousness to-day to be with- 



146 aPEECH OF BISMARCK 

out reason, I am far from drawing the conclusion from that 
fact that we do not need to strengthen our forces for fighting. 
On the contrary. It is for this that I have unrolled this forty 
years' tableau,— perhaps not to your amusement, — and I beg 
pardon for it ; but had I omitted a year from that which 
you yourselves have all so direfully experienced, there would 
have been no idea that the state of anxiety before great wars, 
before further complications the different entanglements of 
which no one can judge beforehand, had been so prevalent 
among us. But now we must be prepared for it, once for 
all. Independently of the present situation, we must be so 
strong, that with the consciousness of a great nation, which 
is strong enough under any circumstances to hold its fortune 
in its own hand against every coalition ["Bravo!"]; with 
the confidence in itself and in God, which brings its own 
power ; with the righteousness of our cause, which the care- 
fulness of the government will endeavor to keep on the side 
of Germany — we shall be able to look forward to every possi- 
bility, and to look forward with peace. [" Bravo ! "] 

The long and the short of it is, that we must be as strong as 
we possibly can in these days, and we have the capability of 
being stronger than any other nation of equal population in 
the world ! [" Bravo ! "] — I will come back again to that,— and 
it would be a crime if we did not use that capability. If we 
do not want our soldiers, we do not need to call them out. 
It only depends upon the not very important question of 
money — not very important, though I mention it by the way. 
I have no inclination to enter upon military or financial 
figures, but during the last few years France has invested 
three thousand millions in the improvement of her forces, 
while we have hardly spent fifteen hundred millions, including 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REIGH8TAG. 147 

that which we now ask from you. [" Hear ! hear ! " from the 
Right.] However, I will leave this to the Ministers of War and 
of the Finance Department to put forward. 

When I say we must be continually trying to be ready for 
all eventualities, I advance with that the claim that we must 
make still greater exertions than other powers for the same 
ends, on account of our geographical situation. We lie in 
the middle of Europe. We have at least three fronts open 
to attack. France has only her eastern boundary, Russia 
only her western side, on which they can be attacked. We 
are, besides, more exposed than any other people through our 
geographical situation to the danger of coalition and through 
the perhaps decreasing lack of cohesion, which the German 
nation has had up till now, in comparison with others. God 
has placed us in a situation in which we can be hindered by 
our neighbors from falling anyhow into slothfulness or dream- 
ing. He has placed on one side of us the French— a most 
warlike and restless nation ; and he has allowed the fighting 
tendencies of Russia, which did not exist to any extent in 
the earlier part of the century, to become great. So in a 
certain measure we get spurs from both sides, and are forced 
into a struggle which perhaps we would not otherwise make. 
The pikes in the European carp pond prevent ^'s from be- 
coming carp [laughter], because they let us feel their stings 
in both our sides. They force us to a struggle which prob- 
ably we should not engage in of our own will ; they also force 
us to a cohesion among us Germans which is opposed to our 
innermost nature [laughter] : otherwise we would rather 
struggle with each other. But the Franco- Russian press 
between which we have been taken compels us to hold to- 
gether, and will materially increase our capability for cohesion 



148 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

through compression, till we reach the condition of indivisi- 
bility which is peculiar to almost all other nations, but which 
has failed us till now. [" Bravo ! "] And we must respond 
to this dispensation of Providence by making ourselves so 
strong that the pike can do no more to us than wake us up. 
[Laughter.] 

Years ago we had the Holy Alliance. I remember an old 
American song which I learnt from my deceased friend 
Motley ; it begins : 

" In good old colonial time, 
When we lived under a king." 

Now those days of the Alliance were patriarchal times, when 
we had a number of provinces on which we could depend, 
and a number of dikes which protected us from the wild 
European floods. There was the German Confederation ; and 
the true beginning and continuation and consummation of 
the German Confederation, for whose use it was formed, was 
the Holy Alliance. We depended on Russia and Austria, and 
in all circumstances we were safe. We dwelt in a becoming 
shyness, on account of which we never ventured an opinion 
until the others had spoken. [Laughter.] That is all lost 
to us ["Very good!" from the Right]; we must now help 
ourselves. The Holy Alliance suffered shipwreck in the 
Crimean war — not through our fault. The German Con- 
federation was destroyed through us, because the existence 
which it created for us could not be borne long either by us 
or by the German people. Both have passed out of the world. 
After the dissolution of the German Confederacy, at the end 
of the war of 1866, Prussia, or the North Germany of that 
time, would have been isolated had we been forced to count 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 149 

upon the fact that no one from any side would forgive us 
the new issues, the important advances which we had ob- 
tained by great efforts. Other powers never love to see the 
success of their neighbors. 

But our relations with Russia were not disturbed through 
the affair of 1866. In that year the remembrance of Count 
Buol's policy, of Austria's policy during the Crimean war, was 
still too fresh in Russia to allow the thought to arise there of 
backing the Austrian monarchy against Prussian attack, of 
renewing the campaign which the Emperor Nicholas had con- 
ducted in 1849 on behalf of Austria, — I beg to be excused if 
I sit down for a moment ; I cannot stand any longer ; — there- 
fore there is always for us a most natural affinity toward 
Russia, which, anticipated in the last century, has taken an 
acknowledged origin in the policy of the Emperor Alexander 
I. in this century. Indeed, Prussia owed him thanks. In 
1813 he could just as well have turned round on the Polish 
frontiers and have concluded peace ; later on he could have 
caused Prussia to fall. In fact, for the restoration to the old 
footing we really had to thank the good wishes of the Czar 
Alexander I., or, if you will be sceptical, say the good wishes 
of the Russian policy, for the way it used Prussia. 

This gratitude has governed the reign of Frederick William 
III. The balance which was due to Russia on the Prussian 
account has been used up in the friendship — I may almost 
say in the service — which Prussia rendered during the whole 
reign of the Czar Nicholas ; and I can say that it was settled 
at Olmtitz.* At Olmiitz the Czar Nicholas did not take the 

* At the conference between Austria, Prussia, and Russia for 
settling German discussions consequent upon the revolutionary 
movement of 1848. 



150 ' SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

side of Prussia, did not once protect us from unfortunate 
experiences, from some humiliations ; for, taken on the whole, 
the Czar Nicholas had a stronger predilection for Austria than 
for Prussia ; the thought that we owed any thanks whatever 
to Russia during his reign is an historical legend. 

But so long as the Czar Nicholas lived, we on our side did 
not break the tradition with Eussia ; during the Crimean 
war, as I have already related to you, we held fast to the 
Russian side at considerable hazard and under threats. His 
Majesty the late King had no inclination to play — what 
then, as I believe, would have been possible — a decided role 
in the war with a strong army. We had concluded treaties 
by which we were bound at a certain time to bring forward 
100,000 men on the field. I proposed to His Majesty to bring 
forward, not 100,000, but 200,000, and to mount them, so that 
we could use them right and left ; so that with His Majesty 
would have lain the final decision of the war. However, the 
late king was not inclined to warlike undertakings, and the 
people can only be grateful to him for it. I was younger and 
less experienced than I am to-day. However, we never bore 
rancor for Olmutz during the Crimean war : we came out of 
it as Russia's friend ; and during the time that I was ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg I was able to enjoy the fruit of this 
friendship in a very welcome reception at court and in 
society. Our partisanship for Austria during the Italian war 
did not meet with the approval of the Russian Cabinet of that 
day, but it had no subsequent disadvantageous effect. Our 
war of 1866 [with Austria] was looked upon rather with a 
certain satisfaction ; Russia did not grudge Austria that, at 
that time. In 1870, during our French war, we had at least 
the satisfaction, coincidently with our defense and victo- 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 151 

rious advance, of being able to render a service to our Rus- 
sian friend in the Black Sea. In no way could the Black Sea 
have been possibly opened by the contracting parties if the 
German troops had not stood victoriously in the neighbor- 
hood of Paris. For example, had the Germans been de- 
feated, I believe the result of the London agreement would 
not have been given so easily in Russia's favor. From the 
war of 1870, therefore, no uneasiness remained between us 
and Russia. 

I quote these facts in order to demonstrate to you the 
origin of the treaty [of 1879] with Austria, which was pub- 
lished only a few days ago, and to vindicate the policy of His 
Majesty from the reproach that it has enlarged the possibilities 
of war for the German Empire through that which concerns 
Austria and does not affect Germany. I intend, therefore, 
to describe to you how it has happened that the traditional 
relations between us and Russia, which I have always specially 
fostered, have taken such a form that we have been induced 
to publish the Austrian treaty made public the day before 
yesterday. 

The earlier years after the French war were passed in the 
best understanding. In 1875 an inclination of my Russian 
colleague. Count Gortschakoff, came to light, of taking the 
trouble to win for himself more popularity with France than 
with us, and by using certain favorable contemporary coin- 
cidences to that end, in order to make the world believe by a 
telegram, prepared for the purpose, — as if in 1875 we had 
any such remote intention, — that we had intended to attack 
France, and it was through the wisdom of Prince Gortschakoff 
that France had been saved from this danger. That was the 
first estrangement that arose between us, and which led me to 



152 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

a lively exchange of sentiments with my former friend and 
later colleague. 

At the same time we always held strongly to the question 
of firmly maintaining peace between the three emperors, of 
continuing the relations which first originated during the 
visits of the Emperors of Russia and of Austria in 1873 here 
in Berlin, and during the following return visits. We also 
succeeded in it. In 1876, just before the Turkish war, we 
declined certain persuasions to an option between Eussia and 
Austria, which were brought before us. I do not consider it 
necessary to go through the details ; they were known at the 
time. The effect of our refusal was, that Russia turned 
directly to Vienna, and a treaty— I believe it was in January, 
1877 — was concluded between Austria and Russia which 
affected the eventualities of an Eastern crisis, and for which, 
in such a case as the occupation of Bosnia, and so on, Austria 
provided. 

Then came the [Russo- Turkish Balkan] war, and we were 
quite contented when the storm passed over even farther 
south than it was originally inclined to. The end of the 
war was definitely settled here in Berlin by the Congress, 
after having been prepared by the Peace of San Stefano. 
According to my conviction, the Peace of San Stefano was not 
much more hazardous for the anti-Russian powers, and not 
much more beneficial to Russia, than the later treaty of the 
Congress has been. One may say the Peace of San Stefano 
leappeared subsequently of its own accord, because little East 
Koumelia, including some 800,000 souls altogether, I believe, 
arbitrarily took upon itself the restitution ot the — not quite 
— of the old San Stefano limits, and annexed itself to 
Bulgaria. Therefore the adjustment of the average, which 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 158 

the Congress established on the basis of San Stefano, was 
not so very bad. Whether or not the settlement of San Ste- 
fano were exactly a masterpiece of diplomacy, I leave un- 
decided. 

We had as little inclination to mix ourselves then in the 
Eastern question as we have to-day. I was dangerously ill in 
Friedrichsruhe, when the request was oflScially communicated 
to me on the part of Russia to convene a Congress of the 
Great Powers at Berlin for the definite settlement of the war. 
I had next to no inclination for it, partly because I was 
physically unable, but also because I had no desire to entangle 
ourselves so far in the matter as the role of President of 
a Congress necessarily involves. When, notwithstanding, I 
finally complied, it was partly owing to the German sense 
of duty toward the interests of peace, but specially owing 
to the grateful remembrance of the favor of the Czar 
Alexander II. toward me which I have always had, and 
which caused me to fulfill this wish. I declared myself 
ready, if we succeeded in obtaining the consent of England 
and of Austria. Russia undertook to get England's consent, 
I took upon myself to promise it for Vienna ; we succeeded, 
and the Congress was held. 

During the Congress, I may truly say, I fulfilled my role 
so successfully, as far as I could in every way without hurt- 
ing the interests of our own country or of our friends, that I 
might have been the fourth Russian plenipotentiary at this 
Congress [laughter] ; indeed, I may almost say, the third ; 
for I can scarcely acknowledge Prince Gortschakoff as a pleni- 
potentiary of Russian policy, represented as it was by the real 
ambassador. Count Shouvaloff. [Laughter.] 

During the whole of the business of the Congress no Rus- 



154 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

sian wish came to my knowledge which I did not recommend ; 
yea, which I did not carry through. In consequence of the 
confidence which the lamented Lord Beaconsfield placed in 
me, in the most diflScult, most critical moment of the Con- 
gress, I appeared at his sick bed in the middle of the night, 
and, at the moment when the Congress stood near a rupture, 
obtained his signature in bed. In fact I so acted at the Con- 
gress, that when it was ended I thought, " I have long pos- 
sessed the highest Russian Order in precious stones, otherwise 
I should get it now." [Laughter.] In short, I had the feeling 
that I had performed such a service for a foreign power as 
is seldom permitted the minister of another country. 

What, then, must have been my surprise and my amazement 
as gradually a kind of press campaign commenced in St. 
Petersburg, during which the German policy was attacked, 
and I personally, through my intentions, was suspected ! 
These attacks increased during the following year, till in 1879 
there were made strong claims that we should exercise upon 
Austria a pressure in matters where we could not attack the 
just rights of that country. I could not lend my hand to that ; 
for had we estranged Austria from us, it would have hap- 
pened, if we did not wish to be quite isolated in Europe, that 
we should have been obliged to depend on Russia. Would 
such a dependence have been endurable ? In former years I 
should have believed it to be have been, for I should have 
said to myself, "We have no mutual interests to quarrel 
about ; there is no reason whatever why Russia should give 
up our friendship." At least, I would not have directly 
contradicted my Russian colleague, who had explained it all 
to me. The occurrence concerning the Congress undeceived 
me. It showed me that even a full surrender of our policy 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 155 

(for a certain time) in favor of the Russian policy would not 
protect us from falling into war with Russia against our 
will and our endeavors. This fight over instructions which 
we gave, or did not give, to our representatives at the nego- 
tiations in the south amounted to threats, to real threats oi 
war, from the quarter least justified. 

That is the origin of our treaty with Austria. We were 
compelled through these threats to that option which I 
avoided ten years ago, of choosing between those two, who 
up till then had been our friends. At that time, in Gastein 
and Vienna, I arranged the treaty which was published 
the day before yesterday, and which to-day still holds good 
between us. 

Its publication, as I saw yesterday and the day before, 
is wrongly understood by the newspapers : they seek to find in 
it an ultimatum, a warning, a threat. That signifies so much 
the less, as the text of the treaty has long been known to 
the Russian Cabinet. Before November of last year we con- 
sidered it due to the candor of a loyal monarch, such as the 
Czar of Russia is, as early as possible to leave him no douht 
how matters lay. I do not consider it possible not to have 
concluded this treaty ; if we had not arranged it then, we 
must have done so to-day. It has exactly the chief attribute 
of an international treaty ; namely, it is the expression of the 
permanent interests of both sides — as much of the Austrian 
side as of ours. ["Bravo!"] No Great Power is obliged to 
keep to the text of any treaty in opposition to the interests of 
its own people ; it is at last compelled to declare quite openly, 
"Times have altered ; I cannot hold to this any longer." It 
must justify its course as well as possible with its own people, 
and with those who have concluded the treaty. It is no credit 



156 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

to any Great Power to lead its own people into trouble because 
it keeps to the letter of one condition or another of a signed 
agreement. That will not be the case, anyway, with these 
treaties. They are just ; — not only the treaty which we have 
concluded with Austria, but similar treaties which exist be- 
tween us and other governments ["Hear! hear!" from the 
Right] — especially the treaties we have made with Italy : they 
are only the expression of mutual interest in the struggles 
and risks which nations have to run. Italy as well as our- 
selves has been in the situation of having to fight Austria 
for the right of consolidating itself nationally. Both live 
now at peace with Austria, and in common with Austria have 
the same struggles and dangers, which alike threaten peace, 
as precious to the one as to the other ; alike have to pro- 
tect internal developments to which they would fain devote 
themselves, and to guard themselves from attacks. This en- 
deavor, and with it the mutual confidence that the treaties 
will be kept, and that with these treaties neither party is 
bound to the other unless it is compatible with its own in- 
terests — all this makes these treaties firm, strong, and last- 
ing. ["Bravo!"] 

How much our treaty with Austria is the expression of 
the interests of both sides was shown at Nicolsburg, and in 
1870. Even in the transactions at Nicolsburg we were under 
the impression that we could not do without Austria — and 
a strong, courageous Austria, which will endure in Europe. 
In 1870, when war broke out between us and France, the 
temptation was indeed extraordinarily strong for her suscept- 
ible feelings to use the opportunity, and take revenge on the 
enemy of 1866 ; but the thoughtful and prudent policy of 
the Austrian Cabinet was obliged to ask itself: "What 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 157 

would be the consequences ? In what situation should we find 
ourselves if we now ally ourselves to the French in order to 
conquer Prussia, — not to say Germany ? " What would have 
been the consequences if France with Austria's help had 
conquered us ? Austria could have had by such a policy 
scarcely any other object than again taking its early position 
in Germany — for that was really the only reason it gave in 
1866 ; there were no other reasons, those relating to pecuniary 
matters being quite unimportant. Now, what would the 
situation of Austria in the German Confederation as presi- 
dential power have been like, if it had been obliged to say 
that, in agreement with France, it had taken the left bank 
of the Khine from Germany ; that it had again reduced the 
South German States to a Rhenish confederation dependent 
on France ; and that it had irrevocably condemned Prussia 
to look for Russia's support and to dependence on Russia's 
future policy ? Such a situation was unacceptable to the 
Austrian statesmen, who were not entirely blinded by rage 
and revenge. 

But that is also the case with us in Germany. If you im- 
agine Austria taken off the map of Europe, you will find that 
we, with Italy, are isolated between Russia and France — be- 
tween the two strongest military powers next to Germany. 
We should either be one nation against two, or, very probably, 
changing our dependence from one to the other. It cannot 
be so. One cannot imagine Austria out of the way ; such an 
empire as Austria will not disappear. But such a nation as 
Austria will be estranged if left in the lurch, as was done at 
the Treaty of Villafranca, and will be inclined to offer its 
hand to those who, on their side, have been the antagonists 
of an unreliable friend. 



158 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

In short, if we would guard against the isolation which, in 
the defenseless situation of Germany is particularly danger- 
ous, we must have a sure friend. We have, by virtue of 
similarity of interests, by virtue of this treaty which has 
been laid before you, two true friends — true, not out of love 
to each other ; for nations wage war on each other from 
hatred : it has never yet happened that out of love one 
country has sacrificed itself for another. [Laughter.] Hatred 
does not always lead to war. If that were the case, France 
would be engaged in continuous wars, not only with us, but 
also with England and Italy ; for it hates all its neighbors. 
[Applause and consent.] I do not believe that the dislike 
now expressed toward us in Kussia is more than factitiously 
padded out, or will be of long duration. Not only do 
opinions and friendships unite us with our allies of the 
treaty, but the most weighty interests of the European 
balance of power, and of our own future. 

Therefore I think you will approve the policy of His 
Majesty the Emperor, which has led to the conclusion of 
this treaty [" Bravo ! "], even should the possibility of war 
be strengthened thereby. 

It is quite true that the alliance we have made will be 
extraordinarily strengthened on one side by the passing of 
this bill, because the proposed increase in one department will 
exceedingly strengthen the German Empire itself. 

The bill asks for an increase of armed troops, — a possible 
increase, which unless needed we shall not want to call out : 
it can remain at home. But if we have it at our disposi- 
tion, if we have arms for it,— (and that is thoroughly neces- 
sary : I remember the carbine supplied by England to our 
Landwehr in 1813, with which I practised as a sportsman— 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICH8TAQ. 169 

that was no weapon for war. We cannot indeed procure 
weapons on the instant. But,) if we have arms for the pur- 
pose, this new law becomes a reinforcement for the security 
of peace, and a corroboration of the alliance for peace, which 
is as strong as if a fourth Great Power had joined the alli- 
ance with an army of 700,000 men — the highest number there 
ever was. [" Bravo ! "] 

I believe, also, that this large increase of strength will have 
a soothing effect upon our own people, and will abate in some 
measure the nervousness of public opinion, of the Bourse, 
and of the press. I hope they will feel comfort [laughter], 
if they make it clear to themselves that after this reinforce- 
ment, and from the moment it is signed and published, the 
soldiers are there. But there is a great want of arms ; we 
must provide better ones, for if we would build up an army 
of " Triarians," * of the best material that we have among 
our people, of men over thirty years of age, generally fathers 
of families, we must have the best kind of weapons for them 
that can be found anywhere. [" Bravo ! "] We must not send 
them into battle with those which we do not consider good 
enough for our young recruits of the line. [" Very good ! "] 
The capable men, the heads of households, these giants who 
still remind us of the time when they had possession of the 
bridge of Versailles, must certainly have the best weapon on 
their shoulders, the most complete arm, the most comfortable 
dress for protection against storms and all extreme events. 
[Repeated " Bravo ! "] We dare not economize in this. And 
I hope it will quiet our fellow-countrymen if they now think 



* Triarii : veteran Roman soldiers, who formed the third rank 
from the front when in order of battle. 



160 SPEECH OF BI8MARGK 

it really likely to be the case (which I do not believe) that we 
should be attacked on both sides at one time. As I explained 
to you in the history of the forty years, it is a possibility, for 
all imaginable coalitions may occur. If it should happen, we 
could place a million good soldiers on the defensive on our 
borders.. At the same time we should be able to hold in 
reserve half a million or more, almost another million, in the 
background, and put them forward according to need. 

It has been said to me, "This will only have the effect of 
causing the others to increase their armies." But they cannot 
do that. ["Bravo!" — Laughter.] They have long reached 
their total amount. We lowered the age in 1867, because we 
believed that, having the German Confederacy, we could make 
matters easier for ourselves, and could let men over thirty-two 
be free. In consequence, our neighbors adopted a longer 
time for service, some a twenty-years period, — when the 
Minister of War speaks he will be able to explain it better to 
you ;— in number they are quite as many as we are, but they 
cannot approach us for quality. [" Quite right ! "] Courage is 
the same in all civilized nations ; the Russian, the Frenchman, 
fights just as bravely as the German ; but our people — our 
700,000 men — have served in war, are well-tried soldiers, who 
have not yet forgotten their profession. And we have that 
in which no other people in the world can equal us — we have 
the material for officers and under-officers to command this 
immense army. [" Bravo ! "] No other nation can approach us 
there. To this end is directed the whole particular course of 
the education of the people in Germany ; and it is done in no 
other country. The class of education which is necessary in 
order to fit an officer and a sub-officer to command, according 
to the claims which the soldier makes on him, is very much 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REIGHSTAQ. 161 

higher here than in any other country. We have not only 
more materials for officers and under-officers than any other 
country, but we have a corps of actual officers which no other 
nation in the world can equal. [" Bravo ! "J In this, and also 
in the excellence of our corps of non-commissioned officers, 
who really are embryo officers, lies our superiority. The 
course of education which an officer pursues not only makes 
very urgent demands on his character, requiring self-denial 
of luxuries and society, but makes the performance of social 
tasks exceedingly difficult ; the performance of which is 
necessary, nevertheless, in order to encourage the fellowship 
which— God be thanked— exists among us in the highest 
degree, and which excites emulation between men and officers 
without in any way injuring discipline. 

No others can equal us in the relationship which exists in 
the German army between officers and men, especially during 
the time of war, with but few unfortunate exceptions — Ex- 
ceptio firmat regulam. On the whole we can say : No Ger- 
man officer leaves his soldiers in the lurch under fire, but 
fetches him out, even with danger to his own life ; and, vice 
versa, no German soldier forsakes his officer : this we know 
by experience. ["Bravo ! "J 

If other armies with the same number of troops that we 
intend to have forthwith, will have officers and under-officers, 
they will be compelled, under the circumstances, to educate 
them ; for a campaign led by a narrow mind * will not succeed 
[laughter], and still less will be performed the difficult duties 
which the officer has toward his men, in order to keep their 

* Bismarck plays on the word " Tlwr," meaning a man who is 
almost a fool, and " Thor," a narrow door, through which no 
army could pass to battle. 



162 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

love and esteem. The kind of education which is necessary 
for that, and the executive ability which among us is gen- 
erally shown by the officer in comradeship and a sense of 
honor, can be shown by no class of officers abroad, for no 
regulations or issued directions will impress it on them. 
Therein we are superior to every nation, and on that account 
they are not able to imitate us. [ " Bravo ! "] So I am not 
anxious about it. 

But, besides this, there is another advantage in your ac- 
ceptance of this measure : the very strength for which we 
strive shows that we are inclined to peace. That sounds 
paradoxical, but it is true. 

With such a powerful machine as we wish to make the Ger- 
man army, no one would undertake to attack us. If I were to 
stand here before you to-day and say to you, — supposing the 
conditions were different from what they are, according to my 
conviction, — "We are urgently threatened by France and 
Russia ; we can see that we shall be attacked by them ; 
according to my opinions as a diplomatist and as a military 
man, it will be more advantageous to us if we strike the first 
blow than if we act on the defensive, — that we now attack at 
once, — it will be more conducive to our success to wage an 
aggressive war, and I therefore beg the Eeichstag for a loan of 
a milliard or of half a milliard in order to undertake imme- 
diate war against both our neighbors " — indeed, gentlemen, I 
do not know if you would have confidence enough in me 
to consent to that. I hope not. [Laughter.] 

But if you had, it would not satisfy me. If we in Ger- 
many would wage a war with the full force of our national 
power, it must be a war in which all join, all bring sacri- 
fices to it, — a war in which the whole nation must agree ; it 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 163 

must be a war of the people ; it must be a war conducted 
with the enthusiasm of 1870, when we were wickedly 
attacked. I can still remember the shrill, joyful shouts 
at the Cologne railway -station : it was the same from 
Berlin to Cologne ; it was the same here in Berlin. The 
waves of public opinion carried us into the war whether we 
would or no. It must be so if the power of a people like ours 
is to arrive at its full worth. But it would be very difficult 
to make the provinces understand now, to make the Confed- 
erate States and their populations understand, that war is 
inevitable, and must be. It would be asked: "Indeed, are 
you so sure about it ? "Who knows ? " In short, when we 
really came to begin to fight, the whole weight of prejudices 
and impossibilities would be much heavier than the material 
opposition with which we should be met by the enemy whom 
we attacked. "Holy Kussia" would be irritated at the 
onset. France would bristle with arms as far as the Pyre- 
nees. It would be the same everywhere. A war in which 
we were not backed by the consent of our people might be 
carried on, when at last the proper authorities considered it 
necessary to declare it ; it would be carried on sharply, and 
perhaps successfully, after fire and blood had once been seen : 
but it would not be radically fought, with that incentive and 
fire behind it which there would be in a war in which we had 
been attacked. Then all Germany, from Memel to the Lake 
of Constance, would explode like a powder-mine, would bristle 
with arms, and no enemy would dare to venture to cope with 
the furor Teutonicus which would show itself at such an at- 
tack. ["Bravo!"] 

If we are superior to our future opponents, as many mili- 
tary opinions besides our own acknowledge, we dare not let 



164 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

that superiority pass away from us. Our military critics 
believe it ; naturally every soldier thinks it, — he would almost 
cease to be of service if he did not wish for war, and believe 
he would be successful in it. If our rivals suppose it is fear 
of the issue which inclines us to peace, they err greatly. 
["Quite right !"] We trust as firmly to success in righteous 
matters as any lieutenant in a foreign garrison can trust to 
his third glass of champagne [laughter] — and perhaps on 
surer grounds. Therefore it is not fear which inclines us to 
peace, but an accurate consciousness of our strength, the knowl- 
edge that should we be attacked at an unfavorable moment 
we are strong enough to resist it, and the consciousness that 
we can still leave it to God's providence to remove the neces- 
sity for war in the mean time. 

Therefore we are not inclined for any kind of aggressive 
war, and if it can only originate by an attack from us it will 
not occur. Fire must be kindled by some one ; we will not 
kindle it. ["Bravo ! "] Neither consciousness of our strength, 
as I have just described it, nor trust in our treaties, will pre- 
vent us from continuing our effort to preserve peace gener- 
ally, with the same vigor as hitherto. We will allow ourselves 
to be led by no ill-temper, and we will be governed by no 
dislike. It is indeed true that the threats and insults, the 
challenges, which have been addressed to us, have excited an 
intense and natural animosity on our side ["Very true !"J — a 
difficult thing to do with Germans, for, as a nation, they are 
more impervious to being disliked than any other people. 
But we are taking pains to soothe these irritations, and we 
would strive for peace, now as ever, with our neighbors, 
but especially with Russia. When I say, "especially with 
Russia," I am of the opinion that France offers us no security 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 165 

for the success of these endeavors, though I will not say that 
it does not try to ; we will seek no quarrel, we will never 
attack France. We have always made very pleasant and 
friendly settlements of the many small incidents which the 
disposition of our neighbor to spy and to corrupt has caused, 
because I should consider it wicked for such fiddle-faddles to 
kindle a great national war, or to make one possible. There 
are cases where, it is said, the most reasonable give way. 
[Laughter. — " Very good ! "] 

Therefore I name Russia by preference ; and I have the 
same confidence in the result, — about which I spoke a year ago, 
and which this " freethinking " paper has printed in such 
large type, — and that, too, without seeking for it, — or, as a 
German newspaper roughly expresses it, without "cringing" 
to Russia. That time is past ; we no longer sue for love, 
either to France or Russia. ["Very good!" — Repeated 
"Bravo!"] The Russian press, Russian public opinion, has 
shown the door to an old, powerful, and faithful friend ; we 
will not obtrude ourselves. We have sought to win the old 
confidential relationship again, but we will run after no one. 
[Unanimous applause.] That does not disturb us ; on the 
contrary, it is just one spur more why we should observe 
with redoubled exactness the claims of the Treaty which 
Russia has with us. 

Among the clauses of the Treaty are some which are not 
acknowledged by all our friends : I mean, duties are included 
in it which we acquired toward Russia at the Berlin Con- 
gress in regard to Bulgaria, and which stood till 1885 quite 
undisputed. It is no question for me, who helped to prepare 
and signed the decisions of the Congress, because at that 
time we were all of opinion that the preponderating influ- 



166 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

ence of Kussia in Bulgaria should consent that Bulgaria, on 
its side, should give up Eastern Koumelia, thus reducing its 
population of 3,000,000 souls by some 800,000, because it gave 
satisfaction to the districts whose interests were involved. 
In consequence of this decision of the Congress, up to 1885 
Russia appointed as prince a near relative of the Czar's fam- 
ily, of whom no one expected or could expect anything more 
than that he would be a faithful exponent of Russian policy. 
This policy appointed the Minister of War and a great num- 
ber of officers ; in short, it ruled in Bulgaria ; there is no 
doubt about it. The Bulgarians, or some of them, or their 
prince, — I do not know who, — ^were not contented with it. 
There was political stratagem ; a revolt from Russia took 
place. From this has arisen a certain situation, which we 
have no call to remedy with force of arms, and which the 
claims upon us that Russia took home from the Congress can- 
not alter theoretically. Whether, if Russia should assert its 
claims forcibly, other difficulties would arise in conjunction 
therewith, I do not know ; it does not concern us at all. We 
will not support forcible means, nor advise them. I do not 
think there is any inclination toward them, — I am compara- 
tively certain that none exist. But should Russia seek by 
diplomacy, through a suggestion, the interference of the 
Suzerain of Bulgaria, the Sultan, — ^if it try to obtain that, I 
hold it to be the task of a loyal German policy to abide 
clearly by the decision of the Berlin treaty, and by the inter- 
pretation we gave it when it was signed, without any excep- 
tion, and on which I, at least, cannot mistake the opinions of 
the Bulgarians. Bulgaria, the little country lying between the 
Danube and the Balkans, is certainly not an object of sufficient 
size to make it the cause, the reason, why Europe should 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG. 167 

plunge into a war from Moscow to the Pyrenees, and from 
the North Sea to Palermo, the issue of which nobody can fore- 
tell ; at the end it would scarcely be known what the fighting 
had been about. [Laughter.] 

I can therefore declare that the unfriendliness which we 
have experienced from Kussian public opinion, and especially 
from the Russian press, will not prevent us, as soon as Russia 
expresses the wish, from diplomatically supporting the diplo- 
matic steps which Russia may take in order to regain its 
interest in Bulgaria. I say designedly, "as soon as Russia 
expresses the wish." In former times we occasionally took 
the trouble to fulfill Russian wishes after receiving confidential 
intimations ; but we have lived to see that Russian news- 
papers have found themselves immediately obliged to prove 
that those very steps of German policy were most hostile 
toward Russia, and have attacked us because we have been 
beforehand in the performance of Russian wishes. We did 
that at the Congress, but we shall not do it again. If Russia 
officially invites us to support steps for the restoration of the 
measures of Congress, providing for the situation in Bulgaria 
of the Sultan as suzerain, I do not hesitate to advise His 
Majesty to aUow it. The treaties make this demand on our 
loyalty toward a neighbor, with whom, be public opinion 
what it will, we have to maintain a neighborly relationship, 
and defend great and mutual monarchical interests, such as 
the interests of order against all its antagonists in Europe. 
I do not doubt that the Czar of Russia will make war if he 
find that the interests of his great empire of a hundred million 
subjects compel him to. But these interests cannot possibly 
be such as to compel him to wage war against us ; I do not 



168 SPEECH OF BISMARCK 

consider it even probable that such a prescript of interests is 
at all imminent. 

I do not, then, believe in an immediate impending disturb- 
ance of peace,— if I may recapitulate, — and beg that you will 
consider the measure in question quite independently of this 
thought, this apprehension, and regarded only as a full re- 
establishment of the employment of the power which God 
has given the German nation in case of need. Should we not 
need it, then we will not call upon it ; and we will try to 
avoid the necessity of needing it. 

This effort is, to some degree, made more difficult for us 
through threatening newspaper articles from abroad, and I 
wish to direct this warning principally to that country to 
discontinue these threats. They lead to nothing. The threat- 
ening which we get — not from the government, but from the 
press — is really an incredible stupidity [laughter], when it is 
remembered that a great and a proud power, such as the 
German Empire, is thought to be capable of being intimidated 
by a certain threatening formation of printers' ink — by a 
collection of words. ["Bravo!"] That should be discon- 
tinued ; then it would be easier for us to meet both our 
neighbors more pleasantly. Every country is in some way 
eventually responsible for the watch it sets upon its press ; 
the score is presented at any time in the form of the opinion 
of other countries. We can be easily bribed with love and 
kindness — perhaps too easily, — but certainly not with threats. 
["Bravo!"] 

We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world 
[enthusiastic applause] ; and it is the fear of God which 
causes us to love and cherish peace. Let him who breaks it 
in defiance be assured that the war-inspiring love of Father- 



BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAa. 169 

land, which in 1813 called the whole people of a then weak, 
small, and exhausted Prussia around the flag, is to-day the 
common property of the whole German nation. And he who 
would attack the German nation in any way will find it 
armed with unity — every warrior having the firm belief in his 
heart : Qod will be with us ! [Great and continuous ap- 
plause.] 



APPENDIX. 



TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 
HUNGARY. 

[Imperial and State Gazette, 3d February, 1888.] 

The governments of Germany and of the Austria-Hungarian 
Monarchy have resolved upon the publication of their definite 
Treaty of October 7th, 1879, in order to end doubts which have 
been entertained on different sides of their purely defensive in- 
tentions, which are construed into different aims. The allied 
governments are guided in their policy by the endeavor to pre- 
serve peace : and, as much as possible to avert all disturbance of 
the same, they are persuaded that the promulgation of the con- 
tents of their Treaty will remove every doubt thereupon, and 
have therefore determined to publish the same. The text runs 
as follows : — 

Considering that Your Majesties, the German Emperor, King 
of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, do 
conceive it Your undeniable duty as Monarchs to care for the 
safety of Your empires and the peace of Your peoples under all 
conditions ; 

Considering that both Monarchs will be in a condition to per- 
form this duty more easily and more effectively through the firm 
cohesion of both empires, as in former standiog alliances ; 

171 



172 APPENDIX. 



finally, tliat no one can object to an intimate 
relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which, 
however, is well fitted to consolidate European peace, originating 
with the Treaty of Berlin : 

YOUR MAJESTIES, The Empebor of Germany, 
and 
The Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, 
since You solemnly engaged to each other that You would at 
no time impute to the other's purely defensive proceedings an 
aggressive tendency of any kind, have resolved to unite in a treaty 
for peace and for mutual protection. 

To this end have Your Imperial Highnesses appointed as Your 
plenipotentiaries : H. I. M. the German Emperor, the R. H. Am- 
bassador in Extraordinary and Plenipotential General Lieuten- 
ant Prince Henry VII. of Reuss, etc., etc.; H. I. M. the Em- 
peror of Austria, King of Hungary, the R. H. Privy Counselor, 
Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Field-Marshal-Lieutenant 
Gyula Count Andrassy, of Esik-Szent-Kiralfy and Kraszna-Horka, 
etc., — who have convened this day at Vienna, and after exchange 
of good and sufficient credentials have agreed as follows : 

Article I. — Should one of the two Empires be attacked by 
Russia, against the expectations and against the sincere wish of 
both Royal contracting parties, the Royal contracting parties are 
pledged each to assist the other with the whole fighting force of 
their Empires, and, according to their ability to conclude peace 
only mutually and harmoniously. 

Article II. — Should one of the Royal contracting parties be 
attacked by another power, the other Royal contractor hereby 
pledges himself not only not to assist the aggressor of his Royal 
ally, but, at the least, to observe a favorable neutral disposition 
toward his Royal ally. Should, however, in such a case, the ag- 
gressive power be supported by Russia, be it in the form of active 
co-operation, be it through military measures which threaten the 
aggressed, then will hold good in this case Article I, of this 



APPENDIX. 173 



treaty, with, its stipulated pledge of mutual assistance from the 
whole army, immediately in force, and the conduct of the war of 
the Royal contracting parties shall then be mutual till peace is 
unanimously concluded. 

Article III.— In conformity with its peaceful character, and 
in order to avoid every misconstruction, this Treaty shall be held 
secret, and will be communicated to a third Power only with the 
consent of both parties, and according to special agreement. 

Both Royal contracting parties hope that, according to the out- 
spoken opinions of the Czar Alexander at the meeting in Alex- 
androwo, the preparations for war in Russia will not prove really 
threatening for You, and have, on this ground, no occasion for 
any communication. Should, however, this hope prove to be mis- 
taken, contrary to expectation, the two Royal contracting parties 
would acknowledge it a duty of loyalty at least to give notice 
confidentially to the Czar Alexander that You must consider an 
attack on one of You equivalent to an attack on both of You. 

In witness whereof have the ambassadors signed this treaty 
personally and affixed Your seals. 

Given at Vienna, October 7, 1879. 

H. VII. P. REUSS. ANDRASSY. 

[L. s.] [L. s.] 



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